The border between seeing and thinking / / Ned Joel Block.

• Superior document: Philosophy of mind series
• VerfasserIn: Block, Ned Joel, 1942-
• Place / Publishing House: New York, New York : : Oxford University Press,, [2023]; ©2023
• Year of Publication: 2023
• Language: English
• Series: Philosophy of mind series.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (561 pages)

"What is the difference between seeing and thinking? Is the border between seeing and thinking a joint in nature in the sense of a fundamental explanatory difference? Is it a difference of degree? Does thinking affect seeing, i.e. is seeing "cognitively penetrable"? Are we aware of faces, causation, numerosity and other "high-level" properties or only of the colors, shapes and textures that-according to the advocate of high level perception--are the basis on which we see them? Is perception conceptual and propositional? Is perception iconic or more akin to language in being discursive? Is seeing singular? Which is more fundamental, visual attribution or visual discrimination? Is all seeing seeing-as? What is the difference between the format and content of perception and do perception and cognition have different formats? Is perception probabilistic and if so, why are we not normally aware of this probabilistic nature of perception? Are the basic features of mind known as "core cognition" a third category in between perception and cognition? Are there perceptual categories that are not concepts? Where does consciousness fit in with regard to the difference between seeing and thinking? Do the lessons from seeing apply to other senses? These are the questions I will be exploring in this book. I will be exploring them not mainly by appeals to "intuitions" as is common in philosophy of perception but by appeal to empirical evidence, including experiments in neuroscience and psychology"-- Provided by publisher.

Table of Contents

Cover -- Half-Title -- Series -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Introduction -- Consciousness -- Pure perception -- What is a joint? -- Constitutivity vs. explanatory depth -- The contents of perception -- Realism about perceptual and cognitive representation -- Three-​layer methodology -- Higher "capacity" in perception (whether conscious or not) than cognition -- Armchair approaches to the perception/​cognition border -- Conceptual engineering -- If there is a fundamental difference between perception and cognition, why don't we see the border in the brain? -- Interface of perception with cognition -- Why should philosophers be interested in this book? -- Roadmap -- 2. Markers of the perceptual and the cognitive -- Adaptation -- Perception vs. cognition in language -- Different kinds of adaptation -- Visual hierarchy -- The use of adaptation in distinguishing low-​level from high-​level perception -- The use of adaptation in distinguishing perception from cognition -- Semantic satiation -- Rivalry -- Pop-​out -- Interpolation of illusory contours -- Neural markers of perception and cognition -- Other markers of perception -- Phenomenology -- Summary -- 3. Two kinds of seeing-​as and singular content -- Burge and Schellenberg on singular content -- Attribution and discrimination -- Ordinary vs. technical language -- Bias: Perception vs. perceptual judgment -- Evaluative perception -- 4. Perception is constitutively nonpropositional and nonconceptual -- Concepts and propositions -- Format/​content/​state/​function -- The nonpropositional nature of perception -- Conjunction -- Negation -- Disjunction -- Atomic propositional representations -- Rivalry and propositional perception -- How do iconicity, nonconceptuality, and nonpropositionality fit together? -- Laws of appearance -- Bayesian "inference".

Bayesian realism -- 5. Perception is iconic -- cognition is discursive -- Iconicity, format, and function -- Iconicity and determinacy -- Structure -- Analog tracking and mirroring -- Analog magnitude representations -- Mental imagery -- Holism -- Integral vs. separable -- Iconic object-​representations in perception -- Object files in working memory -- Memory involving perceptual representations -- 6. Nonconceptual color perception -- Perceptual category representations -- Infant color categories -- Infants' failure to normally deploy color concepts -- Color constancy -- Working memory again -- Experiments on babies' working memory representations -- Adult nonconceptual color perception -- Is high-​level perception conceptual? -- Systematicity again -- Modality -- 7. Neural evidence that perception is nonconceptual -- "No-​report" paradigm vs. "no-​cognition" paradigm -- Another "no-​report" paradigm -- 8. Evidence that is wrongly taken to show that perception is conceptual -- Fast perception -- Cognitive access to mid-​level vision -- 9. Cognitive penetration is common but does not challenge the joint -- Cognitive impenetrability: Recent history -- Perceptual set -- Ambiguous stimuli -- Spatial attention -- Feature-​based attention -- Dimension restriction -- Mental imagery -- 10. Top-​down effects that are probably not cases of cognitive penetration -- Figure/​ground -- Memory color -- 11. Modularity -- 12. Core cognition and perceptual analogs of concepts -- Perception of causation -- Core cognition -- 13. Consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness vs. access consciousness -- Global workspace -- Higher order thought -- Alleged evidence for higher order thought theories of consciousness -- Prefrontalism and electrical stimulation of the brain -- Overflow -- Biological reductionism -- Direct awareness -- Teleological approaches -- Fading qualia.

Consciousness and free will -- 14. Conclusions -- References -- Author Index -- Subject Index.