No Morality, No Self : : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / / James Doyle.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017
• VerfasserIn: Doyle, James,
• Place / Publishing House: Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2018]; ©2017
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (224 p.)

Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reco...

Table of Contents

• Frontmatter
• Contents
• Preface
• PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958)
• 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks
• 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism
• 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality
• 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension
• 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality?
• 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy”
• PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975)
• 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference
• 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference?
• 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem
• 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”?
• 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference
• Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism
• APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law
• APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments?
• Notes
• References
• Acknowledgments
• Index