The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference.
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Superior document: | BSPS Open Series |
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Place / Publishing House: | Calgary : : University of Calgary Press,, 2024. ©2024. |
Year of Publication: | 2024 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | BSPS Open Series
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (450 pages) |
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Table of Contents:
- Front Cover
- Half Title Page
- Series Page
- Full Title Page
- Copyright Page
- Contents
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Preface
- Introduction
- 1. The Project of This Volume
- 2. Part I: General Claims and Arguments
- 3. Part II: Historical Case Studies
- 1 | The Material Theory of Induction, Briefly
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Material Theory of Induction
- 3. Enumerative Induction
- 4. Analogy
- 5. Hypothetical Induction
- 6. Simplicity
- 7. Bayes
- 8. Conclusion
- Appendix: Laplace's Rule of Succession
- PART I - General Claims and Arguments
- 2 | Large-Scale Structure: Four Claims
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Nonhierarchical Relations of Inductive Support
- 3. The Role of Hypotheses in the Discovery ofInductive Relations of Support
- 4. Deductive Inferences in Inductive Structures
- 5. The Maturity of a Science
- 6. Inductively Self-Supporting Structures
- 7. Nonempirical Components of the Large-ScaleStructure of Inductive Support
- 8. Conclusion
- 3 | Circularity
- 1. Fear of Circles
- 2. Vicious Circularity
- 3. Indeterminate Circularities
- 4. Determinate Circularities
- 5. Conclusion
- 4 | The Uniqueness of Domain-Specific Inductive Logics
- 1. The Challenge Posed
- 2. The Uniqueness of Mature Sciences
- 3. Competition Is Empirically Decidable
- 4. Inductive Competition Is Unstable
- 5. Illustrations of Instability
- 6. Unconceived Alternatives
- 7. The Underdetermination Conjecture
- 8. Observationally Equivalent Theories
- 9. Formal Accounts
- 10. Conclusion
- 5 | Coherentism and the Material Theory of Induction
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification
- 3. Similarities
- 4. Dissimilarities
- 5. Problems of Coherentism
- 6. Probabilistic Accounts of Coherence
- 7. Why the Bayesian Analysis of Coherence Fails
- 8. Conclusion.
- 6 | The Problem of Induction
- 1. Synopsis
- 2. Introduction
- 3. What the Modern Problem of Induction Is Not:Inductive Anxiety
- 4. Hume's Critique
- 5. The Reception
- 6. The Nineteenth-Century Hiatus
- 7. Twentieth-Century Revival: The Circularity Formulation
- 8. Twentieth-Century Expansion: The Regress Formulation
- 9. Logic of Induction, Not Epistemology of Belief
- 10. Epistemology Does Not Solve the Problem ofInduction
- 11. The Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction
- 12. Regresses
- 13. Circularities
- 14. Sober and Okasha
- 15. What Justifies Induction in the Material Theory
- 16. Critical Responses to the Material Dissolution
- 17. Conclusion
- PART II - Historical Case Studies
- 7 | The Recession of the Nebulae
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Background to Hubble's Investigations
- 3. The Determination of Distances
- 4. From Particulars to Generalities
- 5. Hubble's Hypotheses
- 6. From Generalities to Particulars
- 7. How Strong Was the Evidence for Linearity?
- 8. Conclusion and Summary
- Appendix: Luminosity and Magnitude
- 8 | Newton on Universal Gravitation
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Moon Test
- 3. The Inferences Summarized
- 4. Elliptical Orbits and the Inverse Square Law
- 5. The Exactness of the Inverse Square Law
- 6. Conclusion
- 9 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Atomic Spectra
- 1. Introduction
- 3. The Ritz Combination Principle
- 4. Mutually Supporting Evidence
- 5. Supporting the Ritz Combination Principle
- 6. Bohr's Theory of the Atom
- 7. The Ritz Combination Principle Supports Quantum Theory
- 8. Quantum Theory Confirms the Ritz Combination Principle
- 9. Conclusion
- 10 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Radiocarbon Dating
- 1. Introduction
- 2. How Radiocarbon Dating Works
- 3. The Need for Calibration
- 4. Relations of Evidential Support.
- 11 | The Determination of Atomic Weights
- 1. Introduction
- 2. Dalton's Atomic Theory
- 3. A Circularity: Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae
- 4. A Failed Hypothesis of Simplicity
- 5. Breaking the Circularity
- 6. The Vaulted Inductive Structure of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae
- 7. Mutual Support of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae
- 8. Mutual Support of Avogadro's Hypothesis and the Law of Dulong and Petit
- 9. Mutual Support of Avogadro's Hypothesis in Chemistry and the Kinetic Theory of Gases
- 10. Hypothesis No More
- 12 | The Use of Hypotheses in Determining Distances in Our Planetary System
- 1. Introduction
- 2. An Evidential Circle: The Distances and Sizes of the Moon and Sun
- 3. Aristarchus: Breaking the Evidential Circles
- 4. Measurements of Parallax
- 5. The Parallax of Mars
- 6. The Transits of Venus
- 7. The Need for Hypotheses
- 8. Pythagorean and Platonic Harmonies
- 9. Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses
- 10. The Copernican Hypothesis
- 11. Securing the Copernican Hypothesis
- 12. Crossing of Relations of Support
- 13. Conclusion
- 13 | Dowsing: The Instabilities of EvidentialCompetition
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Phenomenon Established
- 3. Disputes over the Theory of Dowsing Processes
- 4. The Dispute over Geology
- 5. Dispute over the Phenomena
- 6. The Ideo-Motor Principle
- 7. The Diverging Inductive Logics
- 8. Conclusion: The Inductive Instability
- 14 | Stock Market Prediction: When Inductive Logics Compete
- 1. Introduction
- 2. The Systems
- 3. The Systems Compete
- 4. Conclusion: The Instability of Competing Systems
- Afterword
- Index
- Back Cover.