The Challenges of Nuclear Security : : U. S. and Indian Perspectives.
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Superior document: | Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series |
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Place / Publishing House: | Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2024. ©2024. |
Year of Publication: | 2024 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (321 pages) |
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Kapur, S. Paul. The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives. 1st ed. Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2024. ©2024. 1 online resource (321 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series Intro -- Foreword by Ambassador Rakesh Sood -- An Indian Perspective -- Foreword by Dr. Christopher Ford -- A U.S. Perspective -- Acknowledgement -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Mitigating Insider Threats -- 1.2 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 1.3 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 1.4 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 1.5 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 1.6 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Mitigating Insider Threats and Ensuring Personnel Reliability -- 2.1 An Indian Perspective -- 2.1.1 Why and How Significant Is the Insider Threat? -- 2.1.2 India's Insider Threat Challenge -- 2.1.3 Indian Approach to Addressing Insider Threat -- 2.1.4 Challenges of Ensuring Trustworthiness -- 2.1.5 Are There Solutions and Measures That Can Be Taken? -- 2.1.6 Conclusion -- 2.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 2.2.1 Defining the Insider Threat -- 2.2.2 Introduction to Insider Threats -- 2.2.3 Trustworthiness/Reliability Programs -- 2.2.4 Mitigating Insider Threats with Technical Measures -- 2.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 3.1 An Indian Perspective -- 3.1.1 Basics Aspects of Culture -- 3.1.2 Organizational Culture -- 3.1.3 Nuclear Security Culture -- 3.1.4 Bridging the Gap Between Nuclear Safety and Security Culture -- 3.2 Nuclear Security Management Structure of the Organization -- 3.2.1 Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability at Each Level of the Organization -- 3.2.2 Security Culture Assessment -- 3.2.3 System of Self-Assessment -- 3.2.4 Reporting of Security Incidents -- 3.2.5 Personnel Reliability Programmes -- 3.2.6 Effective Security Culture: -- 3.3 India's Approach to Nuclear Security -- 3.3.1 Key Legislations. 3.3.2 Physical Security -- 3.3.3 Cybersecurity -- 3.3.4 Emergency Response System -- 3.3.5 Establishment of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership -- 3.3.6 Holes in the Security Wall -- 3.3.7 Conclusion -- 3.4 A U.S. Perspective -- 3.4.1 Incorporating Lessons Learned -- 3.4.1.1 Communicating Concerns Builds Understanding -- 3.4.1.2 Taking Steps for Action -- 3.4.2 Nuclear Security from the Workforce to the Community -- 3.4.3 Defining Common Language, Values, and Standards -- 3.4.4 Y-12 Case Study -- 3.4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 4.1 An Indian Perspective -- 4.1.1 Public Relations -- 4.1.1.1 Communications -- 4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication -- 4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP -- 4.1.2 Crisis Communication -- 4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making -- 4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels -- 4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.4 Conclusions -- 4.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure -- 4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities -- 4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds -- 4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response -- 4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities -- 4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes -- 4.2.7 Crisis Communications -- 4.2.8 Case Studies -- 4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979) -- 4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011) -- 4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges -- 4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership -- 4.2.13 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 5.1 An Indian Perspective -- 5.1.1 Components of Physical Protection Regime and Indian Commitments -- 5.1.2 Considerations for Designing a PPS -- 5.1.3 Nuclear Security and Physical Protection in India: An Overview. 5.1.3.1 Historical Perspective -- 5.1.3.2 Security Architecture in India: General Considerations -- 5.1.