Air power as a coercive instrument / / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, Eric Larson.
Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons...
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Byman, Daniel, 1967- Air power as a coercive instrument / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, Eric Larson. Santa Monica, CA : Rand, 1999. 1 online resource (193 p.) text txt computer c online resource cr Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgements; Chapter One - Introduction; Coercion and U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of the USAF; Methodology and Cases Examined; Organization; Part 1. Definitions and Theory; Chapter Two - How to Think About Coercion; Definitions; A Theoretical Starting Point; Thinking about Coercion: a Policymaker's Perspective; Problem One: Limited Relevance; Problem Two: Measurement Pathologies; The Uncertain Meaning of "Success"; Conclusions; Part 2. Successful Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past Chapter Three - Explaining Success or Failure: the Historical Record Conditions for Successful Coercion; Escalation Dominance; Threatening to Defeat an Adversary's Strategy; Coercion in Context: Magnifying Third-Party Threats; Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; Intelligence and Estimation Challenges; Misperceptions and Coercion; Credibility Challenges; Feasibility Challenges; Conclusions; Part 3. Coercive Diplomacy Today; Chapter Four - Domestic Constraints on Coercion; Domestic Politics and the Success of Coercive Diplomacy; Constraints and the Democratic System The Challenge of Obtaining Domestic Support Consequences of Low Support; Sources of Domestic Constraints; Declaratory Policy; Congressional Checks and Balances, and Other Restrictions; The Press; Some Correlates of Public Support; Some Conditions Under Which Support Is Typically High; How an Adversary can Exploit U.S. Domestic Politics; Diminishing the Interests; Tarnishing the Cause and Conduct of the Operation; Dragging Out a Conflict; Imposing Costs; Manipulating Asymmetries in Escalation Preferences; Conclusions; Chapter Five - Coercion and Coalitions The Advantages of Coalitions for Coercers Limits Imposed by Coalitions; Lack of a Common Agenda; Shared Control; Limits to Escalation; Reduced Credibility; Coalitions and Adversary Counter-Coercion; Conclusions; Chapter Six - Coercing Nonstate Actors: a Challenge for the Future; Types of Missions; Coercing Local Warlords; Coercing State Sponsors; Characteristics of Coercive Operations Against Nonstate Actors; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Identifiable and Targetable Assets; Inaccurate Intelligence Estimates Are Particularly Common; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Control over Constituent Elements Indirect Coercion Is Often Difficult, Unreliable, and Counterproductive Nonstate Actors Are Adept at Exploiting Countermeasures to Coercion; Conclusions; Part 4. Coercion and the U.S. Air Force; Chapter Seven - Implications and Recommendations for the USAF; Air Power and Escalation Dominance; Air Power and Adversary Military Operations; Air Power and the Magnification of Third-Party Threats; Air Power and Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; The Need for Restraint; Appendix A - Cases Examined for this Study; Appendix B - Cases and Conditions for Success Appendix C - Coercive Attempts and Common Challenges Coercion--the use of threatened force to induce an adversary to change its behavior--is a critical function of the U.S. military. U.S. forces have recently fought in the Balkans, the Persian Gulf, and the Horn of Africa to compel recalcitrant regimes and warlords to stop repression, abandon weapons programs, permit humanitarian relief, and otherwise modify their actions. Yet despite its overwhelming military might, the United States often fails to coerce successfully. This report examines the phenomenon of coercion and how air power can contribute to its success. Three factors increase the lik English "MR-1061-AF." "Project Air Force, Rand". Includes bibliographical references. Air power United States. Air power. Military planning United States. 0-8330-2743-3 Larson, Eric V. (Eric Victor), 1957- Waxman, Matthew C., 1972- Project Air Force (U.S.) Rand Corporation. |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Byman, Daniel, 1967- |
spellingShingle |
Byman, Daniel, 1967- Air power as a coercive instrument / Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgements; Chapter One - Introduction; Coercion and U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of the USAF; Methodology and Cases Examined; Organization; Part 1. Definitions and Theory; Chapter Two - How to Think About Coercion; Definitions; A Theoretical Starting Point; Thinking about Coercion: a Policymaker's Perspective; Problem One: Limited Relevance; Problem Two: Measurement Pathologies; The Uncertain Meaning of "Success"; Conclusions; Part 2. Successful Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past Chapter Three - Explaining Success or Failure: the Historical Record Conditions for Successful Coercion; Escalation Dominance; Threatening to Defeat an Adversary's Strategy; Coercion in Context: Magnifying Third-Party Threats; Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; Intelligence and Estimation Challenges; Misperceptions and Coercion; Credibility Challenges; Feasibility Challenges; Conclusions; Part 3. Coercive Diplomacy Today; Chapter Four - Domestic Constraints on Coercion; Domestic Politics and the Success of Coercive Diplomacy; Constraints and the Democratic System The Challenge of Obtaining Domestic Support Consequences of Low Support; Sources of Domestic Constraints; Declaratory Policy; Congressional Checks and Balances, and Other Restrictions; The Press; Some Correlates of Public Support; Some Conditions Under Which Support Is Typically High; How an Adversary can Exploit U.S. Domestic Politics; Diminishing the Interests; Tarnishing the Cause and Conduct of the Operation; Dragging Out a Conflict; Imposing Costs; Manipulating Asymmetries in Escalation