Moral Conflicts of Organ Retrieval : : A Case for Constructive Pluralism / / Charles C. Hinkley II.

• Superior document: Value Inquiry Book Series ; 172
• VerfasserIn: Hinkley, Charles C., II,
• Place / Publishing House: Leiden;, Boston : : BRILL,, 2005.
• Year of Publication: 2005
• Language: English
• Series: Value Inquiry Book Series ; 172.
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (247 p.)
• Notes: Description based upon print version of record.

This book addresses ethical conflicts arising from saving the lives of patients who need a transplant while treating living and dead donors, organ sellers, animals, and embryos with proper moral regard. Our challenge is to develop a better world in the light of debatable values and uncertain consequences.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part 1: A Philosophical Framework -- 1 Dilemmas, Conflicts, and Residue -- 1 Terminology -- 2 Moral Residue -- 3 Epistemology and Ontology of Dilemmas -- 4 Dilemmas and Deontic Logic -- 5 Guilt, Regret, and Remorse -- 6 Autonomy and Wrongdoing -- 7 Survivor's Guilt -- 8 The Nature of Emotion -- 9 Residual Requirements to Act -- 10 Can We Do without Residue? -- 11 Intuitively Knowing Dilemmas -- 12 Conclusion -- 2 Medical Ethics and Its Limitations -- 1 Cliff's Choice -- 2 Beauchamp and Childress's Principlism -- 3 Virtue Ethics -- 4 Feminist Bioethics -- 5 Case Analysis -- 6 Engelhardt's Postmodern Libertarianism -- 7 Gert, Culver, and Clouser on Common Morality -- 8 Cliff's Choice Revisited -- 9 Conclusion -- 3 Pluralism, Incommensurability, and Weighing -- 1 Moral Pluralism -- 2 Incommensurability -- 3 Covering Values -- 4 The Plurality of Values -- 5 The Calculation of Values -- 6 The Irresolvability of Conflict -- 7 Education and Skill -- 8 Merited Desire Strength -- 9 Weighing Our Options -- 10 Conclusion -- Part 2: Conflicts of Organ Retrieval -- 4 Transplant Recipients' Quality of Life -- 1 Heart Transplants -- 2 Liver Transplants -- 3 Kidney Transplants -- 4 Conclusion -- 5 Can We Wrong the Dead? -- 1 Bioethics and Patient Autonomy -- 2 The Pitcher-Feinberg Thesis -- 3 Callahan's Challenge -- 4 Serafini's Thesis -- 5 Symbolic Action and the Preferences of the Living -- 6 For the Living -- 7 Conclusion -- 6 Defining Death -- 1 Historical Background for the Whole-Brain Definition of Death -- 2 Problems with the Whole-Brain Definition of Death -- 3 The Higher-Brain Definition -- 4 Revisiting the Whole-Brain Definition -- 5 The Cardiopulmonary Definition -- 6 Renewed Challenges to Whole Brain Death -- 7 Is Defining Death a Moral Issue? -- 8 Conclusion -- 7 The Selling of Organs -- 1 Models of Organ Vending -- 2 Cultural Values and Meaning -- 3 Financial Incentives and the Supply of Organs -- 4 Commodification -- 5 Defenders of Organ Sales and Their Critics -- 6 Risks of Living Donation -- 7 Respect for Persons -- 8 Cadaveric Organ Sales and the Altruistic Tradition -- 9 Conclusion -- 8 Xenografts -- 1 Historical Background -- 2 Qualitative Distinctions and Human Privilege -- 3 Risks to Third Parties -- 4 Responding to Risk -- 5 The Prospects of Xenografts -- 6 Conclusion -- 9 Stem Cell Research -- 1 United States Policy -- 2 The Moral Status of Early Human Life Forms -- 3 Property Rights -- 4 Adult Stem Cells -- 5 iPSCs -- 6 Conclusion -- Part 3: A Philosophical Response -- 10 The Regulative Principle -- 1 Marcus's Regulative Principle -- 2 Mothersill on the Regulative Principle -- 3 The Regulative Principle and Dilemmas -- 4 The Regulative Principle and Conflicts -- 5 Implications for Prevention -- 6 Prevention -- 7 Conclusion -- 11 Constructive Pluralism -- 1 Rationality amid Incommensurability -- 2 Routine Retrieval, Presumed Consent, and Familial Consent -- 3 The Definition of Death -- 4 Selling Organs -- 5 Xenotransplants -- 6 Stem Cell Research -- 7 Additional Strategies -- 8 Sets of Strategies -- 9 Conclusion -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Author Index -- subject Index.