Incentives in Government Contracting / / R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan.
Could the existing level of government services by provided at a lower cost? This study presents a convincing argument for incentive contracts as a means to this end. In a typical market economy, payments from the government to firms account for about one-half of government spending (excluding trans...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Toronto : : University of Toronto Press, , [2019] ©1988 |
Year of Publication: | 2019 |
Language: | English |
Series: | Heritage
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Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (184 p.) |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Figures
- Tables
- Acknowledgments
- 1. Government Contracting
- 2. Uncertainty and Incentives
- 3. The Optimal Contract
- 4. Competition in Bidding
- 5. Simulations with Incentive Contracts
- 6. United States Military Contracting
- 7. Ontario Contracting Rules
- 8. Ontario Contracting Practices
- 9. Domestic Preferences in Government Procurement
- 10. Privatization
- 11. Summary of Results and Recommendations
- References
- Indexes
- NAME INDEX