Veto Players : : How Political Institutions Work / / George Tsebelis.
Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parti...
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2011] ©2003 |
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Tsebelis, George, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / George Tsebelis. Course Book Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2011] ©2003 1 online resource (344 p.) : 44 line illus. 16 tables. text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I. Veto Players Theory -- Part II: Veto Players and Institutional Analysis -- Part III. Policy Effects of Veto Players -- Part IV. Systemic Effects Of Veto Players -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: ? "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2021) Comparative government. Legislation European Union countries. Political planning. Political science Decision making. POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / General. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 9783110442502 print 9780691099897 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831456 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400831456 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400831456.jpg |
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English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Tsebelis, George, Tsebelis, George, |
spellingShingle |
Tsebelis, George, Tsebelis, George, Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I. Veto Players Theory -- Part II: Veto Players and Institutional Analysis -- Part III. Policy Effects of Veto Players -- Part IV. Systemic Effects Of Veto Players -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index |
author_facet |
Tsebelis, George, Tsebelis, George, |
author_variant |
g t gt g t gt |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Tsebelis, George, |
title |
Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / |
title_sub |
How Political Institutions Work / |
title_full |
Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / George Tsebelis. |
title_fullStr |
Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / George Tsebelis. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / George Tsebelis. |
title_auth |
Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I. Veto Players Theory -- Part II: Veto Players and Institutional Analysis -- Part III. Policy Effects of Veto Players -- Part IV. Systemic Effects Of Veto Players -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index |
title_new |
Veto Players : |
title_sort |
veto players : how political institutions work / |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2011 |
physical |
1 online resource (344 p.) : 44 line illus. 16 tables. Issued also in print. |
edition |
Course Book |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Preface and Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Part I. Veto Players Theory -- Part II: Veto Players and Institutional Analysis -- Part III. Policy Effects of Veto Players -- Part IV. Systemic Effects Of Veto Players -- Conclusion -- Bibliography -- Index |
isbn |
9781400831456 9783110442502 9780691099897 |
callnumber-first |
J - Political Science |
callnumber-subject |
JF - Public Administration |
callnumber-label |
JF51 |
callnumber-sort |
JF 251 T745 42011 |
geographic_facet |
European Union countries. |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831456 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400831456 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400831456.jpg |
illustrated |
Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
320 - Political science |
dewey-ones |
320 - Political science |
dewey-full |
320.3 |
dewey-sort |
3320.3 |
dewey-raw |
320.3 |
dewey-search |
320.3 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9781400831456 |
oclc_num |
979726395 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT tsebelisgeorge vetoplayershowpoliticalinstitutionswork |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)453589 (OCoLC)979726395 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Veto Players : How Political Institutions Work / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
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1770176644464508928 |
fullrecord |
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