A Realist Conception of Truth / / William P. Alston.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
• VerfasserIn: Alston, William P.,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2018]; ©1997
• Year of Publication: 2018
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (288 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; CONTENTS --; PREFACE --; Introduction --; CHAPTER 1. Alethic Realism --; CHAPTER 2. Alethic Realism and Metaphysical Realism --; CHAPTER 3. An Epistemological Objection to Alethic Realism --; CHAPTER 4. Dummett's Verificationist Alternative to Alethic Realism --; CHAPTER 5. Putnam's Model-Theoretic Argument --; CHAPTER 6. Putnam on "Conceptual Relativity" --; CHAPTER 7. Epistemic Conceptions of Truth --; CHAPTER 8. Doing without Truth --; Epilogue --; BIBLIOGRAPHY --; INDEX
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781501720550; 9783110536171
• DOI: 10.7591/9781501720550
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: William P. Alston.

One of the most important Anglo-American philosophers of our time here joins the current philosophical debate about the nature of truth. William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia," Greek for truth). This idea holds that the truth value of a statement (belief or proposition) depends on whether what the statement is about is as the statement says it is. Michael Dummett and Hilary Putnam are two of the prominent and widely influential contemporary philosophers whose anti-realist ideas Alston attacks.