Deterrence by Diplomacy / / Anne E. Sartori.
Why are countries often able to communicate critical information using diplomacy? Why do countries typically use diplomacy honestly, despite incentives to bluff? Why are they often able to deter attacks using merely verbal threats? International relations theory is largely pessimistic about the pros...
Saved in:
| Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
|---|---|
| VerfasserIn: | |
| Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2013] ©2005 |
| Year of Publication: | 2013 |
| Edition: | Course Book |
| Language: | English |
| Online Access: | |
| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (184 p.) :; 7 line illus. 18 tables. |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Table of Contents:
- Frontmatter
- Contents
- Preface
- PART I. Introduction
- CHAPTER 1. Introduction
- PART II. How Bluffs Can Hurt a State's Diplomacy, and Honesty Provides the Ability to Communicate
- CHAPTER 2. The Failure of Chinese Diplomacy, 1950
- CHAPTER 3. A Reputational Theory of Diplomacy
- PART III. Evidence That Honesty Matters
- CHAPTER 4. Reputations for Honesty and the Success of Diplomacy
- CHAPTER 5. The Broader Importance of Reputations for Honesty
- PART IV. Conclusion
- CHAPTER 6. Conclusion
- PART V. Appendixes
- APPENDIX A. Characterization of the Equilibrium
- APPENDIX B. The Impact of Communication on War and on Welfare
- APPENDIX C. Implications of the Theory
- APPENDIX D. The Effects of Power Status, Contiguity, and Democracy
- Bibliography
- Index