Incentives in Government Contracting / / R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan.
Could the existing level of government services by provided at a lower cost? This study presents a convincing argument for incentive contracts as a means to this end. In a typical market economy, payments from the government to firms account for about one-half of government spending (excluding trans...
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Place / Publishing House: | Toronto : : University of Toronto Press, , [2019] ©1988 |
Year of Publication: | 2019 |
Language: | English |
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McAfee, R. Preston, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Incentives in Government Contracting / R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan. Toronto : University of Toronto Press, [2019] ©1988 1 online resource (184 p.) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Heritage Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Government Contracting -- 2. Uncertainty and Incentives -- 3. The Optimal Contract -- 4. Competition in Bidding -- 5. Simulations with Incentive Contracts -- 6. United States Military Contracting -- 7. Ontario Contracting Rules -- 8. Ontario Contracting Practices -- 9. Domestic Preferences in Government Procurement -- 10. Privatization -- 11. Summary of Results and Recommendations -- References -- Indexes -- NAME INDEX restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Could the existing level of government services by provided at a lower cost? This study presents a convincing argument for incentive contracts as a means to this end. In a typical market economy, payments from the government to firms account for about one-half of government spending (excluding transfer payments). By changing the way in which a government pays the firms from which it procures goods and services, it would be possible to maintain the existing array of government programs at a lower price. The major finding of this study is that governments could significantly reduce their expenditures by making extensive use of incentive contracts where they currently use either fixed-price contracts or cost-plus contracts. An incentive contract shares cost overruns and cost underruns between the government and the contractor according to a predetermined ratio. An incentive contract stimulates competition among the firms bidding for the contract and shares the project's risk between the government and the selected firm, while giving the contractor incentives to keep incurred costs low. In addition to advocating the use of incentive contracts, the study analyses the consequences of preferential treatment for domestic content over foreign content in government procurement, discusses the choice for a government agency between producing a commodity or service in-house and contracting for its provision with a private firm, and examines the experience with contracting of both the Ontario government and the United States Department of Defense in order to draw lessons for government contracting in general. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) Government purchasing. Public contracts Ontario. Public contracts. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Government & Business. bisacsh McMillan, John, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999 9783110490947 https://doi.org/10.3138/9781487582685 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781487582685 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781487582685.jpg |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
McAfee, R. Preston, McAfee, R. Preston, McMillan, John, |
spellingShingle |
McAfee, R. Preston, McAfee, R. Preston, McMillan, John, Incentives in Government Contracting / Heritage Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Government Contracting -- 2. Uncertainty and Incentives -- 3. The Optimal Contract -- 4. Competition in Bidding -- 5. Simulations with Incentive Contracts -- 6. United States Military Contracting -- 7. Ontario Contracting Rules -- 8. Ontario Contracting Practices -- 9. Domestic Preferences in Government Procurement -- 10. Privatization -- 11. Summary of Results and Recommendations -- References -- Indexes -- NAME INDEX |
author_facet |
McAfee, R. Preston, McAfee, R. Preston, McMillan, John, McMillan, John, McMillan, John, |
author_variant |
r p m rp rpm r p m rp rpm j m jm |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author2 |
McMillan, John, McMillan, John, |
author2_variant |
j m jm |
author2_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
McAfee, R. Preston, |
title |
Incentives in Government Contracting / |
title_full |
Incentives in Government Contracting / R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan. |
title_fullStr |
Incentives in Government Contracting / R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Incentives in Government Contracting / R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan. |
title_auth |
Incentives in Government Contracting / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Government Contracting -- 2. Uncertainty and Incentives -- 3. The Optimal Contract -- 4. Competition in Bidding -- 5. Simulations with Incentive Contracts -- 6. United States Military Contracting -- 7. Ontario Contracting Rules -- 8. Ontario Contracting Practices -- 9. Domestic Preferences in Government Procurement -- 10. Privatization -- 11. Summary of Results and Recommendations -- References -- Indexes -- NAME INDEX |
title_new |
Incentives in Government Contracting / |
title_sort |
incentives in government contracting / |
series |
Heritage |
series2 |
Heritage |
publisher |
University of Toronto Press, |
publishDate |
2019 |
physical |
1 online resource (184 p.) |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Figures -- Tables -- Acknowledgments -- 1. Government Contracting -- 2. Uncertainty and Incentives -- 3. The Optimal Contract -- 4. Competition in Bidding -- 5. Simulations with Incentive Contracts -- 6. United States Military Contracting -- 7. Ontario Contracting Rules -- 8. Ontario Contracting Practices -- 9. Domestic Preferences in Government Procurement -- 10. Privatization -- 11. Summary of Results and Recommendations -- References -- Indexes -- NAME INDEX |
isbn |
9781487582685 9783110490947 |
callnumber-first |
H - Social Science |
callnumber-subject |
HD - Industries, Land Use, Labor |
callnumber-label |
HD3860 |
callnumber-sort |
HD 43860 M383 41988EB |
geographic_facet |
Ontario. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.3138/9781487582685 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781487582685 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781487582685.jpg |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
350 - Public administration & military science |
dewey-ones |
350 - Public administration & military science |
dewey-full |
350.71/1 |
dewey-sort |
3350.71 11 |
dewey-raw |
350.71/1 |
dewey-search |
350.71/1 |
doi_str_mv |
10.3138/9781487582685 |
oclc_num |
1121056324 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT mcafeerpreston incentivesingovernmentcontracting AT mcmillanjohn incentivesingovernmentcontracting |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)527903 (OCoLC)1121056324 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Incentives in Government Contracting / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999 |
author2_original_writing_str_mv |
noLinkedField noLinkedField |
_version_ |
1806143883240800256 |
fullrecord |
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