Game Theory and Canadian Politics / / Thomas Flanagan.

This is the first book-length application of game theory to Canadian politics. It uses a series of case studies to illustrate fundamental concepts of game theory such as two-person and n-person games; solution in mixed strategies; ordinal games; Nash equilibrium; coordination, Assurance, Chicken and...

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Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999
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Place / Publishing House:Toronto : : University of Toronto Press, , [2020]
©1998
Year of Publication:2020
Language:English
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Physical Description:1 online resource (224 p.)
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id 9781442675155
ctrlnum (DE-B1597)551080
(OCoLC)1163877915
collection bib_alma
record_format marc
spelling Flanagan, Thomas, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut
Game Theory and Canadian Politics / Thomas Flanagan.
Toronto : University of Toronto Press, [2020]
©1998
1 online resource (224 p.)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
text file PDF rda
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 Rational Choice -- 2 Game Theory -- 3 Stalemate at Lubicon Lake -- 4 Models of Metrication -- 5 How Many Are Too Many? The Size of Coalitions -- 6 Who's Got the Power? Amending the Canadian Constitution -- 7 The 'Right Stuff: Choosing a Party Leader -- 8 The Staying Power of the Status Quo -- 9 Invasion from the Right: The Reform Party in the 1993 Election -- 10 What Have We Learned? -- Notes -- Index
restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star
This is the first book-length application of game theory to Canadian politics. It uses a series of case studies to illustrate fundamental concepts of game theory such as two-person and n-person games; solution in mixed strategies; ordinal games; Nash equilibrium; coordination, Assurance, Chicken and Prisoner's Dilemma models; Schelling curves; coalition theory and Riker's size principle; voting rules, cycles, and the Condorcet winner; the Banzhaf power index; structure-induced equilibrium; and spatial models of political conflict. No mathematics more complex than simple algebra is required to follow the exposition.The case studies are not just contrived illustrations of abstract models but intensively researched studies of important episodes in Canadian politics. Topics include the Lubicon Lake stalemate, metrification and vaccination; the size of winning coalitions; formulas for amending the Canadian constitution; the mechanics of choosing party leaders; Parliament's failure to legislate on abortion after the Morgentaler decision; and the entry of the Reform Party into the political system. In each case, utilization of game-theory models produces new and sometimes surprising conclusions.Game theory, and the rational-choice paradigm of which it is a part, are an increasingly important addition to the conventional modes of political analysis. This book is intended to show what game theory can add to the philosophical, institutional, and behavioural approaches that have dominated previous works on Canadian politics.
Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
In English.
Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021)
Game theory.
Jeux politiques.
Political science Methodology.
Science politique Méthodologie.
Théorie des jeux.
POLITICAL SCIENCE / History & Theory. bisacsh
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999 9783110490947
https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442675155
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781442675155
Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781442675155.jpg
language English
format eBook
author Flanagan, Thomas,
Flanagan, Thomas,
spellingShingle Flanagan, Thomas,
Flanagan, Thomas,
Game Theory and Canadian Politics /
Frontmatter --
Contents --
Preface --
1 Rational Choice --
2 Game Theory --
3 Stalemate at Lubicon Lake --
4 Models of Metrication --
5 How Many Are Too Many? The Size of Coalitions --
6 Who's Got the Power? Amending the Canadian Constitution --
7 The 'Right Stuff: Choosing a Party Leader --
8 The Staying Power of the Status Quo --
9 Invasion from the Right: The Reform Party in the 1993 Election --
10 What Have We Learned? --
Notes --
Index
author_facet Flanagan, Thomas,
Flanagan, Thomas,
author_variant t f tf
t f tf
author_role VerfasserIn
VerfasserIn
author_sort Flanagan, Thomas,
title Game Theory and Canadian Politics /
title_full Game Theory and Canadian Politics / Thomas Flanagan.
title_fullStr Game Theory and Canadian Politics / Thomas Flanagan.
title_full_unstemmed Game Theory and Canadian Politics / Thomas Flanagan.
title_auth Game Theory and Canadian Politics /
title_alt Frontmatter --
Contents --
Preface --
1 Rational Choice --
2 Game Theory --
3 Stalemate at Lubicon Lake --
4 Models of Metrication --
5 How Many Are Too Many? The Size of Coalitions --
6 Who's Got the Power? Amending the Canadian Constitution --
7 The 'Right Stuff: Choosing a Party Leader --
8 The Staying Power of the Status Quo --
9 Invasion from the Right: The Reform Party in the 1993 Election --
10 What Have We Learned? --
Notes --
Index
title_new Game Theory and Canadian Politics /
title_sort game theory and canadian politics /
publisher University of Toronto Press,
publishDate 2020
physical 1 online resource (224 p.)
contents Frontmatter --
Contents --
Preface --
1 Rational Choice --
2 Game Theory --
3 Stalemate at Lubicon Lake --
4 Models of Metrication --
5 How Many Are Too Many? The Size of Coalitions --
6 Who's Got the Power? Amending the Canadian Constitution --
7 The 'Right Stuff: Choosing a Party Leader --
8 The Staying Power of the Status Quo --
9 Invasion from the Right: The Reform Party in the 1993 Election --
10 What Have We Learned? --
Notes --
Index
isbn 9781442675155
9783110490947
url https://doi.org/10.3138/9781442675155
https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781442675155
https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781442675155.jpg
illustrated Not Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 300 - Social sciences
dewey-tens 320 - Political science
dewey-ones 320 - Political science
dewey-full 320/.01/5193
dewey-sort 3320 11 45193
dewey-raw 320/.01/5193
dewey-search 320/.01/5193
doi_str_mv 10.3138/9781442675155
oclc_num 1163877915
work_keys_str_mv AT flanaganthomas gametheoryandcanadianpolitics
status_str n
ids_txt_mv (DE-B1597)551080
(OCoLC)1163877915
carrierType_str_mv cr
hierarchy_parent_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999
is_hierarchy_title Game Theory and Canadian Politics /
container_title Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter University of Toronto Press eBook-Package Archive 1933-1999
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