Introduction to Environmental Economics and Policy in Japan.

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Place / Publishing House:Singapore : : Springer,, 2024.
©2024.
Year of Publication:2024
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Physical Description:1 online resource (153 pages)
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100 1 |a Arimura, Toshi H. 
245 1 0 |a Introduction to Environmental Economics and Policy in Japan. 
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588 |a Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. 
505 0 |a Intro -- Preface -- Contents -- About the Authors -- Part I Theory of Environmental Economics -- 1 Environmental Problems: A Market Failure -- 1.1 Consumer Benefit and Producer Benefit: Understanding Demand Curve and Supply Curve -- 1.1.1 Consumption of Goods and Consumer Benefits: Consumer Surplus -- 1.1.2 Production of Goods and Producer Profit: Producer Surplus -- 1.2 Why Are Markets Omnipotent? -- 1.2.1 Output and Price Decisions -- 1.2.2 Socially Optimal Output -- 1.3 Why Do Environmental Problems Persist? a Market Failure -- 1.3.1 External Costs -- 1.4 Economic Analysis of Environmental Problems -- 1.4.1 Social Loss in a Competitive Market -- 1.4.2 Optimal Levels of Output and Pollution: Social Surplus Maximization -- 1.4.3 Is Achieving Zero Emissions the Right Thing to Do? -- 1.5 How Can a Market Failure Be Solved? -- 1.5.1 Regulatory Instruments and Market-Based Instruments (Economic Instruments) -- 1.5.2 Administrative Solutions: Command and Control Regulation -- 1.5.3 The Tax Solution -- 1.5.4 The Subsidy Solution -- 1.5.5 Implementation Issues -- References -- 2 Choice of Policy Instruments: Tax, Regulation or Subsidy -- 2.1 Environmental Taxes -- 2.2 Regulatory Instruments -- 2.3 Tax or Subsidy? -- 3 Property Right Approach and Emissions Trading Schemes -- 3.1 Property Rights to the Environment -- 3.1.1 The Model Setup -- 3.1.2 Marginal Private Benefit -- 3.1.3 Marginal External Cost (MEC) -- 3.1.4 Absence of Property Rights -- 3.1.5 Maximizing Social Benefit Through Property Rights Assignments and Bargaining -- 3.1.6 Property Rights Assigned to the Residents -- 3.1.7 Property Rights Assigned to the Polluter -- 3.2 Limitations of the Coase Theorem -- 3.2.1 Transaction Costs -- 3.2.2 Problems with Identifying the Polluter for Bargaining -- 3.3 Emissions Trading: Application of the Coase Theorem -- 3.3.1 ETS and Its Significance. 
505 8 |a 3.3.2 Transaction Costs in ETS -- 3.3.3 ETS and Environmental Tax -- References -- 4 Uncertainty and Policy Choice: Carbon Tax or Emissions Trading Scheme -- 4.1 Policy Choice and Total Social Surplus Under Perfect Information -- 4.2 Loss of Social Surplus Due to Imperfect Information on the MEC Curve -- 4.3 Loss of the Social Surplus Due to Imperfect Information on the CO2 Demand Function -- 4.4 Loss of the Social Surplus: The Slopes of the MEC Curve and the CO2 Demand Curve -- References -- 5 Waste Management: Optimal Disposal Fee and Intergenerational Use of the Landfill -- 5.1 Economic Analysis of Waste Disposal Charges -- 5.1.1 The Model Setup -- 5.1.2 Optimal Amount of Waste -- 5.1.3 No Charges on Waste Disposal -- 5.1.4 A Flat Fee Pricing Scheme -- 5.1.5 A Unit Pricing Scheme -- 5.1.6 No Charge, a Flat Fee, or a Unit Pricing? -- 5.2 Optimal Intergenerational Use of Landfills and Optimal Fee Policy -- 5.2.1 The Model Setup -- 5.2.2 Benefits for the Current and Future Generations When no Fee is Imposed -- 5.2.3 Marginal Social Surplus -- 5.2.4 Do "No Disposal Fees" Maximize the Total Social Surplus of All Generations? -- 5.2.5 Conditions for Optimal Landfill Use Between the Generations -- 5.2.6 Optimal Fees and Optimal Allocation of Waste Generation -- 5.2.7 Existence of the Future Generation and Optimal Waste Management Policies -- 5.2.8 Potential of Market Approaches to Optimizing Intergenerational Allocation of Landfills -- 6 Precaution Against Environmental Accidents and Liability Rules for Damages -- 6.1 Optimal Precaution and Optimal Liability Rules for Damages -- 6.1.1 Social Costs and Optimal Precautionary Measures -- 6.1.2 Firm's Precautionary Measures and Cost Under Liability Rules -- 6.1.3 Which Liability Rule is Socially Desirable? -- 6.2 The Judgment Proof Problem -- 6.2.1 Cases Where Firms Take Insufficient Precaution. 
