Treaty Compliance.

Treaty Compliance.

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Nijhoff Law Specials Series ; v.32
:
The Markland Group, The Markland.
TeilnehmendeR:
Canadian Council on International Law, Canadian Council.
Place / Publishing House:Boston : : BRILL,, 1998.
©1998.
Year of Publication:1998
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Nijhoff Law Specials Series
Physical Description:1 online resource (165 pages)
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Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Table of Contents
  • Preface
  • International Workshop on Compliance Systems for Treaties
  • List of Participants
  • Recommendations Developed in Three Working Groups
  • Working Group One - Biological and Chemical Weapons
  • Working Group Two - Nuclear Treaties
  • 1. The IAEA Safeguards System
  • 2. The NPT and the Security Council
  • 3. Societal Role in Verification
  • Working Group Three - Humanitarian and Human Rights Treaties
  • New Crimes Against Peace? The Application of International Humanitarian Law Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Background
  • III. Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms in International Humanitarian Law
  • IV. The Potential Application of Law of Armed Conflict Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties
  • V. Conclusions
  • Compliance and the Non-proliferation Treaty: Developments in Safeguards and Supply Controls
  • I. The Technological and Political Context of Compliance
  • II. Three Lines of Response: Safeguards, Information and Acquisition
  • III. The Changing Nature of Safeguards
  • IV. Information
  • V. Acquisition
  • VI. Conclusion
  • New Trade and Environmental Compliance Measures to Enhance Conventional Arms Agreements: From Landmines to UN Peace-keeping
  • Introduction: On the Need to Limit Conventional Arms
  • I. Internalizing the Costs of Weapons
  • II. The Conventional Weapons Trade
  • A. The Numbers
  • B. 'Techno-Globalism'
  • C. 'Export or Expire' and the Rise of Commercialism
  • D. Globalization and International Production
  • 1. Dual-Use Items
  • 2. Proliferation and Indigenous Production
  • E. The Data
  • III. Existing Conventional Weapons Regimes
  • A. International Laws of War
  • 1. Customary and Emerging International Laws of War.
  • 2. 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention
  • a. 1995 Review Conference
  • b. The Ottawa Process
  • c. The International Landmine Campaign
  • d. Internalizing the Costs of Landmines
  • e. Proposals for Trade Measures and Codes of Conduct
  • IV. Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls
  • 1. Background To COCOM
  • a. COCOM Lists of Goods and Areas
  • b. Missile Technologies Control Regime
  • 2. The US System of Weapons-Related Trade Controls
  • a. Extraterritorial Implementation of US Trade Controls
  • b. Helms-Burton Act
  • 3. Canadian Trade Controls
  • 4. Export Controls and Free Trade
  • V. UN Register of Conventional Arms
  • 1. Background
  • 2. Operation
  • 3. Evaluation
  • 4. As a Compliance Tool
  • VI. Speculating on a NPT-like Conventional Weapons Treaty
  • VII. Traditional and Emerging Trade and Environment Compliance Measures - Application to Conventional Weapons
  • A. Trade Measures
  • 1. Arms Trade Controls and the GATT
  • a. The 'Essential Security' Exception in the GATT
  • b. New Surveillance Rules
  • 2. Government Subsidies
  • 3. GATT Border Tax Adjustment Rules
  • 4. Application to Conventional Arms Agreements
  • B. International Environmental Law and Measures
  • 1. The Precautionary Principle
  • a. Application to Conventional Weapons
  • 2. Intergenerational Equity and the Preventative Approach
  • 3. Polluter-Pay Principle
  • a. Application to Conventional Weapons
  • 4. Compliance Measures in Environmental Agreements
  • VIII. Conclusion
  • The Compliance Regime under the Chemical Weapons Convention - A Summary and Analysis
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Descriptive Glossary
  • The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
  • The Preparatory Commission
  • The Organization
  • The Conference
  • The Executive Council
  • The Technical Secretariat
  • The Director-General
  • The Inspected State Party
  • The Requesting State Party.
  • The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
  • III. The Elements of the Compliance Regime
  • Inter-Party Consultations
  • Inter-Party Referral to the ICJ
  • OPCW Referral to the ICJ
  • The Evaluation Process
  • Decisions by staff members of the Technical Secretariat
  • Decisions by the Director-General
  • Decisions by the Executive Council
  • Decisions by the Conference
  • Comment
  • Measures Available to The Executive Council
  • Measures Available to the Conference
  • Trade Incentives and Disincentives
  • Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Attack
  • Prerequisite to Withdrawal
  • Penal Legislation
  • National Authority
  • The Confidentiality Regime
  • Some Strengths and Weaknesses in the Compliance Regime
  • Proposals for Improving the Compliance Regime
  • Collective Measures
  • Other Measures
  • A Final Word About Sanctions
  • Conclusion
  • Strengthening Compliance Systems for Disarmament Treaties: The Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions
  • Abstract
  • I. Introduction
  • II. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)
  • III. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
  • IV. BWC and CWC Together
  • V. Conclusion.

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