Fragile by Design : : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / / Stephen H. Haber, Charles W. Calomiris.
Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries-but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business...
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Calomiris, Charles W., author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / Stephen H. Haber, Charles W. Calomiris. Course Book Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2014] ©2015 1 online resource (584 p.) : 30 line illus. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda The Princeton Economic History of the Western World ; 48 Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Section One. No Banks without States, and No States without Banks -- 1. If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? -- 2. The Game of Bank Bargains -- 3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks -- 4. Privileges with Burdens War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking -- 5. Banks and Democracy -- Section Two. The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances The United States versus Canada -- 6. Crippled by Populism -- 7. The New U.S. Bank Bargain -- 8. Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis -- 9. Durable Partners -- Section Three. Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains -- 10. Mexico -- 11. When Autocracy Fails -- 12. Inflation Machines -- 13. The Democratic Consequences of Inflation-Tax Banking in Brazil -- Section Four. Going beyond Structural Narratives -- 14. Traveling to Other Places -- 15. Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses -- References -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Why are banking systems unstable in so many countries-but not in others? The United States has had twelve systemic banking crises since 1840, while Canada has had none. The banking systems of Mexico and Brazil have not only been crisis prone but have provided miniscule amounts of credit to business enterprises and households.Analyzing the political and banking history of the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Brazil through several centuries, Fragile by Design demonstrates that chronic banking crises and scarce credit are not accidents. Calomiris and Haber combine political history and economics to examine how coalitions of politicians, bankers, and other interest groups form, why they endure, and how they generate policies that determine who gets to be a banker, who has access to credit, and who pays for bank bailouts and rescues.Fragile by Design is a revealing exploration of the ways that politics inevitably intrudes into bank regulation. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) BUSINESS and ECONOMICS Banks & Banking. BUSINESS and ECONOMICS Finance. Bank failures History. Bank failures. Banks and banking History. Banks and banking. Business and Economics Banks and Banking. Business and Economics Finance. Credit History. Credit. BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Banks & Banking. bisacsh Haber, Stephen H., author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 9783110665925 print 9780691155241 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400849925 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400849925 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400849925.jpg |
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English |
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author |
Calomiris, Charles W., Calomiris, Charles W., Haber, Stephen H., |
spellingShingle |
Calomiris, Charles W., Calomiris, Charles W., Haber, Stephen H., Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / The Princeton Economic History of the Western World ; Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Section One. No Banks without States, and No States without Banks -- 1. If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? -- 2. The Game of Bank Bargains -- 3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks -- 4. Privileges with Burdens War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking -- 5. Banks and Democracy -- Section Two. The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances The United States versus Canada -- 6. Crippled by Populism -- 7. The New U.S. Bank Bargain -- 8. Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis -- 9. Durable Partners -- Section Three. Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains -- 10. Mexico -- 11. When Autocracy Fails -- 12. Inflation Machines -- 13. The Democratic Consequences of Inflation-Tax Banking in Brazil -- Section Four. Going beyond Structural Narratives -- 14. Traveling to Other Places -- 15. Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses -- References -- Index |
author_facet |
Calomiris, Charles W., Calomiris, Charles W., Haber, Stephen H., Haber, Stephen H., Haber, Stephen H., |
author_variant |
c w c cw cwc c w c cw cwc s h h sh shh |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author2 |
Haber, Stephen H., Haber, Stephen H., |
author2_variant |
s h h sh shh |
author2_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Calomiris, Charles W., |
title |
Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / |
title_sub |
The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / |
title_full |
Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / Stephen H. Haber, Charles W. Calomiris. |
title_fullStr |
Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / Stephen H. Haber, Charles W. Calomiris. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / Stephen H. Haber, Charles W. Calomiris. |
title_auth |
Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Section One. No Banks without States, and No States without Banks -- 1. If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? -- 2. The Game of Bank Bargains -- 3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks -- 4. Privileges with Burdens War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking -- 5. Banks and Democracy -- Section Two. The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances The United States versus Canada -- 6. Crippled by Populism -- 7. The New U.S. Bank Bargain -- 8. Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis -- 9. Durable Partners -- Section Three. Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains -- 10. Mexico -- 11. When Autocracy Fails -- 12. Inflation Machines -- 13. The Democratic Consequences of Inflation-Tax Banking in Brazil -- Section Four. Going beyond Structural Narratives -- 14. Traveling to Other Places -- 15. Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses -- References -- Index |
title_new |
Fragile by Design : |
title_sort |
fragile by design : the political origins of banking crises and scarce credit / |
series |
The Princeton Economic History of the Western World ; |
series2 |
The Princeton Economic History of the Western World ; |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2014 |
physical |
1 online resource (584 p.) : 30 line illus. Issued also in print. |
edition |
Course Book |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Section One. No Banks without States, and No States without Banks -- 1. If Stable and Efficient Banks Are Such a Good Idea, Why Are They So Rare? -- 2. The Game of Bank Bargains -- 3. Tools of Conquest and Survival Why States Need Banks -- 4. Privileges with Burdens War, Empire, and the Monopoly Structure of English Banking -- 5. Banks and Democracy -- Section Two. The Cost of Banker-Populist Alliances The United States versus Canada -- 6. Crippled by Populism -- 7. The New U.S. Bank Bargain -- 8. Leverage, Regulatory Failure, and the Subprime Crisis -- 9. Durable Partners -- Section Three. Authoritarianism, Democratic Transitions, and the Game of Bank Bargains -- 10. Mexico -- 11. When Autocracy Fails -- 12. Inflation Machines -- 13. The Democratic Consequences of Inflation-Tax Banking in Brazil -- Section Four. Going beyond Structural Narratives -- 14. Traveling to Other Places -- 15. Reality Is a Plague on Many Houses -- References -- Index |
isbn |
9781400849925 9783110665925 9780691155241 |
callnumber-first |
H - Social Science |
callnumber-subject |
HG - Finance |
callnumber-label |
HG1561 |
callnumber-sort |
HG 41561 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400849925 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400849925 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400849925.jpg |
illustrated |
Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
330 - Economics |
dewey-ones |
332 - Financial economics |
dewey-full |
332.109 |
dewey-sort |
3332.109 |
dewey-raw |
332.109 |
dewey-search |
332.109 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9781400849925 |
oclc_num |
984651062 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT calomirischarlesw fragilebydesignthepoliticaloriginsofbankingcrisesandscarcecredit AT haberstephenh fragilebydesignthepoliticaloriginsofbankingcrisesandscarcecredit |
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Fragile by Design : The Political Origins of Banking Crises and Scarce Credit / |
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Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press Complete eBook-Package 2014-2015 |
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