The Tet Offensive : : Intelligence Failure in War / / James J. Wirtz.

In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently decl...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
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Place / Publishing House:Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2013]
©1994
Year of Publication:2013
Language:English
Series:Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
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Physical Description:1 online resource (272 p.)
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id 9781501713361
ctrlnum (DE-B1597)481773
(OCoLC)972293300
collection bib_alma
record_format marc
spelling Wirtz, James J., author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War / James J. Wirtz.
Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press, [2013]
©1994
1 online resource (272 p.)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
text file PDF rda
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- Introduction -- Part I. “The Big Victory, The Great Task” -- Part II. The Origins Of Surpriseo -- Conclusion: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence -- Bibliography -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star
In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 26. Apr 2024)
Tet Offensive, 1968.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 Military intelligence.
Vietnam War, 1961-1975 United States.
Military History.
U.S. History.
Vietnam.
POLITICAL SCIENCE / Security (National & International). bisacsh
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000 9783110536171
https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713361
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501713361
Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501713361/original
language English
format eBook
author Wirtz, James J.,
Wirtz, James J.,
spellingShingle Wirtz, James J.,
Wirtz, James J.,
The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War /
Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
Frontmatter --
Contents --
Acknowledgments --
Abbreviations --
Introduction --
Part I. “The Big Victory, The Great Task” --
Part II. The Origins Of Surpriseo --
Conclusion: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence --
Bibliography --
Index
author_facet Wirtz, James J.,
Wirtz, James J.,
author_variant j j w jj jjw
j j w jj jjw
author_role VerfasserIn
VerfasserIn
author_sort Wirtz, James J.,
title The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War /
title_sub Intelligence Failure in War /
title_full The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War / James J. Wirtz.
title_fullStr The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War / James J. Wirtz.
title_full_unstemmed The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War / James J. Wirtz.
title_auth The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War /
title_alt Frontmatter --
Contents --
Acknowledgments --
Abbreviations --
Introduction --
Part I. “The Big Victory, The Great Task” --
Part II. The Origins Of Surpriseo --
Conclusion: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence --
Bibliography --
Index
title_new The Tet Offensive :
title_sort the tet offensive : intelligence failure in war /
series Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
series2 Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
publisher Cornell University Press,
publishDate 2013
physical 1 online resource (272 p.)
contents Frontmatter --
Contents --
Acknowledgments --
Abbreviations --
Introduction --
Part I. “The Big Victory, The Great Task” --
Part II. The Origins Of Surpriseo --
Conclusion: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence --
Bibliography --
Index
isbn 9781501713361
9783110536171
callnumber-first D - World History
callnumber-subject DS - Asia
callnumber-label DS559
callnumber-sort DS 3559
geographic_facet United States.
url https://doi.org/10.7591/9781501713361
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781501713361
https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781501713361/original
illustrated Not Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 900 - History & geography
dewey-tens 950 - History of Asia
dewey-ones 959 - Southeast Asia
dewey-full 959.704/38
dewey-sort 3959.704 238
dewey-raw 959.704/38
dewey-search 959.704/38
doi_str_mv 10.7591/9781501713361
oclc_num 972293300
work_keys_str_mv AT wirtzjamesj thetetoffensiveintelligencefailureinwar
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ids_txt_mv (DE-B1597)481773
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carrierType_str_mv cr
hierarchy_parent_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
is_hierarchy_title The Tet Offensive : Intelligence Failure in War /
container_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
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