The Origin of Oughtness : : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / / Stefan Fischer.
How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff...
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| Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2018 Part 1 |
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| VerfasserIn: | |
| Place / Publishing House: | Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2018] ©2018 |
| Year of Publication: | 2018 |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Practical Philosophy ,
22 |
| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (XIII, 284 p.) |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Preface and acknowledgments
- Contents
- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it
- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness
- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness
- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end
- Part ii: four theories of oughtness
- 4 stemmer’s humean theory of oughtness
- 5 halbig’s value realism
- 6 schroeder’s hypotheticalism
- 7 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism
- 8 why humeanism ‘wins’
- Part iii: constructing conativism
- 9 a look ahead
- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism
- 11 the argument from favored desires
- 12 the nature of desiring
- 13 promoting desires
- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy
- 15 the nature of practical reasons
- 16 the weight of favorings
- 17 conativism and the morality angle
- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation
- Bibliography
- Index