Treaty Compliance.
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Superior document: | Nijhoff Law Specials Series ; v.32 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Boston : : BRILL,, 1998. ©1998. |
Year of Publication: | 1998 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | Nijhoff Law Specials Series
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (165 pages) |
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The Markland Group, The Markland. Treaty Compliance. 1st ed. Boston : BRILL, 1998. ©1998. 1 online resource (165 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Nijhoff Law Specials Series ; v.32 Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- International Workshop on Compliance Systems for Treaties -- List of Participants -- Recommendations Developed in Three Working Groups -- Working Group One - Biological and Chemical Weapons -- Working Group Two - Nuclear Treaties -- 1. The IAEA Safeguards System -- 2. The NPT and the Security Council -- 3. Societal Role in Verification -- Working Group Three - Humanitarian and Human Rights Treaties -- New Crimes Against Peace? The Application of International Humanitarian Law Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties -- I. Introduction -- II. Background -- III. Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms in International Humanitarian Law -- IV. The Potential Application of Law of Armed Conflict Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties -- V. Conclusions -- Compliance and the Non-proliferation Treaty: Developments in Safeguards and Supply Controls -- I. The Technological and Political Context of Compliance -- II. Three Lines of Response: Safeguards, Information and Acquisition -- III. The Changing Nature of Safeguards -- IV. Information -- V. Acquisition -- VI. Conclusion -- New Trade and Environmental Compliance Measures to Enhance Conventional Arms Agreements: From Landmines to UN Peace-keeping -- Introduction: On the Need to Limit Conventional Arms -- I. Internalizing the Costs of Weapons -- II. The Conventional Weapons Trade -- A. The Numbers -- B. 'Techno-Globalism' -- C. 'Export or Expire' and the Rise of Commercialism -- D. Globalization and International Production -- 1. Dual-Use Items -- 2. Proliferation and Indigenous Production -- E. The Data -- III. Existing Conventional Weapons Regimes -- A. International Laws of War -- 1. Customary and Emerging International Laws of War. 2. 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention -- a. 1995 Review Conference -- b. The Ottawa Process -- c. The International Landmine Campaign -- d. Internalizing the Costs of Landmines -- e. Proposals for Trade Measures and Codes of Conduct -- IV. Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls -- 1. Background To COCOM -- a. COCOM Lists of Goods and Areas -- b. Missile Technologies Control Regime -- 2. The US System of Weapons-Related Trade Controls -- a. Extraterritorial Implementation of US Trade Controls -- b. Helms-Burton Act -- 3. Canadian Trade Controls -- 4. Export Controls and Free Trade -- V. UN Register of Conventional Arms -- 1. Background -- 2. Operation -- 3. Evaluation -- 4. As a Compliance Tool -- VI. Speculating on a NPT-like Conventional Weapons Treaty -- VII. Traditional and Emerging Trade and Environment Compliance Measures - Application to Conventional Weapons -- A. Trade Measures -- 1. Arms Trade Controls and the GATT -- a. The 'Essential Security' Exception in the GATT -- b. New Surveillance Rules -- 2. Government Subsidies -- 3. GATT Border Tax Adjustment Rules -- 4. Application to Conventional Arms Agreements -- B. International Environmental Law and Measures -- 1. The Precautionary Principle -- a. Application to Conventional Weapons -- 2. Intergenerational Equity and the Preventative Approach -- 3. Polluter-Pay Principle -- a. Application to Conventional Weapons -- 4. Compliance Measures in Environmental Agreements -- VIII. Conclusion -- The Compliance Regime under the Chemical Weapons Convention - A Summary and Analysis -- I. Introduction -- II. Descriptive Glossary -- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- The Preparatory Commission -- The Organization -- The Conference -- The Executive Council -- The Technical Secretariat -- The Director-General -- The Inspected State Party -- The Requesting State Party. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- III. The Elements of the Compliance Regime -- Inter-Party Consultations -- Inter-Party Referral to the ICJ -- OPCW Referral to the ICJ -- The Evaluation Process -- Decisions by staff members of the Technical Secretariat -- Decisions by the Director-General -- Decisions by the Executive Council -- Decisions by the Conference -- Comment -- Measures Available to The Executive Council -- Measures Available to the Conference -- Trade Incentives and Disincentives -- Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Attack -- Prerequisite to Withdrawal -- Penal Legislation -- National Authority -- The Confidentiality Regime -- Some Strengths and Weaknesses in the Compliance Regime -- Proposals for Improving the Compliance Regime -- Collective Measures -- Other Measures -- A Final Word About Sanctions -- Conclusion -- Strengthening Compliance Systems for Disarmament Treaties: The Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- III. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- IV. BWC and CWC Together -- V. Conclusion. Canadian Council on International Law, Canadian Council. 90-411-0732-0 Nijhoff Law Specials Series |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
