Body, Mind and Self in Hume’s Critical Realism / / Fred Wilson.
This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structur...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter DGBA Backlist Complete English Language 2000-2014 PART1 |
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VerfasserIn: | |
Place / Publishing House: | Berlin ;, Boston : : De Gruyter, , [2013] ©2008 |
Year of Publication: | 2013 |
Language: | English |
Series: | Philosophische Analyse / Philosophical Analysis ,
22 |
Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (512 p.) |
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Other title: | Frontmatter -- Acknowledgments -- Note -- Table of Contents -- Introduction -- Endnotes to Introduction -- Chapter One: Self as Substance -- Chapter Two: Nominalism and Acquaintance -- Chapter Three: From the Substance Tradition through Locke to Hume: Ordinary Things and Critical Realism -- Chapter Four: The Disappearance of the Simple Self: Its Problems -- Chapter Five: Hume’s Positive Account of the Self -- Bibliography -- Index of Names -- Backmatter |
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Summary: | This essay proposes that Hume’s non-substantialist bundle account of minds is basically correct. The concept of a person is not a metaphysical notion but a forensic one, that of a being who enters into the moral and normative relations of civil society. A person is a bundle but it is also a structured bundle. Hume’s metaphysics of relations is argued must be replaced by a more adequate one such as that of Russell, but beyond that Hume’s account is essentially correct. In particular it is argued that it is one’s character that constitutes one’s identity; and that sympathy and the passions of pride and humility are central in forming and maintaining one’s character and one’s identity as a person. But also central is one’s body: a person is an embodied consciousness: the notion that one’s body is essential to one’s identity is defended at length. Various concepts of mind and consciousness are examined - for example, neutral monism and intentionality - and also the concept of privacy and our inferences to other minds. |
Format: | Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. |
ISBN: | 9783110327076 9783110238570 9783110238488 9783110636949 9783110331226 9783110331219 |
ISSN: | 2198-2066 ; |
DOI: | 10.1515/9783110327076 |
Access: | restricted access |
Hierarchical level: | Monograph |
Statement of Responsibility: | Fred Wilson. |