Moral Conflicts of Organ Retrieval : : A Case for Constructive Pluralism / / Charles C. Hinkley II.

• Superior document: Value Inquiry Book Series ; 172
• VerfasserIn: Hinkley, Charles C., II,
• Place / Publishing House: Leiden;, Boston : : BRILL,, 2005.
• Year of Publication: 2005
• Language: English
• Series: Value Inquiry Book Series ; 172.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (247 p.)
• Notes: Description based upon print version of record.

This book addresses ethical conflicts arising from saving the lives of patients who need a transplant while treating living and dead donors, organ sellers, animals, and embryos with proper moral regard. Our challenge is to develop a better world in the light of debatable values and uncertain consequ...

Table of Contents

• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part 1: A Philosophical Framework
• 1 Dilemmas, Conflicts, and Residue
• 1 Terminology
• 2 Moral Residue
• 3 Epistemology and Ontology of Dilemmas
• 4 Dilemmas and Deontic Logic
• 5 Guilt, Regret, and Remorse
• 6 Autonomy and Wrongdoing
• 7 Survivor's Guilt
• 8 The Nature of Emotion
• 9 Residual Requirements to Act
• 10 Can We Do without Residue?
• 11 Intuitively Knowing Dilemmas
• 12 Conclusion
• 2 Medical Ethics and Its Limitations
• 1 Cliff's Choice
• 2 Beauchamp and Childress's Principlism
• 3 Virtue Ethics
• 4 Feminist Bioethics
• 5 Case Analysis
• 6 Engelhardt's Postmodern Libertarianism
• 7 Gert, Culver, and Clouser on Common Morality
• 8 Cliff's Choice Revisited
• 9 Conclusion
• 3 Pluralism, Incommensurability, and Weighing
• 1 Moral Pluralism
• 2 Incommensurability
• 3 Covering Values
• 4 The Plurality of Values
• 5 The Calculation of Values
• 6 The Irresolvability of Conflict
• 7 Education and Skill
• 8 Merited Desire Strength
• 9 Weighing Our Options
• 10 Conclusion
• Part 2: Conflicts of Organ Retrieval
• 4 Transplant Recipients' Quality of Life
• 1 Heart Transplants
• 2 Liver Transplants
• 3 Kidney Transplants
• 4 Conclusion
• 5 Can We Wrong the Dead?
• 1 Bioethics and Patient Autonomy
• 2 The Pitcher-Feinberg Thesis
• 3 Callahan's Challenge
• 4 Serafini's Thesis
• 5 Symbolic Action and the Preferences of the Living
• 6 For the Living
• 7 Conclusion
• 6 Defining Death
• 1 Historical Background for the Whole-Brain Definition of Death
• 2 Problems with the Whole-Brain Definition of Death
• 3 The Higher-Brain Definition
• 4 Revisiting the Whole-Brain Definition
• 5 The Cardiopulmonary Definition
• 6 Renewed Challenges to Whole Brain Death
• 7 Is Defining Death a Moral Issue?
• 8 Conclusion
• 7 The Selling of Organs
• 1 Models of Organ Vending
• 2 Cultural Values and Meaning
• 3 Financial Incentives and the Supply of Organs
• 4 Commodification
• 5 Defenders of Organ Sales and Their Critics
• 6 Risks of Living Donation
• 7 Respect for Persons
• 8 Cadaveric Organ Sales and the Altruistic Tradition
• 9 Conclusion
• 8 Xenografts
• 1 Historical Background
• 2 Qualitative Distinctions and Human Privilege
• 3 Risks to Third Parties
• 4 Responding to Risk
• 5 The Prospects of Xenografts
• 6 Conclusion
• 9 Stem Cell Research
• 1 United States Policy
• 2 The Moral Status of Early Human Life Forms
• 3 Property Rights
• 4 Adult Stem Cells
• 5 iPSCs
• 6 Conclusion
• Part 3: A Philosophical Response
• 10 The Regulative Principle
• 1 Marcus's Regulative Principle
• 2 Mothersill on the Regulative Principle
• 3 The Regulative Principle and Dilemmas
• 4 The Regulative Principle and Conflicts
• 5 Implications for Prevention
• 6 Prevention
• 7 Conclusion
• 11 Constructive Pluralism
• 1 Rationality amid Incommensurability
• 2 Routine Retrieval, Presumed Consent, and Familial Consent
• 3 The Definition of Death
• 4 Selling Organs
• 5 Xenotransplants
• 6 Stem Cell Research
• 7 Additional Strategies
• 8 Sets of Strategies
• 9 Conclusion
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Author Index
• subject Index.