The Large-Scale Structure of Inductive Inference.

• Superior document: BSPS Open Series
• Author: Norton, John D.
• Place / Publishing House: Calgary : : University of Calgary Press,, 2024.; ©2024.
• Year of Publication: 2024
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: BSPS Open Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (450 pages)

Table of Contents

Front Cover -- Half Title Page -- Series Page -- Full Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface -- Introduction -- 1. The Project of This Volume -- 2. Part I: General Claims and Arguments -- 3. Part II: Historical Case Studies -- 1 | The Material Theory of Induction, Briefly -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Material Theory of Induction -- 3. Enumerative Induction -- 4. Analogy -- 5. Hypothetical Induction -- 6. Simplicity -- 7. Bayes -- 8. Conclusion -- Appendix: Laplace's Rule of Succession -- PART I - General Claims and Arguments -- 2 | Large-Scale Structure: Four Claims -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Nonhierarchical Relations of Inductive Support -- 3. The Role of Hypotheses in the Discovery ofInductive Relations of Support -- 4. Deductive Inferences in Inductive Structures -- 5. The Maturity of a Science -- 6. Inductively Self-Supporting Structures -- 7. Nonempirical Components of the Large-ScaleStructure of Inductive Support -- 8. Conclusion -- 3 | Circularity -- 1. Fear of Circles -- 2. Vicious Circularity -- 3. Indeterminate Circularities -- 4. Determinate Circularities -- 5. Conclusion -- 4 | The Uniqueness of Domain-Specific Inductive Logics -- 1. The Challenge Posed -- 2. The Uniqueness of Mature Sciences -- 3. Competition Is Empirically Decidable -- 4. Inductive Competition Is Unstable -- 5. Illustrations of Instability -- 6. Unconceived Alternatives -- 7. The Underdetermination Conjecture -- 8. Observationally Equivalent Theories -- 9. Formal Accounts -- 10. Conclusion -- 5 | Coherentism and the Material Theory of Induction -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification -- 3. Similarities -- 4. Dissimilarities -- 5. Problems of Coherentism -- 6. Probabilistic Accounts of Coherence -- 7. Why the Bayesian Analysis of Coherence Fails -- 8. Conclusion.

6 | The Problem of Induction -- 1. Synopsis -- 2. Introduction -- 3. What the Modern Problem of Induction Is Not:Inductive Anxiety -- 4. Hume's Critique -- 5. The Reception -- 6. The Nineteenth-Century Hiatus -- 7. Twentieth-Century Revival: The Circularity Formulation -- 8. Twentieth-Century Expansion: The Regress Formulation -- 9. Logic of Induction, Not Epistemology of Belief -- 10. Epistemology Does Not Solve the Problem ofInduction -- 11. The Material Dissolution of the Problem of Induction -- 12. Regresses -- 13. Circularities -- 14. Sober and Okasha -- 15. What Justifies Induction in the Material Theory -- 16. Critical Responses to the Material Dissolution -- 17. Conclusion -- PART II - Historical Case Studies -- 7 | The Recession of the Nebulae -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Background to Hubble's Investigations -- 3. The Determination of Distances -- 4. From Particulars to Generalities -- 5. Hubble's Hypotheses -- 6. From Generalities to Particulars -- 7. How Strong Was the Evidence for Linearity? -- 8. Conclusion and Summary -- Appendix: Luminosity and Magnitude -- 8 | Newton on Universal Gravitation -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Moon Test -- 3. The Inferences Summarized -- 4. Elliptical Orbits and the Inverse Square Law -- 5. The Exactness of the Inverse Square Law -- 6. Conclusion -- 9 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Atomic Spectra -- 1. Introduction -- 3. The Ritz Combination Principle -- 4. Mutually Supporting Evidence -- 5. Supporting the Ritz Combination Principle -- 6. Bohr's Theory of the Atom -- 7. The Ritz Combination Principle Supports Quantum Theory -- 8. Quantum Theory Confirms the Ritz Combination Principle -- 9. Conclusion -- 10 | Mutually Supporting Evidence in Radiocarbon Dating -- 1. Introduction -- 2. How Radiocarbon Dating Works -- 3. The Need for Calibration -- 4. Relations of Evidential Support.

11 | The Determination of Atomic Weights -- 1. Introduction -- 2. Dalton's Atomic Theory -- 3. A Circularity: Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae -- 4. A Failed Hypothesis of Simplicity -- 5. Breaking the Circularity -- 6. The Vaulted Inductive Structure of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae -- 7. Mutual Support of Atomic Weights and Molecular Formulae -- 8. Mutual Support of Avogadro's Hypothesis and the Law of Dulong and Petit -- 9. Mutual Support of Avogadro's Hypothesis in Chemistry and the Kinetic Theory of Gases -- 10. Hypothesis No More -- 12 | The Use of Hypotheses in Determining Distances in Our Planetary System -- 1. Introduction -- 2. An Evidential Circle: The Distances and Sizes of the Moon and Sun -- 3. Aristarchus: Breaking the Evidential Circles -- 4. Measurements of Parallax -- 5. The Parallax of Mars -- 6. The Transits of Venus -- 7. The Need for Hypotheses -- 8. Pythagorean and Platonic Harmonies -- 9. Ptolemy's Planetary Hypotheses -- 10. The Copernican Hypothesis -- 11. Securing the Copernican Hypothesis -- 12. Crossing of Relations of Support -- 13. Conclusion -- 13 | Dowsing: The Instabilities of EvidentialCompetition -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Phenomenon Established -- 3. Disputes over the Theory of Dowsing Processes -- 4. The Dispute over Geology -- 5. Dispute over the Phenomena -- 6. The Ideo-Motor Principle -- 7. The Diverging Inductive Logics -- 8. Conclusion: The Inductive Instability -- 14 | Stock Market Prediction: When Inductive Logics Compete -- 1. Introduction -- 2. The Systems -- 3. The Systems Compete -- 4. Conclusion: The Instability of Competing Systems -- Afterword -- Index -- Back Cover.