Body, Mind and Self in Hume’s Critical Realism / / Fred Wilson.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1
• VerfasserIn: Wilson, Fred,
• Place / Publishing House: Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2013]; ©2008
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Language: English
• Series: Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis , 22
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (512 p.)

This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Note -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Endnotes to Introduction -- Chapter One: Self as Substance -- Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- Chapter Five: Hume’s Positive Account of the Self -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Backmatter