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response -- 5.1.3.4 The Role of Technology in Nuclear Security in India -- 5.1.4 Security of Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities -- 5.1.5 Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials -- 5.1.5.1 Security of Radioactive Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.2 Security of Nuclear Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.3 Special Security Measures -- 5.1.6 Conclusion and Future Initiatives -- 5.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 5.2.1 DEPO Method Overview -- 5.2.2 Applying the DEPO Method -- 5.2.3 Defining System Requirements -- 5.2.3.1 Asset(s) Under Protection -- 5.2.3.2 Defining System Constraints and Restraints -- 5.2.3.3 Defining the Threat -- 5.2.4 Design: Delay, Detection, and Response -- 5.2.4.1 Detection -- 5.2.4.2 Delay -- 5.2.4.3 Response -- 5.2.4.4 Evaluate -- 5.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 6.1 An Indian Perspective -- 6.1.1 Introduction -- 6.1.2 Control and Security of Radioactive Sources in Major Areas of Their Applications -- 6.1.2.1 Industrial Gamma Radiography (IR) Sources and Practices -- 6.1.2.2 Irradiator Plants (Gamma Radiation Plants) -- 6.1.2.3 Radiotherapy: RI Sources and Systems for Cancer Care -- 6.1.2.4 Other Areas of RI Source Applications -- 6.1.2.5 Human Element/Factor-Related Aspects -- 6.1.2.6 'Legacy Source'-Related Events and Lessons -- 6.1.3 Production of RI-Based Sources and Operation of Radiation Technology Facilities/Services-Indian Experiences with Control of Sources -- 6.1.4 Strengthening Measures to Control the Use of Radioactive Sources and to Foster Alternative Technologies -- 6.1.4.1 Alternative Technologies to the Use of Radioactive Sources-Existing, Emerging, and Under-Development Options -- 6.1.4.2 Medical Application Sources. 6.1.4.3 Industrial Application and Research Sources -- 6.1.4.4 Envisaged Areas of Continuity in RI Source Applications -- 6.1.5 Control of Radioactive Sources-Continuing Challenges and Path Forward -- 6.1.6 Recommendations -- 6.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 6.2.1 Overview: The Regulatory Framework in the United States -- 6.2.1.1 Federal Regulators: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- 6.2.1.2 State-Level Regulation: "Agreement State" Compacts -- 6.2.1.3 Agreements with the Armed Forces -- 6.2.2 Challenges Within the Framework -- 6.2.2.1 Compatible vs. Identical Regulations -- 6.2.2.2 Prescriptive vs. Performance-Based Criteria -- 6.2.3 An Emerging Consensus: Permanent Risk Reduction -- 6.2.3.1 The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP) -- 6.2.3.2 Collaborations with Diverse Stakeholders -- 6.2.3.3 Elimination of Nuclear Threat Networks to National Security -- 6.2.4 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Facilities -- 7.1 An Indian Perspective -- 7.1.1 Identifying Risks and Vulnerabilities -- 7.1.2 Cybersecurity in India: An Overview -- 7.1.3 India's Cyber and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 7.1.4 Case Study: The Kudankulam Breach -- 7.1.5 Important Considerations and Recommendations -- 7.1.6 Conclusion -- 7.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 7.2.1 Background -- 7.2.2 Threat Agents and Vulnerabilities -- 7.2.3 U.S. Regulatory Approach -- 7.2.4 Potential Risks from a Cyberattack -- 7.2.5 Defense and Response -- 7.2.6 Supply-Chain Security -- 7.2.7 Assessing Cybersecurity -- 7.2.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Index. Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. Wueger, Diana. 3-031-56813-3 |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Kapur, S. Paul. |
spellingShingle |
Kapur, S. Paul. The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives. Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series Intro -- Foreword by Ambassador Rakesh Sood -- An Indian Perspective -- Foreword by Dr. Christopher Ford -- A U.S. Perspective -- Acknowledgement -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Mitigating Insider Threats -- 1.2 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 1.3 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 1.4 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 1.5 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 1.6 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Mitigating Insider Threats and Ensuring Personnel Reliability -- 2.1 An Indian Perspective -- 2.1.1 Why and How Significant Is the Insider Threat? -- 2.1.2 India's Insider Threat Challenge -- 2.1.3 Indian Approach to Addressing Insider Threat -- 2.1.4 Challenges of Ensuring Trustworthiness -- 2.1.5 Are There Solutions and Measures That Can Be Taken? -- 2.1.6 Conclusion -- 2.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 2.2.1 Defining the Insider Threat -- 2.2.2 Introduction to Insider Threats -- 2.2.3 Trustworthiness/Reliability Programs -- 2.2.4 Mitigating Insider Threats with Technical Measures -- 2.