The Challenges of Nuclear Security : : U. S. and Indian Perspectives.

The Challenges of Nuclear Security : : U. S. and Indian Perspectives.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series
:
Kapur, S. Paul.
TeilnehmendeR:
Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai.
Wueger, Diana.
Place / Publishing House:Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2024.
©2024.
Year of Publication:2024
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series
Physical Description:1 online resource (321 pages)
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Foreword by Ambassador Rakesh Sood
  • An Indian Perspective
  • Foreword by Dr. Christopher Ford
  • A U.S. Perspective
  • Acknowledgement
  • Contents
  • Notes on Contributors
  • List of Figures
  • List of Tables
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 Mitigating Insider Threats
  • 1.2 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security
  • 1.3 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications
  • 1.4 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials
  • 1.5 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources
  • 1.6 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Infrastructure
  • 1.7 Conclusion
  • References
  • 2 Mitigating Insider Threats and Ensuring Personnel Reliability
  • 2.1 An Indian Perspective
  • 2.1.1 Why and How Significant Is the Insider Threat?
  • 2.1.2 India's Insider Threat Challenge
  • 2.1.3 Indian Approach to Addressing Insider Threat
  • 2.1.4 Challenges of Ensuring Trustworthiness
  • 2.1.5 Are There Solutions and Measures That Can Be Taken?
  • 2.1.6 Conclusion
  • 2.2 A U.S. Perspective
  • 2.2.1 Defining the Insider Threat
  • 2.2.2 Introduction to Insider Threats
  • 2.2.3 Trustworthiness/Reliability Programs
  • 2.2.4 Mitigating Insider Threats with Technical Measures
  • 2.2.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • 3 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security
  • 3.1 An Indian Perspective
  • 3.1.1 Basics Aspects of Culture
  • 3.1.2 Organizational Culture
  • 3.1.3 Nuclear Security Culture
  • 3.1.4 Bridging the Gap Between Nuclear Safety and Security Culture
  • 3.2 Nuclear Security Management Structure of the Organization
  • 3.2.1 Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability at Each Level of the Organization
  • 3.2.2 Security Culture Assessment
  • 3.2.3 System of Self-Assessment
  • 3.2.4 Reporting of Security Incidents
  • 3.2.5 Personnel Reliability Programmes
  • 3.2.6 Effective Security Culture:
  • 3.3 India's Approach to Nuclear Security
  • 3.3.1 Key Legislations.
  • 3.3.2 Physical Security
  • 3.3.3 Cybersecurity
  • 3.3.4 Emergency Response System
  • 3.3.5 Establishment of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership
  • 3.3.6 Holes in the Security Wall
  • 3.3.7 Conclusion
  • 3.4 A U.S. Perspective
  • 3.4.1 Incorporating Lessons Learned
  • 3.4.1.1 Communicating Concerns Builds Understanding
  • 3.4.1.2 Taking Steps for Action
  • 3.4.2 Nuclear Security from the Workforce to the Community
  • 3.4.3 Defining Common Language, Values, and Standards
  • 3.4.4 Y-12 Case Study
  • 3.4.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • 4 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications
  • 4.1 An Indian Perspective
  • 4.1.1 Public Relations
  • 4.1.1.1 Communications
  • 4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication
  • 4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP
  • 4.1.2 Crisis Communication
  • 4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making
  • 4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels
  • 4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology
  • 4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology
  • 4.1.4 Conclusions
  • 4.2 A U.S. Perspective
  • 4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure
  • 4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities
  • 4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds
  • 4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response
  • 4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities
  • 4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes
  • 4.2.7 Crisis Communications
  • 4.2.8 Case Studies
  • 4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979)
  • 4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011)
  • 4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges
  • 4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership
  • 4.2.13 Conclusion
  • References
  • 5 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials
  • 5.1 An Indian Perspective
  • 5.1.1 Components of Physical Protection Regime and Indian Commitments
  • 5.1.2 Considerations for Designing a PPS
  • 5.1.3 Nuclear Security and Physical Protection in India: An Overview.