The Markland Group, The Markland. |
spellingShingle |
The Markland Group, The Markland. Treaty Compliance. Nijhoff Law Specials Series ; Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- International Workshop on Compliance Systems for Treaties -- List of Participants -- Recommendations Developed in Three Working Groups -- Working Group One - Biological and Chemical Weapons -- Working Group Two - Nuclear Treaties -- 1. The IAEA Safeguards System -- 2. The NPT and the Security Council -- 3. Societal Role in Verification -- Working Group Three - Humanitarian and Human Rights Treaties -- New Crimes Against Peace? The Application of International Humanitarian Law Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties -- I. Introduction -- II. Background -- III. Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms in International Humanitarian Law -- IV. The Potential Application of Law of Armed Conflict Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties -- V. Conclusions -- Compliance and the Non-proliferation Treaty: Developments in Safeguards and Supply Controls -- I. The Technological and Political Context of Compliance -- II. Three Lines of Response: Safeguards, Information and Acquisition -- III. The Changing Nature of Safeguards -- IV. Information -- V. Acquisition -- VI. Conclusion -- New Trade and Environmental Compliance Measures to Enhance Conventional Arms Agreements: From Landmines to UN Peace-keeping -- Introduction: On the Need to Limit Conventional Arms -- I. Internalizing the Costs of Weapons -- II. The Conventional Weapons Trade -- A. The Numbers -- B. 'Techno-Globalism' -- C. 'Export or Expire' and the Rise of Commercialism -- D. Globalization and International Production -- 1. Dual-Use Items -- 2. Proliferation and Indigenous Production -- E. The Data -- III. Existing Conventional Weapons Regimes -- A. International Laws of War -- 1. Customary and Emerging International Laws of War. 2. 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention -- a. 1995 Review Conference -- b. The Ottawa Process -- c. The International Landmine Campaign -- d. Internalizing the Costs of Landmines -- e. Proposals for Trade Measures and Codes of Conduct -- IV. Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls -- 1. Background To COCOM -- a. COCOM Lists of Goods and Areas -- b. Missile Technologies Control Regime -- 2. The US System of Weapons-Related Trade Controls -- a. Extraterritorial Implementation of US Trade Controls -- b. Helms-Burton Act -- 3. Canadian Trade Controls -- 4. Export Controls and Free Trade -- V. UN Register of Conventional Arms -- 1. Background -- 2. Operation -- 3. Evaluation -- 4. As a Compliance Tool -- VI. Speculating on a NPT-like Conventional Weapons Treaty -- VII. Traditional and Emerging Trade and Environment Compliance Measures - Application to Conventional Weapons -- A. Trade Measures -- 1. Arms Trade Controls and the GATT -- a. The 'Essential Security' Exception in the GATT -- b. New Surveillance Rules -- 2. Government Subsidies -- 3. GATT Border Tax Adjustment Rules -- 4. Application to Conventional Arms Agreements -- B. International Environmental Law and Measures -- 1. The Precautionary Principle -- a. Application to Conventional Weapons -- 2. Intergenerational Equity and the Preventative Approach -- 3. Polluter-Pay Principle -- a. Application to Conventional Weapons -- 4. Compliance Measures in Environmental Agreements -- VIII. Conclusion -- The Compliance Regime under the Chemical Weapons Convention - A Summary and Analysis -- I. Introduction -- II. Descriptive Glossary -- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- The Preparatory Commission -- The Organization -- The Conference -- The Executive Council -- The Technical Secretariat -- The Director-General -- The Inspected State Party -- The Requesting State Party. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- III. The Elements of the Compliance Regime -- Inter-Party Consultations -- Inter-Party Referral to the ICJ -- OPCW Referral to the ICJ -- The Evaluation Process -- Decisions by staff members of the Technical Secretariat -- Decisions by the Director-General -- Decisions by the Executive Council -- Decisions by the Conference -- Comment -- Measures Available to The Executive Council -- Measures Available to the Conference -- Trade Incentives and Disincentives -- Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Attack -- Prerequisite to Withdrawal -- Penal Legislation -- National Authority -- The Confidentiality Regime -- Some Strengths and Weaknesses in the Compliance Regime -- Proposals for Improving the Compliance Regime -- Collective Measures -- Other Measures -- A Final Word About Sanctions -- Conclusion -- Strengthening Compliance Systems for Disarmament Treaties: The Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- III. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- IV. BWC and CWC Together -- V. Conclusion. |
author_facet |
The Markland Group, The Markland. Canadian Council on International Law, Canadian Council. |
author_variant |
m g t m t mgtm mgtmt |
author2 |
Canadian Council on International Law, Canadian Council. |
author2_variant |
c o i l c c c coilcc coilccc |
author2_role |
TeilnehmendeR |
author_sort |
The Markland Group, The Markland. |
title |
Treaty Compliance. |
title_full |
Treaty Compliance. |
title_fullStr |
