A non-instrumentalist approach to collective intentionality, practical reason, and the self / / Juliette Gloor.

• VerfasserIn: Gloor, Juliette,
• Place / Publishing House: Göttingen, Germany : : V&R Unipress,, 2014.; ©2014
• Year of Publication: 2014
• Language: German
• Series: V&R Academic A non-instrumentalist approach to collective intentionality, practical reason, and the self
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (256 p.)
• Notes: Description based upon print version of record.

Juliette Gloors Monographie fragt aus hauptsächlich analytischer Perspektive und unter spezieller Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen anglo-amerikanischen Debatten, was es bedeutet, Gründe und andere intentionale Einstellungen zu teilen. Die Leitfrage der Untersuchung lautet, inwiefern Moral und...

Table of Contents

• Title Page; Copyright; Table of Contents; Body; Preface; Overview; Chapter 1: A Problematic Dichotomy - Setting the Methodological Frame; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Two Fundamental Problems of Instrumental Rationality with Collective Intentionality; 1.3 A Problematic Dichotomy: Two Separate Realms of Behaviour; 1.4 Korsgaard's Two Conceptions of the Final Good; 1.4.1 The Function of Rational Animals; 1.4.2 Normative Goodness; 1.4.3 The Relation between the Good Human Life and the Human Good; 1.5 Feeling Respect: "The Feeling of Us"; 1.6 The Relation between Language and Self-Consciousness
• 1.6.1 Schmid's Criticism of Searle1.6.2 We-Intentions and Sharing Intentions; 1.7 Can Collective Intentionality Consist of Purely Cognitive Relations?; 1.8 Conclusion; Chapter 2: Collective Intentionality and Animal Consciousness; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Collective Intentionality; 2.2.1 Shareability and Actual Sharedness; 2.3 The First Person Perspective, Sharing Mental Attitudes, and Reasons; 2.3.1 The Age-Old Division between Perception or Affect and Thinking; 2.4 Animal Mentality; 2.4.1 The Peculiar Nature of Animal Consciousness; 2.4.2 The Structural Openness of Animal Consciousness
• 2.5 Defending a Non-Instrumentalist Approach to Collective Intentionality2.6 Self-Consciousness Revisited; 2.6.1 The Non-Epistemological Knowledge-Relationship of the Self with Itself; 2.6.2 Self-Consciousness and Reasons; 2.7 Conclusion; Chapter 3: Practical Reasons and Other-Regardingness; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Epistemic Norms Are (not) of the Same Kind as Practical Norms; 3.2.1 Epistemic Norms Are Constitutive Norms of Thought; 3.3 Practical Norms; 3.4 Practical Identities and the Moral Identity We Share; 3.4.1 A Crucial Ambiguity in Korsgaard's Account of Normativity
• 3.5 Two Objections and Two Replies3.6 Korsgaard's "Public Conception of Reasons"; 3.6.1 Two Final Objections; 3.7 Conclusion; Chapter 4: Self-Relation and Relation to Others; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Shareability and Communicability; 4.2.1 Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument; 4.2.2 Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument and Korsgaard's Notion of Publicity; 4.3 Sharing Evaluative Perspectives and Plural Agency; 4.4 Meeting the Challenge; 4.5 The Normative Structure of the Self; 4.5.1 Richardson's Objection from "Reflective Sovereignty"; 4.5.2 Larmore's Objection from Self-Commitment
• 4.5.3 First Person Authority4.6 Conclusion; Chapter 5: Why Human Self-Relation Cannot Be Instrumentally Normative - Results and Some Applications; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Can Instrumentalism Be Saved?; 5.2.1 The Normativity of the Will; 5.2.2 The Form of Rational Animals; 5.2.3 The Instrumentalist's Worry and a Reply; 5.3 Two Ways of Understanding Action; 5.4 Human Desires Are Reason-Responsive; 5.5 Subjectively Normative Reasons and Objectively Normative Reasons; 5.6 The Milgram Experiment; 5.7 Conclusion; Bibliography