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 3.1 An Indian Perspective -- 3.1.1 Basics Aspects of Culture -- 3.1.2 Organizational Culture -- 3.1.3 Nuclear Security Culture -- 3.1.4 Bridging the Gap Between Nuclear Safety and Security Culture -- 3.2 Nuclear Security Management Structure of the Organization -- 3.2.1 Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability at Each Level of the Organization -- 3.2.2 Security Culture Assessment -- 3.2.3 System of Self-Assessment -- 3.2.4 Reporting of Security Incidents -- 3.2.5 Personnel Reliability Programmes -- 3.2.6 Effective Security Culture: -- 3.3 India's Approach to Nuclear Security -- 3.3.1 Key Legislations. 3.3.2 Physical Security -- 3.3.3 Cybersecurity -- 3.3.4 Emergency Response System -- 3.3.5 Establishment of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership -- 3.3.6 Holes in the Security Wall -- 3.3.7 Conclusion -- 3.4 A U.S. Perspective -- 3.4.1 Incorporating Lessons Learned -- 3.4.1.1 Communicating Concerns Builds Understanding -- 3.4.1.2 Taking Steps for Action -- 3.4.2 Nuclear Security from the Workforce to the Community -- 3.4.3 Defining Common Language, Values, and Standards -- 3.4.4 Y-12 Case Study -- 3.4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 4.1 An Indian Perspective -- 4.1.1 Public Relations -- 4.1.1.1 Communications -- 4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication -- 4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP -- 4.1.2 Crisis Communication -- 4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making -- 4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels -- 4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.4 Conclusions -- 4.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure -- 4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities -- 4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds -- 4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response -- 4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities -- 4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes -- 4.2.7 Crisis Communications -- 4.2.8 Case Studies -- 4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979) -- 4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011) -- 4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges -- 4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership -- 4.2.13 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 5.1 An Indian Perspective -- 5.1.1 Components of Physical Protection Regime and Indian Commitments -- 5.1.2 Considerations for Designing a PPS -- 5.1.3 Nuclear Security and Physical Protection in India: An Overview. 5.1.3.1 Historical Perspective -- 5.1.3.2 Security Architecture in India: General Considerations -- 5.1.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response -- 5.1.3.4 The Role of Technology in Nuclear Security in India -- 5.1.4 Security of Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities -- 5.1.5 Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials -- 5.1.5.1 Security of Radioactive Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.2 Security of Nuclear Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.3 Special Security Measures -- 5.1.6 Conclusion and Future Initiatives -- 5.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 5.2.1 DEPO Method Overview -- 5.2.2 Applying the DEPO Method -- 5.2.3 Defining System Requirements -- 5.2.3.1 Asset(s) Under Protection -- 5.2.3.2 Defining System Constraints and Restraints -- 5.2.3.3 Defining the Threat -- 5.2.4 Design: Delay, Detection, and Response -- 5.2.4.1 Detection -- 5.2.4.2 Delay -- 5.2.4.3 Response -- 5.2.4.4 Evaluate -- 5.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 6.1 An Indian Perspective -- 6.1.1 Introduction -- 6.1.2 Control and Security of Radioactive Sources in Major Areas of Their Applications -- 6.1.2.1 Industrial Gamma Radiography (IR) Sources and Practices -- 6.1.2.2 Irradiator Plants (Gamma Radiation Plants) -- 6.1.2.3 Radiotherapy: RI Sources and Systems for Cancer Care -- 6.1.2.4 Other Areas of RI Source Applications -- 6.1.2.5 Human Element/Factor-Related Aspects -- 6.1.2.6 'Legacy Source'-Related Events and Lessons -- 6.1.3 Production of RI-Based Sources and Operation of Radiation Technology Facilities/Services-Indian Experiences with Control of Sources -- 6.1.4 Strengthening Measures to Control the Use of Radioactive Sources and to Foster Alternative Technologies -- 6.1.4.1 Alternative Technologies to the Use of Radioactive Sources-Existing, Emerging, and Under-Development Options -- 6.1.4.2 Medical Application Sources. 6.1.4.3 Industrial Application and Research Sources -- 6.1.4.4 Envisaged Areas of Continuity in RI Source Applications -- 6.1.5 Control of Radioactive Sources-Continuing Challenges and Path Forward -- 6.1.6 Recommendations -- 6.