A non-instrumentalist approach to collective intentionality, practical reason, and the self / / Juliette Gloor.

• VerfasserIn: Gloor, Juliette,
• Place / Publishing House: Göttingen, Germany : : V&R Unipress,, 2014.; ©2014
• Year of Publication: 2014
• Language: German
• Series: V&R Academic A non-instrumentalist approach to collective intentionality, practical reason, and the self
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (256 p.)
• Notes: Description based upon print version of record.

Juliette Gloors Monographie fragt aus hauptsächlich analytischer Perspektive und unter spezieller Berücksichtigung der einschlägigen anglo-amerikanischen Debatten, was es bedeutet, Gründe und andere intentionale Einstellungen zu teilen. Die Leitfrage der Untersuchung lautet, inwiefern Moral und damit Selbstbewusstsein als Bedingungen der Möglichkeit solchen Teilens begriffen werden können. Die Dissertation ist ein Beitrag zur Forschung innerhalb des Gebiets der Praktischen Philosophie (insbesondere der normativen Ethik) und der Sozialphilosophie (speziell im Bereich der Kollektiven Intentional

Table of Contents

Title Page; Copyright; Table of Contents; Body; Preface; Overview; Chapter 1: A Problematic Dichotomy - Setting the Methodological Frame; 1.1 Introduction; 1.2 Two Fundamental Problems of Instrumental Rationality with Collective Intentionality; 1.3 A Problematic Dichotomy: Two Separate Realms of Behaviour; 1.4 Korsgaard's Two Conceptions of the Final Good; 1.4.1 The Function of Rational Animals; 1.4.2 Normative Goodness; 1.4.3 The Relation between the Good Human Life and the Human Good; 1.5 Feeling Respect: "The Feeling of Us"; 1.6 The Relation between Language and Self-Consciousness

1.6.1 Schmid's Criticism of Searle1.6.2 We-Intentions and Sharing Intentions; 1.7 Can Collective Intentionality Consist of Purely Cognitive Relations?; 1.8 Conclusion; Chapter 2: Collective Intentionality and Animal Consciousness; 2.1 Introduction; 2.2 Collective Intentionality; 2.2.1 Shareability and Actual Sharedness; 2.3 The First Person Perspective, Sharing Mental Attitudes, and Reasons; 2.3.1 The Age-Old Division between Perception or Affect and Thinking; 2.4 Animal Mentality; 2.4.1 The Peculiar Nature of Animal Consciousness; 2.4.2 The Structural Openness of Animal Consciousness

2.5 Defending a Non-Instrumentalist Approach to Collective Intentionality2.6 Self-Consciousness Revisited; 2.6.1 The Non-Epistemological Knowledge-Relationship of the Self with Itself; 2.6.2 Self-Consciousness and Reasons; 2.7 Conclusion; Chapter 3: Practical Reasons and Other-Regardingness; 3.1 Introduction; 3.2 Epistemic Norms Are (not) of the Same Kind as Practical Norms; 3.2.1 Epistemic Norms Are Constitutive Norms of Thought; 3.3 Practical Norms; 3.4 Practical Identities and the Moral Identity We Share; 3.4.1 A Crucial Ambiguity in Korsgaard's Account of Normativity

3.5 Two Objections and Two Replies3.6 Korsgaard's "Public Conception of Reasons"; 3.6.1 Two Final Objections; 3.7 Conclusion; Chapter 4: Self-Relation and Relation to Others; 4.1 Introduction; 4.2 Shareability and Communicability; 4.2.1 Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument; 4.2.2 Wittgenstein's Private Language Argument and Korsgaard's Notion of Publicity; 4.3 Sharing Evaluative Perspectives and Plural Agency; 4.4 Meeting the Challenge; 4.5 The Normative Structure of the Self; 4.5.1 Richardson's Objection from "Reflective Sovereignty"; 4.5.2 Larmore's Objection from Self-Commitment

4.5.3 First Person Authority4.6 Conclusion; Chapter 5: Why Human Self-Relation Cannot Be Instrumentally Normative - Results and Some Applications; 5.1 Introduction; 5.2 Can Instrumentalism Be Saved?; 5.2.1 The Normativity of the Will; 5.2.2 The Form of Rational Animals; 5.2.3 The Instrumentalist's Worry and a Reply; 5.3 Two Ways of Understanding Action; 5.4 Human Desires Are Reason-Responsive; 5.5 Subjectively Normative Reasons and Objectively Normative Reasons; 5.6 The Milgram Experiment; 5.7 Conclusion; Bibliography