No Morality, No Self : : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / / James Doyle.

Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reco...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017
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Place / Publishing House:Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2018]
©2017
Julkaisuvuosi:2018
Kieli:English
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Ulkoasu:1 online resource (224 p.)
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Other title:Frontmatter --
Contents --
Preface --
PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) --
1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks --
2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism --
3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality --
4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension --
5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? --
6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” --
PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) --
7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference --
8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? --
9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem --
10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? --
11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference --
Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism --
APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law --
APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? --
Notes --
References --
Acknowledgments --
Index
Yhteenveto:Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view.
Aineistotyyppi:Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
ISBN:9780674982819
9783110543315
DOI:10.4159/9780674982819
Pääsy:restricted access
Hierarchical level:Monograph
Statement of Responsibility: James Doyle.