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 6.2.1 Overview: The Regulatory Framework in the United States -- 6.2.1.1 Federal Regulators: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- 6.2.1.2 State-Level Regulation: "Agreement State" Compacts -- 6.2.1.3 Agreements with the Armed Forces -- 6.2.2 Challenges Within the Framework -- 6.2.2.1 Compatible vs. Identical Regulations -- 6.2.2.2 Prescriptive vs. Performance-Based Criteria -- 6.2.3 An Emerging Consensus: Permanent Risk Reduction -- 6.2.3.1 The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP) -- 6.2.3.2 Collaborations with Diverse Stakeholders -- 6.2.3.3 Elimination of Nuclear Threat Networks to National Security -- 6.2.4 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Facilities -- 7.1 An Indian Perspective -- 7.1.1 Identifying Risks and Vulnerabilities -- 7.1.2 Cybersecurity in India: An Overview -- 7.1.3 India's Cyber and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 7.1.4 Case Study: The Kudankulam Breach -- 7.1.5 Important Considerations and Recommendations -- 7.1.6 Conclusion -- 7.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 7.2.1 Background -- 7.2.2 Threat Agents and Vulnerabilities -- 7.2.3 U.S. Regulatory Approach -- 7.2.4 Potential Risks from a Cyberattack -- 7.2.5 Defense and Response -- 7.2.6 Supply-Chain Security -- 7.2.7 Assessing Cybersecurity -- 7.2.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Index. |
author_facet |
Kapur, S. Paul. Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. Wueger, Diana. |
author_variant |
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author2 |
Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. Wueger, Diana. |
author2_variant |
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Kapur, S. Paul. |
title |
The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives. |
title_sub |
U. S. and Indian Perspectives. |
title_full |
The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives. |
title_fullStr |
The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives. |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives. |
title_auth |
The Challenges of Nuclear Security : U. S. and Indian Perspectives. |
title_new |
The Challenges of Nuclear Security : |
title_sort |
the challenges of nuclear security : u. s. and indian perspectives. |
series |
Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series |
series2 |
Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series |
publisher |
Springer International Publishing AG, |
publishDate |
2024 |
physical |
1 online resource (321 pages) |
edition |
1st ed. |
contents |
Intro -- Foreword by Ambassador Rakesh Sood -- An Indian Perspective -- Foreword by Dr. Christopher Ford -- A U.S. Perspective -- Acknowledgement -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Mitigating Insider Threats -- 1.2 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 1.3 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 1.4 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 1.5 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 1.6 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Mitigating Insider Threats and Ensuring Personnel Reliability -- 2.1 An Indian Perspective -- 2.1.1 Why and How Significant Is the Insider Threat? -- 2.1.2 India's Insider Threat Challenge -- 2.1.3 Indian Approach to Addressing Insider Threat -- 2.1.4 Challenges of Ensuring Trustworthiness -- 2.1.5 Are There Solutions and Measures That Can Be Taken? -- 2.1.6 Conclusion -- 2.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 2.2.1 Defining the Insider Threat -- 2.2.2 Introduction to Insider Threats -- 2.2.3 Trustworthiness/Reliability Programs -- 2.2.4 Mitigating Insider Threats with Technical Measures -- 2.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 3.1 An Indian Perspective -- 3.1.1 Basics Aspects of Culture -- 3.1.2 Organizational Culture -- 3.1.3 Nuclear Security Culture -- 3.1.4 Bridging the Gap Between Nuclear Safety and Security Culture -- 3.2 Nuclear Security Management Structure of the Organization -- 3.2.1 Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability at Each Level of the Organization -- 3.2.2 Security Culture Assessment -- 3.2.3 System of Self-Assessment -- 3.2.4 Reporting of Security Incidents -- 3.2.5 Personnel Reliability Programmes -- 3.2.6 Effective Security Culture: -- 3.3 India's Approach to Nuclear Security -- 3.3.1 Key Legislations. 