Preferences; Conclusions; Chapter Five - Coercion and Coalitions The Advantages of Coalitions for Coercers Limits Imposed by Coalitions; Lack of a Common Agenda; Shared Control; Limits to Escalation; Reduced Credibility; Coalitions and Adversary Counter-Coercion; Conclusions; Chapter Six - Coercing Nonstate Actors: a Challenge for the Future; Types of Missions; Coercing Local Warlords; Coercing State Sponsors; Characteristics of Coercive Operations Against Nonstate Actors; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Identifiable and Targetable Assets; Inaccurate Intelligence Estimates Are Particularly Common; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Control over Constituent Elements Indirect Coercion Is Often Difficult, Unreliable, and Counterproductive Nonstate Actors Are Adept at Exploiting Countermeasures to Coercion; Conclusions; Part 4. Coercion and the U.S. Air Force; Chapter Seven - Implications and Recommendations for the USAF; Air Power and Escalation Dominance; Air Power and Adversary Military Operations; Air Power and the Magnification of Third-Party Threats; Air Power and Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; The Need for Restraint; Appendix A - Cases Examined for this Study; Appendix B - Cases and Conditions for Success Appendix C - Coercive Attempts and Common Challenges |
author_facet |
Byman, Daniel, 1967- Larson, Eric V. 1957- Waxman, Matthew C., 1972- Project Air Force (U.S.) Rand Corporation. Project Air Force (U.S.) Rand Corporation. |
author_variant |
d b db |
author2 |
Larson, Eric V. 1957- Waxman, Matthew C., 1972- Project Air Force (U.S.) Rand Corporation. |
author2_variant |
e v l ev evl m c w mc mcw |
author2_fuller |
(Eric Victor), |
author2_role |
TeilnehmendeR TeilnehmendeR TeilnehmendeR TeilnehmendeR |
author_corporate |
Project Air Force (U.S.) Rand Corporation. |
author_sort |
Byman, Daniel, 1967- |
title |
Air power as a coercive instrument / |
title_full |
Air power as a coercive instrument / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, Eric Larson. |
title_fullStr |
Air power as a coercive instrument / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, Eric Larson. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Air power as a coercive instrument / Daniel L. Byman, Matthew C. Waxman, Eric Larson. |
title_auth |
Air power as a coercive instrument / |
title_new |
Air power as a coercive instrument / |
title_sort |
air power as a coercive instrument / |
publisher |
Rand, |
publishDate |
1999 |
physical |
1 online resource (193 p.) |
contents |
Cover; Preface; Contents; Figures; Tables; Summary; Acknowledgements; Chapter One - Introduction; Coercion and U.S. National Security Policy; The Role of the USAF; Methodology and Cases Examined; Organization; Part 1. Definitions and Theory; Chapter Two - How to Think About Coercion; Definitions; A Theoretical Starting Point; Thinking about Coercion: a Policymaker's Perspective; Problem One: Limited Relevance; Problem Two: Measurement Pathologies; The Uncertain Meaning of "Success"; Conclusions; Part 2. Successful Coercive Diplomacy: Lessons from the Past Chapter Three - Explaining Success or Failure: the Historical Record Conditions for Successful Coercion; Escalation Dominance; Threatening to Defeat an Adversary's Strategy; Coercion in Context: Magnifying Third-Party Threats; Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; Intelligence and Estimation Challenges; Misperceptions and Coercion; Credibility Challenges; Feasibility Challenges; Conclusions; Part 3. Coercive Diplomacy Today; Chapter Four - Domestic Constraints on Coercion; Domestic Politics and the Success of Coercive Diplomacy; Constraints and the Democratic System The Challenge of Obtaining Domestic Support Consequences of Low Support; Sources of Domestic Constraints; Declaratory Policy; Congressional Checks and Balances, and Other Restrictions; The Press; Some Correlates of Public Support; Some Conditions Under Which Support Is Typically High; How an Adversary can Exploit U.S. Domestic Politics; Diminishing the Interests; Tarnishing the Cause and Conduct of the Operation; Dragging Out a Conflict; Imposing Costs; Manipulating Asymmetries in Escalation Preferences; Conclusions; Chapter Five - Coercion and Coalitions The Advantages of Coalitions for Coercers Limits Imposed by Coalitions; Lack of a Common Agenda; Shared Control; Limits to Escalation; Reduced Credibility; Coalitions and Adversary Counter-Coercion; Conclusions; Chapter Six - Coercing Nonstate Actors: a Challenge for the Future; Types of Missions; Coercing Local Warlords; Coercing State Sponsors; Characteristics of Coercive Operations Against Nonstate Actors; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Identifiable and Targetable Assets; Inaccurate Intelligence Estimates Are Particularly Common; Nonstate Adversaries May Lack Control over Constituent Elements Indirect Coercion Is Often Difficult, Unreliable, and Counterproductive Nonstate Actors Are Adept at Exploiting Countermeasures to Coercion; Conclusions; Part 4. Coercion and the U.S. Air Force; Chapter Seven - Implications and Recommendations for the USAF; Air Power and Escalation Dominance; Air Power and Adversary Military Operations; Air Power and the Magnification of Third-Party Threats; Air Power and Common Challenges in Coercive Operations; The Need for Restraint; Appendix A - Cases Examined for this Study; Appendix B - Cases and Conditions for Success Appendix C - Coercive Attempts and Common Challenges |
isbn |
1-282-45109-X 9786612451096 0-8330-4828-7 0-585-24548-7 0-8330-2743-3 |
callnumber-first |
U - Military Science |
callnumber-subject |
UG - Military Engineering and Air Forces |
callnumber-label |
UG633 |
callnumber-sort |
UG 3633 B94 41999 |
geographic_facet |
United States. |
illustrated |
Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
350 - Public administration & military science |
dewey-ones |
358 - Air & other specialized forces |
dewey-full |
358.4/14/0973 |
dewey-sort |
3358.4 214 3973 |
dewey-raw |
358.4/14/0973 |
dewey-search |
358.4/14/0973 |
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