The Tet Offensive : : Intelligence Failure in War / / James J. Wirtz.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Cornell University Press Archive Pre-2000
• VerfasserIn: Wirtz, James J.,
• Place / Publishing House: Ithaca, NY : : Cornell University Press, , [2013]; ©1994
• Year of Publication: 2013
• Language: English
• Series: Cornell Studies in Security Affairs
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (272 p.)
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Acknowledgments --; Abbreviations --; Introduction --; Part I. “The Big Victory, The Great Task” --; Part II. The Origins Of Surpriseo --; Conclusion: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence --; Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781501713361; 9783110536171
• DOI: 10.7591/9781501713361
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: James J. Wirtz.

In this account of one of the worst intelligence failures in Americanhistory, James J. Wirtz explains why U.S. forces were surprised by the North Vietnamese Tet Offensive in 1968. Wirtz reconstructs the turning point of the Vietnam War in unprecedented detail. Drawing upon Vietcong and recently declassified U.S. sources, he is able to trace the strategy and unfolding of the Tet campaign as well as the U.S. response.