The Origin of Oughtness : : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / / Stefan Fischer.
How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff...
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Series: | Practical Philosophy ,
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Fischer, Stefan, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. Berlin ; Boston : De Gruyter, [2018] ©2018 1 online resource (XIII, 284 p.) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Practical Philosophy , 2197-9243 ; 22 Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer’s humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig’s value realism -- 6 schroeder’s hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism ‘wins’ -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star How come we ought to do things? Current metanormative debates often suffer from the fact that authors implicitly use adequacy conditions not shared by their opponents. This leads to an unsatisfying dialectical gridlock (Chang): One author accuses her opponents of not being able to account for stuff she judges essential, but the opponents do not think this to be a major flaw. In an attempt to meet the problem of gridlock head-on, the current investigation approaches oughtness differently. I start with the introduction of a grounding framework for thinking about oughtness that allows a lucid presentation of the views on the market. It soon becomes clear that one necessary part of any plausible assessment of accounts of oughtness is a discussion of their adequacy conditions. I continue with a detailed evaluation of four different accounts, as presented by Halbig (2007), Schroeder (2007), Stemmer (2006), and Scanlon (2014). My main result is that desire-based or Humean theories of oughtness are more plausible because desire-independent accounts fail to explain something crucial: the for-me character of oughtness. Based on the insights gathered thus far, I then develop a new Humean theory – metaethical conativism – and defend it against some historically influential objections. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 28. Feb 2023) Metaethics. Metaethik. Moralphilosophie. Normativität. PHILOSOPHY / History & Surveys / Modern. bisacsh Meta-ethics. moral philosophy. normativity. Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2018 Part 1 9783110762488 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus eBook-Package 2018 9783110719550 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2018 English 9783110604252 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2018 9783110603255 ZDB-23-DGG Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Philosophy 2018 English 9783110604214 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Philosophy 2018 9783110603217 ZDB-23-DPH EPUB 9783110599251 print 9783110600728 https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110599787 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110599787 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9783110599787/original |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Fischer, Stefan, Fischer, Stefan, |
spellingShingle |
Fischer, Stefan, Fischer, Stefan, The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / Practical Philosophy , Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer’s humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig’s value realism -- 6 schroeder’s hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism ‘wins’ -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index |
author_facet |
Fischer, Stefan, Fischer, Stefan, |
author_variant |
s f sf s f sf |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Fischer, Stefan, |
title |
The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
title_sub |
A Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
title_full |
The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. |
title_fullStr |
The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / Stefan Fischer. |
title_auth |
The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer’s humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig’s value realism -- 6 schroeder’s hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism ‘wins’ -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index |
title_new |
The Origin of Oughtness : |
title_sort |
the origin of oughtness : a case for metaethical conativism / |
series |
Practical Philosophy , |
series2 |
Practical Philosophy , |
publisher |
De Gruyter, |
publishDate |
2018 |
physical |
1 online resource (XIII, 284 p.) Issued also in print. |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Preface and acknowledgments -- Contents -- Part i: the phenomenon and how to explain it -- 1 the phenomenon of oughtness -- 2 the grounds for explaining oughtness -- 3 two angles and a dialectical dead end -- Part ii: four theories of oughtness -- 4 stemmer’s humean theory of oughtness -- 5 halbig’s value realism -- 6 schroeder’s hypotheticalism -- 7 scanlon’s reasons fundamentalism -- 8 why humeanism ‘wins’ -- Part iii: constructing conativism -- 9 a look ahead -- 10 an anthropological framework for humeanism -- 11 the argument from favored desires -- 12 the nature of desiring -- 13 promoting desires -- 14 idealization, epistemic error, and autonomy -- 15 the nature of practical reasons -- 16 the weight of favorings -- 17 conativism and the morality angle -- 18 the origin of oughtness: a recapitulation -- Bibliography -- Index |
isbn |
9783110599787 9783110762488 9783110719550 9783110604252 9783110603255 9783110604214 9783110603217 9783110599251 9783110600728 |
issn |
2197-9243 ; |
callnumber-first |
B - Philosophy, Psychology, Religion |
callnumber-subject |
BJ - Ethics |
callnumber-label |
BJ1012 |
callnumber-sort |
BJ 41012 F5365 42018 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110599787 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9783110599787 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9783110599787/original |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
100 - Philosophy & psychology |
dewey-tens |
170 - Ethics |
dewey-ones |
170 - Ethics |
dewey-full |
170 |
dewey-sort |
3170 |
dewey-raw |
170 |
dewey-search |
170 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9783110599787 |
oclc_num |
1049627104 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT fischerstefan theoriginofoughtnessacaseformetaethicalconativism AT fischerstefan originofoughtnessacaseformetaethicalconativism |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)494770 (OCoLC)1049627104 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2018 Part 1 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus eBook-Package 2018 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2018 English Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE COMPLETE 2018 Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Philosophy 2018 English Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter EBOOK PACKAGE Philosophy 2018 |
is_hierarchy_title |
The Origin of Oughtness : A Case for Metaethical Conativism / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DG Plus DeG Package 2018 Part 1 |
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fullrecord |
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