Epistemic Defeat : : A Treatment of Defeat as an Independent Phenomenon / / Jan Constantin.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Ebook Package English 2021
• VerfasserIn: Constantin, Jan,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2021]; ©2021
• Year of Publication: 2021
• Language: English
• Series: Epistemic Studies : Philosophy of Science, Cognition and Mind , 47
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (X, 287 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Preface --; Contents --; Introduction --; 1 Defeaters, Functional Profiles and Deep Distinctions --; 2 Rebutting Defeat --; 3 Undercutting Defeat --; 4 Putting Things Together --; 5 Defeat and Epistemic Justification --; 6 Defeat and Disagreement --; Conclusion --; Bibliography --; Index – Definitions and Examples --; Index – Names
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9783110730548; 9783110750720; 9783110750706; 9783110754001; 9783110753776; 9783110754155; 9783110753929
• ISSN: 2512-5168
• DOI: 10.1515/9783110730548
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Jan Constantin.

A number of well-developed theories shed light on the question, under what circumstances our beliefs enjoy epistemic justification. Yet, comparatively little is known about epistemic defeat—when new information causes the loss of epistemic justification. This book proposes and defends a detailed account of epistemic defeaters. The main kinds of defeaters are analyzed in detail and integrated into a general framework that aims to explain how beliefs lose justification. It is argued that defeaters introduce incompatibilities into a noetic system and thereby prompt a structured re-evaluation process that makes a justified reinstatement of the defeated belief impossible. The account is then applied to the topic of disagreement, where it is used in an argument for conciliationism, as well as a new explanation for higher-order defeat. Throughout the book, the notion of defeat is the center of attention, while a number of new issues are discussed at the intersections of defeat and justification. Specifically, new problems are raised for broadly internalist accounts of defeat, a fully descriptive reliabilist account of defeat is provided, and the case for normative defeat is revisited.