The Challenges of Nuclear Security : : U. S. and Indian Perspectives.

• Superior document: Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series
• Author: Kapur, S. Paul.
• TeilnehmendeR: Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai.; Wueger, Diana.
• Place / Publishing House: Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2024.; ©2024.
• Year of Publication: 2024
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Initiatives in Strategic Studies: Issues and Policies Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (321 pages)

Table of Contents

Intro -- Foreword by Ambassador Rakesh Sood -- An Indian Perspective -- Foreword by Dr. Christopher Ford -- A U.S. Perspective -- Acknowledgement -- Contents -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 Mitigating Insider Threats -- 1.2 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 1.3 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 1.4 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 1.5 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 1.6 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 1.7 Conclusion -- References -- 2 Mitigating Insider Threats and Ensuring Personnel Reliability -- 2.1 An Indian Perspective -- 2.1.1 Why and How Significant Is the Insider Threat? -- 2.1.2 India's Insider Threat Challenge -- 2.1.3 Indian Approach to Addressing Insider Threat -- 2.1.4 Challenges of Ensuring Trustworthiness -- 2.1.5 Are There Solutions and Measures That Can Be Taken? -- 2.1.6 Conclusion -- 2.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 2.2.1 Defining the Insider Threat -- 2.2.2 Introduction to Insider Threats -- 2.2.3 Trustworthiness/Reliability Programs -- 2.2.4 Mitigating Insider Threats with Technical Measures -- 2.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 3 The Role of Organizational Culture in Nuclear Security -- 3.1 An Indian Perspective -- 3.1.1 Basics Aspects of Culture -- 3.1.2 Organizational Culture -- 3.1.3 Nuclear Security Culture -- 3.1.4 Bridging the Gap Between Nuclear Safety and Security Culture -- 3.2 Nuclear Security Management Structure of the Organization -- 3.2.1 Roles, Responsibilities, and Accountability at Each Level of the Organization -- 3.2.2 Security Culture Assessment -- 3.2.3 System of Self-Assessment -- 3.2.4 Reporting of Security Incidents -- 3.2.5 Personnel Reliability Programmes -- 3.2.6 Effective Security Culture: -- 3.3 India's Approach to Nuclear Security -- 3.3.1 Key Legislations.

3.3.2 Physical Security -- 3.3.3 Cybersecurity -- 3.3.4 Emergency Response System -- 3.3.5 Establishment of Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership -- 3.3.6 Holes in the Security Wall -- 3.3.7 Conclusion -- 3.4 A U.S. Perspective -- 3.4.1 Incorporating Lessons Learned -- 3.4.1.1 Communicating Concerns Builds Understanding -- 3.4.1.2 Taking Steps for Action -- 3.4.2 Nuclear Security from the Workforce to the Community -- 3.4.3 Defining Common Language, Values, and Standards -- 3.4.4 Y-12 Case Study -- 3.4.5 Conclusion -- References -- 4 Emergency Response and Crisis Communications -- 4.1 An Indian Perspective -- 4.1.1 Public Relations -- 4.1.1.1 Communications -- 4.1.1.2 Three Phases of Communication -- 4.1.1.3 A Case Study: Kudankulam NPP -- 4.1.2 Crisis Communication -- 4.1.2.1 Early Phase Decision-making -- 4.1.2.2 Emergency Action Levels -- 4.1.3 Improved Emergency Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.3.1 Features of New Exercise Methodology -- 4.1.4 Conclusions -- 4.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 4.2.1 Tiered Response Structure -- 4.2.2 Identifying and Delegating Necessary Authorities -- 4.2.3 Predetermined Standards and Thresholds -- 4.2.4 Detection, Monitoring, and Modeling Capabilities for Prevention and Response -- 4.2.5 Integrating Pre- and Post-Event Response Communities -- 4.2.6 Robust Exercise Programs and After-Action Processes -- 4.2.7 Crisis Communications -- 4.2.8 Case Studies -- 4.2.9 Three Mile Island (1979) -- 4.2.10 Fukushima Daiichi (2011) -- 4.2.11 Future Threats and Challenges -- 4.2.12 Advancing the Bilateral Partnership -- 4.2.13 Conclusion -- References -- 5 Physical Protection of Nuclear Facilities and Materials -- 5.1 An Indian Perspective -- 5.1.1 Components of Physical Protection Regime and Indian Commitments -- 5.1.2 Considerations for Designing a PPS -- 5.1.3 Nuclear Security and Physical Protection in India: An Overview.