Treaty Compliance. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Treaty Compliance. |
title_auth |
Treaty Compliance. |
title_new |
Treaty Compliance. |
title_sort |
treaty compliance. |
series |
Nijhoff Law Specials Series ; |
series2 |
Nijhoff Law Specials Series ; |
publisher |
BRILL, |
publishDate |
1998 |
physical |
1 online resource (165 pages) |
edition |
1st ed. |
contents |
Intro -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- International Workshop on Compliance Systems for Treaties -- List of Participants -- Recommendations Developed in Three Working Groups -- Working Group One - Biological and Chemical Weapons -- Working Group Two - Nuclear Treaties -- 1. The IAEA Safeguards System -- 2. The NPT and the Security Council -- 3. Societal Role in Verification -- Working Group Three - Humanitarian and Human Rights Treaties -- New Crimes Against Peace? The Application of International Humanitarian Law Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties -- I. Introduction -- II. Background -- III. Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms in International Humanitarian Law -- IV. The Potential Application of Law of Armed Conflict Compliance and Enforcement Mechanisms to Arms Control and Disarmament Treaties -- V. Conclusions -- Compliance and the Non-proliferation Treaty: Developments in Safeguards and Supply Controls -- I. The Technological and Political Context of Compliance -- II. Three Lines of Response: Safeguards, Information and Acquisition -- III. The Changing Nature of Safeguards -- IV. Information -- V. Acquisition -- VI. Conclusion -- New Trade and Environmental Compliance Measures to Enhance Conventional Arms Agreements: From Landmines to UN Peace-keeping -- Introduction: On the Need to Limit Conventional Arms -- I. Internalizing the Costs of Weapons -- II. The Conventional Weapons Trade -- A. The Numbers -- B. 'Techno-Globalism' -- C. 'Export or Expire' and the Rise of Commercialism -- D. Globalization and International Production -- 1. Dual-Use Items -- 2. Proliferation and Indigenous Production -- E. The Data -- III. Existing Conventional Weapons Regimes -- A. International Laws of War -- 1. Customary and Emerging International Laws of War. 2. 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention -- a. 1995 Review Conference -- b. The Ottawa Process -- c. The International Landmine Campaign -- d. Internalizing the Costs of Landmines -- e. Proposals for Trade Measures and Codes of Conduct -- IV. Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Strategic Export Controls -- 1. Background To COCOM -- a. COCOM Lists of Goods and Areas -- b. Missile Technologies Control Regime -- 2. The US System of Weapons-Related Trade Controls -- a. Extraterritorial Implementation of US Trade Controls -- b. Helms-Burton Act -- 3. Canadian Trade Controls -- 4. Export Controls and Free Trade -- V. UN Register of Conventional Arms -- 1. Background -- 2. Operation -- 3. Evaluation -- 4. As a Compliance Tool -- VI. Speculating on a NPT-like Conventional Weapons Treaty -- VII. Traditional and Emerging Trade and Environment Compliance Measures - Application to Conventional Weapons -- A. Trade Measures -- 1. Arms Trade Controls and the GATT -- a. The 'Essential Security' Exception in the GATT -- b. New Surveillance Rules -- 2. Government Subsidies -- 3. GATT Border Tax Adjustment Rules -- 4. Application to Conventional Arms Agreements -- B. International Environmental Law and Measures -- 1. The Precautionary Principle -- a. Application to Conventional Weapons -- 2. Intergenerational Equity and the Preventative Approach -- 3. Polluter-Pay Principle -- a. Application to Conventional Weapons -- 4. Compliance Measures in Environmental Agreements -- VIII. Conclusion -- The Compliance Regime under the Chemical Weapons Convention - A Summary and Analysis -- I. Introduction -- II. Descriptive Glossary -- The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- The Preparatory Commission -- The Organization -- The Conference -- The Executive Council -- The Technical Secretariat -- The Director-General -- The Inspected State Party -- The Requesting State Party. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -- III. The Elements of the Compliance Regime -- Inter-Party Consultations -- Inter-Party Referral to the ICJ -- OPCW Referral to the ICJ -- The Evaluation Process -- Decisions by staff members of the Technical Secretariat -- Decisions by the Director-General -- Decisions by the Executive Council -- Decisions by the Conference -- Comment -- Measures Available to The Executive Council -- Measures Available to the Conference -- Trade Incentives and Disincentives -- Assistance and Protection Against Chemical Attack -- Prerequisite to Withdrawal -- Penal Legislation -- National Authority -- The Confidentiality Regime -- Some Strengths and Weaknesses in the Compliance Regime -- Proposals for Improving the Compliance Regime -- Collective Measures -- Other Measures -- A Final Word About Sanctions -- Conclusion -- Strengthening Compliance Systems for Disarmament Treaties: The Biological and Chemical Weapons Conventions -- Abstract -- I. Introduction -- II. Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) -- III. Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) -- IV. BWC and CWC Together -- V. Conclusion. |
isbn |
90-04-63587-4 90-411-0732-0 |
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Not Illustrated |
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