505 8 |a 6.2.2 Cases Where Firms Take Excessive Precaution -- 6.2.3 Judgment Proofing and the Firm's Incentives for Precaution -- References -- Part II Environmental Policy in Japan -- 7 Recycling Laws and Their Evaluation in Japan -- 7.1 Recycling in Japan -- 7.1.1 Container and Packaging Recycling Act -- 7.1.2 Home Appliance Recycling Act -- 7.1.3 Small Home Appliance Recycling Act -- 7.1.4 End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling Act -- 7.1.5 Construction Material Recycling Act -- 7.1.6 Food Waste Recycling Act -- 7.2 Microplastic Pollution -- 7.3 Preventing Waste Scattering and Illegal Dumping -- 7.3.1 Deposit-Refund Scheme -- 7.3.2 Penal Regulation as a Substitute for a Deposit-Refund Scheme -- Reference -- 8 Air Pollution in Japan and the World -- 8.1 Introduction -- 8.2 Sources, Causes, and Health Effects of Air Pollution -- 8.3 Air Pollution and Policy Measures in Japan -- 8.4 Air Pollution Policies in Japan -- 8.4.1 Point Sources -- 8.4.2 Mobile Sources: Vehicle Emission Standards and Vehicle Type Regulations -- 8.4.3 Economic Analysis of Air Pollution Regulations: A Case of the Vehicle Type Regulation -- 8.5 Air Pollution in Developing Countries -- 8.6 Household Air Pollution in Developing Countries -- References -- 9 International Efforts on Climate Change and Carbon Pricing in Japan -- 9.1 International Cooperation on Climate Change -- 9.1.1 International Climate Agreements: The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement -- 9.1.2 The Clean Development Mechanism -- 9.1.3 The Joint Crediting Mechanism -- 9.1.4 Transitioning to Carbon Neutrality -- 9.2 The Mechanism of Carbon Pricing -- 9.2.1 Short- and Longer-Term Effects of Carbon Pricing -- 9.2.2 Carbon Neutrality and Emissions Trading -- 9.3 Carbon Pricing Developments Across the World -- 9.4 Carbon Pricing in Japan -- 9.4.1 The Global Warming Countermeasure Tax -- 9.4.2 Sub-national Emissions Trading Schemes. 
505 8 |a 9.4.3 J-Credit Scheme: A Voluntary Emissions Reduction Certification Program in Japan -- 9.5 Designing Carbon Pricing Systems -- 9.5.1 Carbon Leakage and International Competitiveness -- 9.5.2 The Fairness and Regressivity of Carbon Pricing -- 9.5.3 The Double Dividend of Carbon Pricing -- 9.5.4 Effective Carbon Rates and Challenges of the Current Energy Taxes -- 9.6 Carbon Pricing for Carbon Neutrality: Japan's Green Transformation (GX) -- References. 
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