5.1.3.1 Historical Perspective -- 5.1.3.2 Security Architecture in India: General Considerations -- 5.1.3.3 Emergency Preparedness and Response -- 5.1.3.4 The Role of Technology in Nuclear Security in India -- 5.1.4 Security of Radioactive Materials in Nuclear Facilities -- 5.1.5 Transport Security of Nuclear and Radioactive Materials -- 5.1.5.1 Security of Radioactive Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.2 Security of Nuclear Materials in Transit -- 5.1.5.3 Special Security Measures -- 5.1.6 Conclusion and Future Initiatives -- 5.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 5.2.1 DEPO Method Overview -- 5.2.2 Applying the DEPO Method -- 5.2.3 Defining System Requirements -- 5.2.3.1 Asset(s) Under Protection -- 5.2.3.2 Defining System Constraints and Restraints -- 5.2.3.3 Defining the Threat -- 5.2.4 Design: Delay, Detection, and Response -- 5.2.4.1 Detection -- 5.2.4.2 Delay -- 5.2.4.3 Response -- 5.2.4.4 Evaluate -- 5.2.5 Conclusion -- References -- 6 Controlling and Managing Radioactive Sources -- 6.1 An Indian Perspective -- 6.1.1 Introduction -- 6.1.2 Control and Security of Radioactive Sources in Major Areas of Their Applications -- 6.1.2.1 Industrial Gamma Radiography (IR) Sources and Practices -- 6.1.2.2 Irradiator Plants (Gamma Radiation Plants) -- 6.1.2.3 Radiotherapy: RI Sources and Systems for Cancer Care -- 6.1.2.4 Other Areas of RI Source Applications -- 6.1.2.5 Human Element/Factor-Related Aspects -- 6.1.2.6 'Legacy Source'-Related Events and Lessons -- 6.1.3 Production of RI-Based Sources and Operation of Radiation Technology Facilities/Services-Indian Experiences with Control of Sources -- 6.1.4 Strengthening Measures to Control the Use of Radioactive Sources and to Foster Alternative Technologies -- 6.1.4.1 Alternative Technologies to the Use of Radioactive Sources-Existing, Emerging, and Under-Development Options -- 6.1.4.2 Medical Application Sources.

6.1.4.3 Industrial Application and Research Sources -- 6.1.4.4 Envisaged Areas of Continuity in RI Source Applications -- 6.1.5 Control of Radioactive Sources-Continuing Challenges and Path Forward -- 6.1.6 Recommendations -- 6.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 6.2.1 Overview: The Regulatory Framework in the United States -- 6.2.1.1 Federal Regulators: The Nuclear Regulatory Commission -- 6.2.1.2 State-Level Regulation: "Agreement State" Compacts -- 6.2.1.3 Agreements with the Armed Forces -- 6.2.2 Challenges Within the Framework -- 6.2.2.1 Compatible vs. Identical Regulations -- 6.2.2.2 Prescriptive vs. Performance-Based Criteria -- 6.2.3 An Emerging Consensus: Permanent Risk Reduction -- 6.2.3.1 The Cesium Irradiator Replacement Project (CIRP) -- 6.2.3.2 Collaborations with Diverse Stakeholders -- 6.2.3.3 Elimination of Nuclear Threat Networks to National Security -- 6.2.4 Conclusion -- References -- 7 Cybersecurity and Nuclear Facilities -- 7.1 An Indian Perspective -- 7.1.1 Identifying Risks and Vulnerabilities -- 7.1.2 Cybersecurity in India: An Overview -- 7.1.3 India's Cyber and Nuclear Infrastructure -- 7.1.4 Case Study: The Kudankulam Breach -- 7.1.5 Important Considerations and Recommendations -- 7.1.6 Conclusion -- 7.2 A U.S. Perspective -- 7.2.1 Background -- 7.2.2 Threat Agents and Vulnerabilities -- 7.2.3 U.S. Regulatory Approach -- 7.2.4 Potential Risks from a Cyberattack -- 7.2.5 Defense and Response -- 7.2.6 Supply-Chain Security -- 7.2.7 Assessing Cybersecurity -- 7.2.8 Summary and Conclusions -- References -- Index.