3.3.2 Physical Security -- 3.3.3 Cybersecurity -- 3.3.4 Emergency Response System -- 3.3.5 Establishment of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership -- 3.3.6 Holes in the Security Wall -- 3.3.7 Conclusion -- 3.4 A U.S. Perspective -- 3.4.1 Incorporating Lessons Learned -- 3.4.1.1 Communicating Concerns Builds Understanding -- 3.4.1.2 Taking Steps for Action -- 3.4.2 Nuclear Security from the Workforce to the Community -- 3.4.3 Defining Common Language, Values, and Standards -- 3.4.4 Y-12 Case Study -- 3.4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 4.1 An Indian Perspective -- 4.1.1 Public Relations -- 4.1.1.1 Communications -- 4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication -- 4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP -- 4.1.2 Crisis Communication -- 4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making -- 4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels -- 4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.4 Conclusions -- 4.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure -- 4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities -- 4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds -- 4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response -- 4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities -- 4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes -- 4.2.7 Crisis Communications -- 4.2.8 Case Studies -- 4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979) -- 4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011) -- 4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges -- 4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership -- 4.2.13 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 5.1 An Indian Perspective -- 5.1.1 Components of Physical Protection Regime and Indian Commitments -- 5.1.2 Considerations for Designing a PPS -- 5.1.3 Nuclear Security and Physical Protection in India: An Overview. 5.1.3.1 Historical Perspective -- 5.1.3.2 Security Architecture in India: General Considerations -- 5.1.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response -- 5.1.3.4 The Role of Technology in Nuclear Security in India -- 5.1.4 Security of Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities -- 5.1.5 Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials -- 5.1.5.1 Security of Radioactive Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.2 Security of Nuclear Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.3 Special Security Measures -- 5.1.6 Conclusion and Future Initiatives -- 5.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 5.2.1 DEPO Method Overview -- 5.2.2 Applying the DEPO Method -- 5.2.3 Defining System Requirements -- 5.2.3.1 Asset(s) Under Protection -- 5.2.3.2 Defining System Constraints and Restraints -- 5.2.3.3 Defining the Threat -- 5.2.4 Design: Delay, Detection, and Response -- 5.2.4.1 Detection -- 5.2.4.2 Delay -- 5.2.4.3 Response -- 5.2.4.4 Evaluate -- 5.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 6.1 An Indian Perspective -- 6.1.1 Introduction -- 6.1.2 Control and Security of Radioactive Sources in Major Areas of Their Applications -- 6.1.2.1 Industrial Gamma Radiography (IR) Sources and Practices -- 6.1.2.2 Irradiator Plants (Gamma Radiation Plants) -- 6.1.2.3 Radiotherapy: RI Sources and Systems for Cancer Care -- 6.1.2.4 Other Areas of RI Source Applications -- 6.1.2.5 Human Element/Factor-Related Aspects -- 6.1.2.6 'Legacy Source'-Related Events and Lessons -- 6.1.3 Production of RI-Based Sources and Operation of Radiation Technology Facilities/Services-Indian Experiences with Control of Sources -- 6.1.4 Strengthening Measures to Control the Use of Radioactive Sources and to Foster Alternative Technologies -- 6.1.4.1 Alternative Technologies to the Use of Radioactive Sources-Existing, Emerging, and Under-Development Options -- 6.1.4.2 Medical Application Sources. 6.1.4.3 Industrial Application and Research Sources -- 6.1.4.4 Envisaged Areas of Continuity in RI Source Applications -- 6.1.5 Control of Radioactive Sources-Continuing Challenges and Path Forward -- 6.1.6 Recommendations -- 6.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 6.2.1 Overview: The Regulatory Framework in the United States -- 6.2.1.1 Federal Regulators: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- 6.2.1.2 State-Level Regulation: "Agreement State" Compacts -- 6.2.1.3 Agreements with the Armed Forces -- 6.2.2 Challenges Within the Framework -- 6.2.2.1 Compatible vs. Identical Regulations -- 6.2.2.2 Prescriptive vs. Performance-Based Criteria -- 6.2.3 An Emerging Consensus: Permanent Risk Reduction -- 6.2.3.1 The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP) -- 6.2.3.2 Collaborations with Diverse Stakeholders -- 6.2.3.3 Elimination of Nuclear Threat Networks to National Security -- 6.2.4 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Facilities -- 7.1 An Indian Perspective -- 7.1.1 Identifying Risks and Vulnerabilities -- 7.1.2 Cybersecurity in India: An Overview -- 7.1.3 India's Cyber and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 7.1.4 Case Study: The Kudankulam Breach -- 7.1.5 Important Considerations and Recommendations -- 7.1.6 Conclusion -- 7.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 7.2.1 Background -- 7.2.2 Threat Agents and Vulnerabilities -- 7.2.3 U.S. Regulatory Approach -- 7.2.4 Potential Risks from a Cyberattack -- 7.2.5 Defense and Response -- 7.2.6 Supply-Chain Security -- 7.2.7 Assessing Cybersecurity -- 7.2.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Index. |
