No Morality, No Self : : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / / James Doyle.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017
• VerfasserIn: Doyle, James,
• Place / Publishing House: Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2018]; ©2017
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (224 p.)

Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) -- 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism -- 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality -- 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension -- 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? -- 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” -- PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) -- 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference -- 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? -- 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem -- 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? -- 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference -- Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism -- APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law -- APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index