Thomas Reid and the Problem of Secondary Qualities / / Christopher A. Shrock.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Edinburgh University Press Complete eBook-Package 2017
• VerfasserIn: Shrock, Christopher A.,
• Place / Publishing House: Edinburgh : : Edinburgh University Press, , [2022]; ©2017
• Year of Publication: 2022
• Language: English
• Series: Edinburgh Studies in Scottish Philosophy : ESSP
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (192 p.) :; 2 B/W illustrations 2 B/W tables
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Acknowledgements --; Series Editor’s Preface --; PART I Why Secondary Qualities are a Problem --; Introduction --; 1 Why Direct Realism? --; 2 General Exposition of the Problem of Secondary Qualities --; 3 Why Direct Realism Needs Objective Secondary Qualities --; PART II How Thomas Reid Solves the Problem --; 4 Primary and Secondary Qualities in Reid’s Theory of Perception --; 5 Answering the Problem of Secondary Qualities --; 6 Understanding Reid’s Distinction --; PART III Objections to Reid’s Theory of Secondary Qualities and Replies --; 7 Scientific Objections --; 8 A Priori Objections --; 9 A Historical Objection --; 10 Conclusion --; Bibliography --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781474417853; 9783110781403
• DOI: 10.1515/9781474417853?locatt=mode:legacy
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Christopher A. Shrock.

Defends Reid's Common Sense philosophy against the claim that perception does not allow us to experience the physical worldWith a new reading of Thomas Reid on primary and secondary qualities, Christopher A. Shrock illuminates the Common Sense theory of perception. Shrock follow's Reid's lead in defending common sense philosophy against the problem of secondary qualities, which claims that our perceptions are only experiences in our brains, and don't let us know about the world around us. At the same time, Schrock maintains a healthy optimism about science and reason.Common sense philosophy states that we connect with the physical world around us through our perception of it. Philosophers call this view of perception 'direct realism'. The opposite view to this is 'the problem of secondary qualities', which relegates our perceptions – from colours, smells, sounds and tastes to how long something looks or how heavy something feels – to the mental realm, because science has no objective place for them. The logical conclusion of this argument is that we can never perceive physical objects or their properties through our senses.Key FeaturesGives a new and convincing interpretation of Reid on primary and secondary qualitiesFormalises the problem of secondary qualities, the most important objection facing direct realism todayEngages with a historically wide range of thinkers, from early moderns to the presentProposes an innovative philosophy of colour, where colours are objective, visible properties of mind-external entities"