Fragile by Design : : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / / Stephen H. Haber, Charles W. Calomiris.

Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries-but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015
VerfasserIn:
Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2014]
©2015
Year of Publication:2014
Edition:Course Book
Language:English
Series:The Princeton Economic History of the Western World ; 48
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (584 p.) :; 30 line illus.
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Section One. No Banks without States, and No States without Banks
  • 1. If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare?
  • 2. The Game of Bank Bargains
  • 3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks
  • 4. Privileges with Burdens War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking
  • 5. Banks and Democracy
  • Section Two. The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances The United States versus Canada
  • 6. Crippled by Populism
  • 7. The New U.S. Bank Bargain
  • 8. Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis
  • 9. Durable Partners
  • Section Three. Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains
  • 10. Mexico
  • 11. When Autocracy Fails
  • 12. Inflation Machines
  • 13. The Democratic Consequences of Inflation-Tax Banking in Brazil
  • Section Four. Going beyond Structural Narratives
  • 14. Traveling to Other Places
  • 15. Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses
  • References
  • Index