  • 5.1.3.1 Historical Perspective
  • 5.1.3.2 Security Architecture in India: General Considerations
  • 5.1.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response
  • 5.1.3.4 The Role of Technology in Nuclear Security in India
  • 5.1.4 Security of Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities
  • 5.1.5 Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials
  • 5.1.5.1 Security of Radioactive Materials in Transit
  • 5.1.5.2 Security of Nuclear Materials in Transit
  • 5.1.5.3 Special Security Measures
  • 5.1.6 Conclusion and Future Initiatives
  • 5.2 A U.S. Perspective
  • 5.2.1 DEPO Method Overview
  • 5.2.2 Applying the DEPO Method
  • 5.2.3 Defining System Requirements
  • 5.2.3.1 Asset(s) Under Protection
  • 5.2.3.2 Defining System Constraints and Restraints
  • 5.2.3.3 Defining the Threat
  • 5.2.4 Design: Delay, Detection, and Response
  • 5.2.4.1 Detection
  • 5.2.4.2 Delay
  • 5.2.4.3 Response
  • 5.2.4.4 Evaluate
  • 5.2.5 Conclusion
  • References
  • 6 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources
  • 6.1 An Indian Perspective
  • 6.1.1 Introduction
  • 6.1.2 Control and Security of Radioactive Sources in Major Areas of Their Applications
  • 6.1.2.1 Industrial Gamma Radiography (IR) Sources and Practices
  • 6.1.2.2 Irradiator Plants (Gamma Radiation Plants)
  • 6.1.2.3 Radiotherapy: RI Sources and Systems for Cancer Care
  • 6.1.2.4 Other Areas of RI Source Applications
  • 6.1.2.5 Human Element/Factor-Related Aspects
  • 6.1.2.6 'Legacy Source'-Related Events and Lessons
  • 6.1.3 Production of RI-Based Sources and Operation of Radiation Technology Facilities/Services-Indian Experiences with Control of Sources
  • 6.1.4 Strengthening Measures to Control the Use of Radioactive Sources and to Foster Alternative Technologies
  • 6.1.4.1 Alternative Technologies to the Use of Radioactive Sources-Existing, Emerging, and Under-Development Options
  • 6.1.4.2 Medical Application Sources.
  • 6.1.4.3 Industrial Application and Research Sources
  • 6.1.4.4 Envisaged Areas of Continuity in RI Source Applications
  • 6.1.5 Control of Radioactive Sources-Continuing Challenges and Path Forward
  • 6.1.6 Recommendations
  • 6.2 A U.S. Perspective
  • 6.2.1 Overview: The Regulatory Framework in the United States
  • 6.2.1.1 Federal Regulators: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • 6.2.1.2 State-Level Regulation: "Agreement State" Compacts
  • 6.2.1.3 Agreements with the Armed Forces
  • 6.2.2 Challenges Within the Framework
  • 6.2.2.1 Compatible vs. Identical Regulations
  • 6.2.2.2 Prescriptive vs. Performance-Based Criteria
  • 6.2.3 An Emerging Consensus: Permanent Risk Reduction
  • 6.2.3.1 The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP)
  • 6.2.3.2 Collaborations with Diverse Stakeholders
  • 6.2.3.3 Elimination of Nuclear Threat Networks to National Security
  • 6.2.4 Conclusion
  • References
  • 7 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Facilities
  • 7.1 An Indian Perspective
  • 7.1.1 Identifying Risks and Vulnerabilities
  • 7.1.2 Cybersecurity in India: An Overview
  • 7.1.3 India's Cyber and Nuclear Infrastructure
  • 7.1.4 Case Study: The Kudankulam Breach
  • 7.1.5 Important Considerations and Recommendations
  • 7.1.6 Conclusion
  • 7.2 A U.S. Perspective
  • 7.2.1 Background
  • 7.2.2 Threat Agents and Vulnerabilities
  • 7.2.3 U.S. Regulatory Approach
  • 7.2.4 Potential Risks from a Cyberattack
  • 7.2.5 Defense and Response
  • 7.2.6 Supply-Chain Security
  • 7.2.7 Assessing Cybersecurity
  • 7.2.8 Summary and Conclusions
  • References
  • Index.

Similar Items