Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities / / Christopher A. Shrock.
Defends Reid's Common Sense philosophy against the claim that perception does not allow us to experience the physical worldWith a new reading of Thomas Reid on primary and secondary qualities, Christopher A. Shrock illuminates the Common Sense theory of perception. Shrock follow's Reid...
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| Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Edinburgh University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017 |
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| VerfasserIn: | |
| Place / Publishing House: | Edinburgh : : Edinburgh University Press, , [2022] ©2017 |
| Year of Publication: | 2022 |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Edinburgh Studies in Scottish Philosophy : ESSP
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| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (192 p.) :; 2 B/W illustrations 2 B/W tables |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Acknowledgements
- Series Editor’s Preface
- PART I Why Secondary Qualities are a Problem
- Introduction
- 1 Why Direct Realism?
- 2 General Exposition of the Problem of Secondary Qualities
- 3 Why Direct Realism Needs Objective Secondary Qualities
- PART II How Thomas Reid Solves the Problem
- Introduction
- 4 Primary and Secondary Qualities in Reid’s Theory of Perception
- 5 Answering the Problem of Secondary Qualities
- 6 Understanding Reid’s Distinction
- PART III Objections to Reid’s Theory of Secondary Qualities and Replies
- Introduction
- 7 Scientific Objections
- 8 A Priori Objections
- 9 A Historical Objection
- 10 Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index