Game Theory and Canadian Politics / / Thomas Flanagan.
This is the first book-length application of game theory to Canadian politics. It uses a series of case studies to illustrate fundamental concepts of game theory such as two-person and n-person games; solution in mixed strategies; ordinal games; Nash equilibrium; coordination, Assurance, Chicken and...
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| Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999 |
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| Place / Publishing House: | Toronto : : University of Toronto Press, , [2020] ©1998 |
| Year of Publication: | 2020 |
| Language: | English |
| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (224 p.) |
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Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- 1 Rational Choice
- 2 Game Theory
- 3 Stalemate at Lubicon Lake
- 4 Models of Metrication
- 5 How Many Are Too Many? The Size of Coalitions
- 6 Who's Got the Power? Amending the Canadian Constitution
- 7 The 'Right Stuff: Choosing a Party Leader
- 8 The Staying Power of the Status Quo
- 9 Invasion from the Right: The Reform Party in the 1993 Election
- 10 What Have We Learned?
- Notes
- Index