No Morality, No Self : : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / / James Doyle.
Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reco...
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Place / Publishing House: | Cambridge, MA : : Harvard University Press, , [2018] ©2017 |
Year of Publication: | 2018 |
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Doyle, James, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / James Doyle. Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press, [2018] ©2017 1 online resource (224 p.) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) -- 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism -- 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality -- 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension -- 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? -- 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” -- PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) -- 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference -- 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? -- 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem -- 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? -- 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference -- Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism -- APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law -- APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” and “The First Person” have become touchstones of analytic philosophy but their significance remains controversial or misunderstood. James Doyle offers a fresh interpretation of Anscombe’s theses about ethical reasoning and individual identity that reconciles seemingly incompatible points of view. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 24. Aug 2021) Ethics Philosophy. Self (Philosophy). Skepticism. PHILOSOPHY / Individual Philosophers. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017 9783110543315 https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674982819 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674982819 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674982819.jpg |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Doyle, James, Doyle, James, |
spellingShingle |
Doyle, James, Doyle, James, No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) -- 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism -- 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality -- 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension -- 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? -- 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” -- PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) -- 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference -- 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? -- 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem -- 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? -- 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference -- Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism -- APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law -- APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
author_facet |
Doyle, James, Doyle, James, |
author_variant |
j d jd j d jd |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Doyle, James, |
title |
No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / |
title_sub |
Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / |
title_full |
No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / James Doyle. |
title_fullStr |
No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / James Doyle. |
title_full_unstemmed |
No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / James Doyle. |
title_auth |
No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) -- 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism -- 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality -- 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension -- 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? -- 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” -- PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) -- 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference -- 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? -- 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem -- 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? -- 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference -- Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism -- APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law -- APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
title_new |
No Morality, No Self : |
title_sort |
no morality, no self : anscombe’s radical skepticism / |
publisher |
Harvard University Press, |
publishDate |
2018 |
physical |
1 online resource (224 p.) |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- PART ONE: No Morality: “Modern Moral Philosophy” (1958) -- 1. Virtue Ethics, Eudaimonism, and the Greeks -- 2. The Invention of “ Morality” and the Possibility of Consequentialism -- 3. The Misguided Project of Vindicating Morality -- 4. The Futility of Seeking the Extension of a Word with No Intension -- 5. What’s Really Wrong with the Vocabulary of Morality? -- 6. Assessing “Modern Moral Philosophy” -- PART TWO: No Self: “The First Person” (1975) -- 7. The Circularity Problem for Accounts of “I” as a Device of Self-Reference -- 8. Is the Fundamental Reference Rule for “I” the Key to Explaining First-Person Self-Reference? -- 9. Rumfitt’s Solution to the Circularity Problem -- 10. Can We Make Sense of a Nonreferential Account of “I”? -- 11. Strategies for Saving “I” as a Singular Term: Domesticating FP and Deflating Reference -- Epilogue: The Anti-Cartesian Basis of Anscombe’s Skepticism -- APPENDIX A. Aquinas and Natural Law -- APPENDIX B. Stoic Ethics: A Law Conception without Commandments? -- Notes -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Index |
isbn |
9780674982819 9783110543315 |
callnumber-first |
B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-subject |
B - Philosophy |
callnumber-label |
B1618 |
callnumber-sort |
B 41618 A574 D695 42018 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.4159/9780674982819 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9780674982819 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9780674982819.jpg |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-tens |
120 - Epistemology |
dewey-ones |
126 - The self |
dewey-full |
126 |
dewey-sort |
3126 |
dewey-raw |
126 |
dewey-search |
126 |
doi_str_mv |
10.4159/9780674982819 |
oclc_num |
1023497322 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT doylejames nomoralitynoselfanscombesradicalskepticism |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)502283 (OCoLC)1023497322 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017 |
is_hierarchy_title |
No Morality, No Self : Anscombe’s Radical Skepticism / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Harvard University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017 |
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1770176298771021824 |
fullrecord |
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