The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference.

• Superior document: BSPS Open Series
• Author: Norton, John D.
• Place / Publishing House: Calgary : : University of Calgary Press,, 2024.; ©2024.
• Year of Publication: 2024
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: BSPS Open Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (450 pages)

Table of Contents

• Front Cover
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Full Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. The Project of This Volume
• 2. Part I: General Claims and Arguments
• 3. Part II: Historical Case Studies
• 1 | The Material Theory of Induction, Briefly
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Material Theory of Induction
• 3. Enumerative Induction
• 4. Analogy
• 5. Hypothetical Induction
• 6. Simplicity
• 7. Bayes
• 8. Conclusion
• Appendix: Laplace's Rule of Succession
• PART I - General Claims and Arguments
• 2 | Large-Scale Structure: Four Claims
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Nonhierarchical Relations of Inductive Support
• 3. The Role of Hypotheses in the Discovery ofInductive Relations of Support
• 4. Deductive Inferences in Inductive Structures
• 5. The Maturity of a Science
• 6. Inductively Self-Supporting Structures
• 7. Nonempirical Components of the Large-ScaleStructure of Inductive Support
• 8. Conclusion
• 3 | Circularity
• 1. Fear of Circles
• 2. Vicious Circularity
• 3. Indeterminate Circularities
• 4. Determinate Circularities
• 5. Conclusion
• 4 | The Uniqueness of Domain-Specific Inductive Logics
• 1. The Challenge Posed
• 2. The Uniqueness of Mature Sciences
• 3. Competition Is Empirically Decidable
• 4. Inductive Competition Is Unstable
• 5. Illustrations of Instability
• 6. Unconceived Alternatives
• 7. The Underdetermination Conjecture
• 8. Observationally Equivalent Theories
• 9. Formal Accounts
• 10. Conclusion
• 5 | Coherentism and the Material Theory of Induction
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification
• 3. Similarities
• 4. Dissimilarities
• 5. Problems of Coherentism
• 6. Probabilistic Accounts of Coherence
• 7. Why the Bayesian Analysis of Coherence Fails
• 8. Conclusion.
• 6 | The Problem of Induction
• 1. Synopsis
• 2. Introduction
• 3. What the Modern Problem of Induction Is Not:Inductive Anxiety
• 4. Hume's Critique
• 5. The Reception
• 6. The Nineteenth-Century Hiatus
• 7. Twentieth-Century Revival: The Circularity Formulation
• 8. Twentieth-Century Expansion: The Regress Formulation
• 9. Logic of Induction, Not Epistemology of Belief
• 10. Epistemology Does Not Solve the Problem ofInduction
• 11. The Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction
• 12. Regresses
• 13. Circularities
• 14. Sober and Okasha
• 15. What Justifies Induction in the Material Theory
• 16. Critical Responses to the Material Dissolution
• 17. Conclusion
• PART II - Historical Case Studies
• 7 | The Recession of the Nebulae
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Background to Hubble's Investigations
• 3. The Determination of Distances
• 4. From Particulars to Generalities
• 5. Hubble's Hypotheses
• 6. From Generalities to Particulars
• 7. How Strong Was the Evidence for Linearity?
• 8. Conclusion and Summary
• Appendix: Luminosity and Magnitude
• 8 | Newton on Universal Gravitation
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Moon Test
• 3. The Inferences Summarized
• 4. Elliptical Orbits and the Inverse Square Law
• 5. The Exactness of the Inverse Square Law
• 6. Conclusion
• 9 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Atomic Spectra
• 1. Introduction
• 3. The Ritz Combination Principle
• 4. Mutually Supporting Evidence
• 5. Supporting the Ritz Combination Principle
• 6. Bohr's Theory of the Atom
• 7. The Ritz Combination Principle Supports Quantum Theory
• 8. Quantum Theory Confirms the Ritz Combination Principle
• 9. Conclusion
• 10 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Radiocarbon Dating
• 1. Introduction
• 2. How Radiocarbon Dating Works
• 3. The Need for Calibration
• 4. Relations of Evidential Support.
• 11 | The Determination of Atomic Weights
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Dalton's Atomic Theory
• 3. A Circularity: Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae
• 4. A Failed Hypothesis of Simplicity
• 5. Breaking the Circularity
• 6. The Vaulted Inductive Structure of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae
• 7. Mutual Support of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae
• 8. Mutual Support of Avogadro's Hypothesis and the Law of Dulong and Petit
• 9. Mutual Support of Avogadro's Hypothesis in Chemistry and the Kinetic Theory of Gases
• 10. Hypothesis No More
• 12 | The Use of Hypotheses in Determining Distances in Our Planetary System
• 1. Introduction
• 2. An Evidential Circle: The Distances and Sizes of the Moon and Sun
• 3. Aristarchus: Breaking the Evidential Circles
• 4. Measurements of Parallax
• 5. The Parallax of Mars
• 6. The Transits of Venus
• 7. The Need for Hypotheses
• 8. Pythagorean and Platonic Harmonies
• 9. Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses
• 10. The Copernican Hypothesis
• 11. Securing the Copernican Hypothesis
• 12. Crossing of Relations of Support
• 13. Conclusion
• 13 | Dowsing: The Instabilities of EvidentialCompetition
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Phenomenon Established
• 3. Disputes over the Theory of Dowsing Processes
• 4. The Dispute over Geology
• 5. Dispute over the Phenomena
• 6. The Ideo-Motor Principle
• 7. The Diverging Inductive Logics
• 8. Conclusion: The Inductive Instability
• 14 | Stock Market Prediction: When Inductive Logics Compete
• 1. Introduction
• 2. The Systems
• 3. The Systems Compete
• 4. Conclusion: The Instability of Competing Systems
• Afterword
• Index
• Back Cover.