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Preferences / / ed. by Christoph Fehige, Ulla Wessels.

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Philosophy 1990 - 1999
MitwirkendeR:
BOK, HILARY,
BOMBOSCH, UWE,
BRANDT, RICHARD Β .,
BROOME, JOHN,
CORRADINI, ANTONELLA,
DANIELSSON, SVEN,
FEHIGE, CHRISTOPH,
GAUTHIER, DAVID,
GIBBARD, ALLAN,
HARE, RICHARD Μ.,
HEGSELMANN, RAINER,
HINSCH, WILFRIED,
KRAUSE, ULRICH,
KUSSER, ANNA,
KUTSCHERA, FRANZ VON,
LADEN, ANTHONY SIMON,
LENZEN, WOLFGANG,
LUMER, CHRISTOPH,
MCMAHAN, JEFF,
MEGGLE, GEORG,
MILLGRAM, ELIJAH,
NIDA-RÜMELIN, JULIAN,
NORTMANN, ULRICH,
SCHÜSSLER, RUDOLF,
SHOEMAKER, SYDNEY,
SINGER, PETER,
SPITZLEY, THOMAS,
TRAPP, RAINER WERNER,
VELLEMAN, J. DAVID,
WESSELS, ULLA,
WIGGINS, DAVID,
WILLASCHEK, MARCUS,
ÅQVIST, LENNART,
HerausgeberIn:
Fehige, Christoph,
Wessels, Ulla,
Place / Publishing House:Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2011]
©1998
Year of Publication:2011
Language:English
Series:Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy ; 19
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (568 p.) :; Num. figs.
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Table of Contents:
  • I-VI
  • Preface
  • Contents
  • Abstracts
  • Introduction
  • Preferences - an Introduction
  • Preferences - a Short Bibliography
  • Part I: Preference and Decision
  • Deciding to Desire
  • Desiring at Will (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram
  • Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision?
  • Intrinsic Desirabilities: A Reply to Lumer
  • The Rational Criticism of Preferences
  • Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt
  • Is Motivation Internal to Value?
  • Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman
  • Numerical Representations of Value-Orderings: Some Basic Problems
  • Interval Orders Defended: A Reply to Danielsson
  • Part II: Preference and Metaethics
  • Prima Facie Obligations in Deontic Logic: A Chisholmian Analysis Based on Normative Preference Structures
  • The Meaning of "Ought, Prima Facie" and Decision Situations: A Reply to Åqvist
  • Values and Duties
  • Beyond Duty: A Reply to von Kutschera
  • Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Obligation
  • Autonomy and Morality: A Reply to Willaschek
  • In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical Reasons
  • Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins
  • Preference and Preferability
  • Goodness and Rational Preferability: A Reply to Gibbard
  • Part III: Preference and Ethics
  • Extended Preferences
  • Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi's Extended Preference Theory
  • Experimental Ethics: A Computer Simulation of Classes, Cliques, and Solidarity
  • Solidarity among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann
  • The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality?
  • A Hobbesian Choice: Reply to Trapp
  • Symposium on Possible Preferences
  • Introduction to Possible Preferences
  • Possible Preferences
  • Preferences of Possible People
  • Who Counts?
  • Procreation
  • Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing
  • McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods
  • A Pareto Principle for Possible People
  • Notes on Contributors
  • Name Index
  • Subject Index
  • 569-570

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