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S. and Indian Perspectives.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="250" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1st ed.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="1"><subfield code="a">Cham :</subfield><subfield code="b">Springer International Publishing AG,</subfield><subfield code="c">2024.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="264" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="c">©2024.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="300" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">1 online resource (321 pages)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="336" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">text</subfield><subfield code="b">txt</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacontent</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="337" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">computer</subfield><subfield code="b">c</subfield><subfield code="2">rdamedia</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="338" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">online resource</subfield><subfield code="b">cr</subfield><subfield code="2">rdacarrier</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="490" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="0" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Intro -- Foreword by Ambassador Rakesh Sood -- An Indian Perspective -- Foreword by Dr. Christopher Ford -- A U.S. Perspective -- Acknowledgement -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Mitigating Insider Threats -- 1.2 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 1.3 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 1.4 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 1.5 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 1.6 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Mitigating Insider Threats and Ensuring Personnel Reliability -- 2.1 An Indian Perspective -- 2.1.1 Why and How Significant Is the Insider Threat? -- 2.1.2 India's Insider Threat Challenge -- 2.1.3 Indian Approach to Addressing Insider Threat -- 2.1.4 Challenges of Ensuring Trustworthiness -- 2.1.5 Are There Solutions and Measures That Can Be Taken? -- 2.1.6 Conclusion -- 2.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 2.2.1 Defining the Insider Threat -- 2.2.2 Introduction to Insider Threats -- 2.2.3 Trustworthiness/Reliability Programs -- 2.2.4 Mitigating Insider Threats with Technical Measures -- 2.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 3.1 An Indian Perspective -- 3.1.1 Basics Aspects of Culture -- 3.1.2 Organizational Culture -- 3.1.3 Nuclear Security Culture -- 3.1.4 Bridging the Gap Between Nuclear Safety and Security Culture -- 3.2 Nuclear Security Management Structure of the Organization -- 3.2.1 Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability at Each Level of the Organization -- 3.2.2 Security Culture Assessment -- 3.2.3 System of Self-Assessment -- 3.2.4 Reporting of Security Incidents -- 3.2.5 Personnel Reliability Programmes -- 3.2.6 Effective Security Culture: -- 3.3 India's Approach to Nuclear Security -- 3.3.1 Key Legislations.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">3.3.2 Physical Security -- 3.3.3 Cybersecurity -- 3.3.4 Emergency Response System -- 3.3.5 Establishment of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership -- 3.3.6 Holes in the Security Wall -- 3.3.7 Conclusion -- 3.4 A U.S. Perspective -- 3.4.1 Incorporating Lessons Learned -- 3.4.1.1 Communicating Concerns Builds Understanding -- 3.4.1.2 Taking Steps for Action -- 3.4.2 Nuclear Security from the Workforce to the Community -- 3.4.3 Defining Common Language, Values, and Standards -- 3.4.4 Y-12 Case Study -- 3.4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 4.1 An Indian Perspective -- 4.1.1 Public Relations -- 4.1.1.1 Communications -- 4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication -- 4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP -- 4.1.2 Crisis Communication -- 4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making -- 4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels -- 4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.4 Conclusions -- 4.