The border between seeing and thinking / / Ned Joel Block.

"What is the difference between seeing and thinking? Is the border between seeing and thinking a joint in nature in the sense of a fundamental explanatory difference? Is it a difference of degree? Does thinking affect seeing, i.e. is seeing "cognitively penetrable"? Are we aware of fa...

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Philosophy of mind series
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Place / Publishing House:New York, New York : : Oxford University Press,, [2023]
©2023
Year of Publication:2023
Language:English
Series:Philosophy of mind series.
Physical Description:1 online resource (561 pages)
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Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Half-Title
  • Series
  • Title
  • Copyright
  • Dedication
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • 1. Introduction
  • Consciousness
  • Pure perception
  • What is a joint?
  • Constitutivity vs. explanatory depth
  • The contents of perception
  • Realism about perceptual and cognitive representation
  • Three-​layer methodology
  • Higher "capacity" in perception (whether conscious or not) than cognition
  • Armchair approaches to the perception/​cognition border
  • Conceptual engineering
  • If there is a fundamental difference between perception and cognition, why don't we see the border in the brain?
  • Interface of perception with cognition
  • Why should philosophers be interested in this book?
  • Roadmap
  • 2. Markers of the perceptual and the cognitive
  • Adaptation
  • Perception vs. cognition in language
  • Different kinds of adaptation
  • Visual hierarchy
  • The use of adaptation in distinguishing low-​level from high-​level perception
  • The use of adaptation in distinguishing perception from cognition
  • Semantic satiation
  • Rivalry
  • Pop-​out
  • Interpolation of illusory contours
  • Neural markers of perception and cognition
  • Other markers of perception
  • Phenomenology
  • Summary
  • 3. Two kinds of seeing-​as and singular content
  • Burge and Schellenberg on singular content
  • Attribution and discrimination
  • Ordinary vs. technical language
  • Bias: Perception vs. perceptual judgment
  • Evaluative perception
  • 4. Perception is constitutively nonpropositional and nonconceptual
  • Concepts and propositions
  • Format/​content/​state/​function
  • The nonpropositional nature of perception
  • Conjunction
  • Negation
  • Disjunction
  • Atomic propositional representations
  • Rivalry and propositional perception
  • How do iconicity, nonconceptuality, and nonpropositionality fit together?
  • Laws of appearance
  • Bayesian "inference".
  • Bayesian realism
  • 5. Perception is iconic
  • cognition is discursive
  • Iconicity, format, and function
  • Iconicity and determinacy
  • Structure
  • Analog tracking and mirroring
  • Analog magnitude representations
  • Mental imagery
  • Holism
  • Integral vs. separable
  • Iconic object-​representations in perception
  • Object files in working memory
  • Memory involving perceptual representations
  • 6. Nonconceptual color perception
  • Perceptual category representations
  • Infant color categories
  • Infants' failure to normally deploy color concepts
  • Color constancy
  • Working memory again
  • Experiments on babies' working memory representations
  • Adult nonconceptual color perception
  • Is high-​level perception conceptual?
  • Systematicity again
  • Modality
  • 7. Neural evidence that perception is nonconceptual
  • "No-​report" paradigm vs. "no-​cognition" paradigm
  • Another "no-​report" paradigm
  • 8. Evidence that is wrongly taken to show that perception is conceptual
  • Fast perception
  • Cognitive access to mid-​level vision
  • 9. Cognitive penetration is common but does not challenge the joint
  • Cognitive impenetrability: Recent history
  • Perceptual set
  • Ambiguous stimuli
  • Spatial attention
  • Feature-​based attention
  • Dimension restriction
  • Mental imagery
  • 10. Top-​down effects that are probably not cases of cognitive penetration
  • Figure/​ground
  • Memory color
  • 11. Modularity
  • 12. Core cognition and perceptual analogs of concepts
  • Perception of causation
  • Core cognition
  • 13. Consciousness
  • Phenomenal consciousness vs. access consciousness
  • Global workspace
  • Higher order thought
  • Alleged evidence for higher order thought theories of consciousness
  • Prefrontalism and electrical stimulation of the brain
  • Overflow
  • Biological reductionism
  • Direct awareness
  • Teleological approaches
  • Fading qualia.
  • Consciousness and free will
  • 14. Conclusions
  • References
  • Author Index
  • Subject Index.