Preferences / / ed. by Christoph Fehige, Ulla Wessels.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Philosophy 1990 - 1999
• MitwirkendeR: BOK, HILARY,; BOMBOSCH, UWE,; BRANDT, RICHARD Β .,; BROOME, JOHN,; CORRADINI, ANTONELLA,; DANIELSSON, SVEN,; FEHIGE, CHRISTOPH,; GAUTHIER, DAVID,; GIBBARD, ALLAN,; HARE, RICHARD Μ.,; HEGSELMANN, RAINER,; HINSCH, WILFRIED,; KRAUSE, ULRICH,; KUSSER, ANNA,; KUTSCHERA, FRANZ VON,; LADEN, ANTHONY SIMON,; LENZEN, WOLFGANG,; LUMER, CHRISTOPH,; MCMAHAN, JEFF,; MEGGLE, GEORG,; MILLGRAM, ELIJAH,; NIDA-RÜMELIN, JULIAN,; NORTMANN, ULRICH,; SCHÜSSLER, RUDOLF,; SHOEMAKER, SYDNEY,; SINGER, PETER,; SPITZLEY, THOMAS,; TRAPP, RAINER WERNER,; VELLEMAN, J. DAVID,; WESSELS, ULLA,; WIGGINS, DAVID,; WILLASCHEK, MARCUS,; ÅQVIST, LENNART,
• HerausgeberIn: Fehige, Christoph,; Wessels, Ulla,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2011]; ©1998
• Year of Publication: 2011
• Language: English
• Series: Perspektiven der Analytischen Philosophie / Perspectives in Analytical Philosophy ; 19
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (568 p.) :; Num. figs.

Table of Contents

I-VI -- Preface -- Contents -- Abstracts -- Introduction -- Preferences - an Introduction -- Preferences - a Short Bibliography -- Part I: Preference and Decision -- Deciding to Desire -- Desiring at Will (and at Pill): A Reply to Millgram -- Which Preferences Shall Be the Basis of Rational Decision? -- Intrinsic Desirabilities: A Reply to Lumer -- The Rational Criticism of Preferences -- Rational by Shock: A Reply to Brandt -- Is Motivation Internal to Value? -- Motivation and Value: A Reply to Velleman -- Numerical Representations of Value-Orderings: Some Basic Problems -- Interval Orders Defended: A Reply to Danielsson -- Part II: Preference and Metaethics -- Prima Facie Obligations in Deontic Logic: A Chisholmian Analysis Based on Normative Preference Structures -- The Meaning of "Ought, Prima Facie" and Decision Situations: A Reply to Åqvist -- Values and Duties -- Beyond Duty: A Reply to von Kutschera -- Agency, Autonomy, and Moral Obligation -- Autonomy and Morality: A Reply to Willaschek -- In a Subjectivist Framework, Categorical Requirements and Real Practical Reasons -- Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins -- Preference and Preferability -- Goodness and Rational Preferability: A Reply to Gibbard -- Part III: Preference and Ethics -- Extended Preferences -- Wish You Were Me: A Reply to Broome and a Comment on Harsanyi's Extended Preference Theory -- Experimental Ethics: A Computer Simulation of Classes, Cliques, and Solidarity -- Solidarity among Rational Egoists: A Reply to Hegselmann -- The Potentialities and Limits of a Rational Justification of Ethical Norms, or: What Precisely Is Minimal Morality? -- A Hobbesian Choice: Reply to Trapp -- Symposium on Possible Preferences -- Introduction to Possible Preferences -- Possible Preferences -- Preferences of Possible People -- Who Counts? -- Procreation -- Preferences, Death, and the Ethics of Killing -- McMahan on Psychological Continuity and the Value of Future Goods -- A Pareto Principle for Possible People -- Notes on Contributors -- Name Index -- Subject Index -- 569-570