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure -- 4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities -- 4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds -- 4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response -- 4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities -- 4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes -- 4.2.7 Crisis Communications -- 4.2.8 Case Studies -- 4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979) -- 4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011) -- 4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges -- 4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership -- 4.2.13 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 5.1 An Indian Perspective -- 5.1.1 Components of Physical Protection Regime and Indian Commitments -- 5.1.2 Considerations for Designing a PPS -- 5.1.3 Nuclear Security and Physical Protection in India: An Overview.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">5.1.3.1 Historical Perspective -- 5.1.3.2 Security Architecture in India: General Considerations -- 5.1.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response -- 5.1.3.4 The Role of Technology in Nuclear Security in India -- 5.1.4 Security of Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities -- 5.1.5 Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials -- 5.1.5.1 Security of Radioactive Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.2 Security of Nuclear Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.3 Special Security Measures -- 5.1.6 Conclusion and Future Initiatives -- 5.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 5.2.1 DEPO Method Overview -- 5.2.2 Applying the DEPO Method -- 5.2.3 Defining System Requirements -- 5.2.3.1 Asset(s) Under Protection -- 5.2.3.2 Defining System Constraints and Restraints -- 5.2.3.3 Defining the Threat -- 5.2.4 Design: Delay, Detection, and Response -- 5.2.4.1 Detection -- 5.2.4.2 Delay -- 5.2.4.3 Response -- 5.2.4.4 Evaluate -- 5.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 6.1 An Indian Perspective -- 6.1.1 Introduction -- 6.1.2 Control and Security of Radioactive Sources in Major Areas of Their Applications -- 6.1.2.1 Industrial Gamma Radiography (IR) Sources and Practices -- 6.1.2.2 Irradiator Plants (Gamma Radiation Plants) -- 6.1.2.3 Radiotherapy: RI Sources and Systems for Cancer Care -- 6.1.2.4 Other Areas of RI Source Applications -- 6.1.2.5 Human Element/Factor-Related Aspects -- 6.1.2.6 'Legacy Source'-Related Events and Lessons -- 6.1.3 Production of RI-Based Sources and Operation of Radiation Technology Facilities/Services-Indian Experiences with Control of Sources -- 6.1.4 Strengthening Measures to Control the Use of Radioactive Sources and to Foster Alternative Technologies -- 6.1.4.1 Alternative Technologies to the Use of Radioactive Sources-Existing, Emerging, and Under-Development Options -- 6.1.4.2 Medical Application Sources.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">6.1.4.3 Industrial Application and Research Sources -- 6.1.4.4 Envisaged Areas of Continuity in RI Source Applications -- 6.1.5 Control of Radioactive Sources-Continuing Challenges and Path Forward -- 6.1.6 Recommendations -- 6.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 6.2.1 Overview: The Regulatory Framework in the United States -- 6.2.1.1 Federal Regulators: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- 6.2.1.2 State-Level Regulation: "Agreement State" Compacts -- 6.2.1.3 Agreements with the Armed Forces -- 6.2.2 Challenges Within the Framework -- 6.2.2.1 Compatible vs. Identical Regulations -- 6.2.2.2 Prescriptive vs. Performance-Based Criteria -- 6.2.3 An Emerging Consensus: Permanent Risk Reduction -- 6.2.3.1 The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP) -- 6.2.3.2 Collaborations with Diverse Stakeholders -- 6.2.3.3 Elimination of Nuclear Threat Networks to National Security -- 6.2.4 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Facilities -- 7.1 An Indian Perspective -- 7.1.1 Identifying Risks and Vulnerabilities -- 7.1.2 Cybersecurity in India: An Overview -- 7.1.3 India's Cyber and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 7.1.4 Case Study: The Kudankulam Breach -- 7.1.5 Important Considerations and Recommendations -- 7.1.6 Conclusion -- 7.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 7.2.1 Background -- 7.2.2 Threat Agents and Vulnerabilities -- 7.2.3 U.S. Regulatory Approach -- 7.2.4 Potential Risks from a Cyberattack -- 7.2.5 Defense and Response -- 7.2.6 Supply-Chain Security -- 7.2.7 Assessing Cybersecurity -- 7.2.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield 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