Veto Players : : How Political Institutions Work / / George Tsebelis.
Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parti...
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Superior document: | Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2011] ©2003 |
Year of Publication: | 2011 |
Edition: | Course Book |
Language: | English |
Online Access: | |
Physical Description: | 1 online resource (344 p.) :; 44 line illus. 16 tables. |
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LEADER | 04903nam a22007455i 4500 | ||
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001 | 9781400831456 | ||
003 | DE-B1597 | ||
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035 | |a (OCoLC)979726395 | ||
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041 | 0 | |a eng | |
044 | |a nju |c US-NJ | ||
050 | 4 | |a JF51 .T745 2011 | |
072 | 7 | |a POL016000 |2 bisacsh | |
082 | 0 | 4 | |a 320.3 |
100 | 1 | |a Tsebelis, George, |e author. |4 aut |4 http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Veto Players : |b How Political Institutions Work / |c George Tsebelis. |
250 | |a Course Book | ||
264 | 1 | |a Princeton, NJ : |b Princeton University Press, |c [2011] | |
264 | 4 | |c ©2003 | |
300 | |a 1 online resource (344 p.) : |b 44 line illus. 16 tables. | ||
336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
347 | |a text file |b PDF |2 rda | ||
505 | 0 | 0 | |t Frontmatter -- |t Contents -- |t List of Figures -- |t List of Tables -- |t Preface and Acknowledgments -- |t Introduction -- |t Part I. Veto Players Theory -- |t Part II: Veto Players and Institutional Analysis -- |t Part III. Policy Effects of Veto Players -- |t Part IV. Systemic Effects Of Veto Players -- |t Conclusion -- |t Bibliography -- |t Index |
506 | 0 | |a restricted access |u http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec |f online access with authorization |2 star | |
520 | |a Political scientists have long classified systems of government as parliamentary or presidential, two-party or multiparty, and so on. But such distinctions often fail to provide useful insights. For example, how are we to compare the United States, a presidential bicameral regime with two weak parties, to Denmark, a parliamentary unicameral regime with many strong parties? Veto Players advances an important, new understanding of how governments are structured. The real distinctions between political systems, contends George Tsebelis, are to be found in the extent to which they afford political actors veto power over policy choices. Drawing richly on game theory, he develops a scheme by which governments can thus be classified. He shows why an increase in the number of "veto players," or an increase in their ideological distance from each other, increases policy stability, impeding significant departures from the status quo. Policy stability affects a series of other key characteristics of polities, argues the author. For example, it leads to high judicial and bureaucratic independence, as well as high government instability (in parliamentary systems). The propositions derived from the theoretical framework Tsebelis develops in the first part of the book are tested in the second part with various data sets from advanced industrialized countries, as well as analysis of legislation in the European Union. Representing the first consistent and consequential theory of comparative politics, Veto Players will be welcomed by students and scholars as a defining text of the discipline. From the preface to the Italian edition: ? "Tsebelis has produced what is today the most original theory for the understanding of the dynamics of contemporary regimes. . . . This book promises to remain a lasting contribution to political analysis."--Gianfranco Pasquino, Professor of Political Science, University of Bologna | ||
530 | |a Issued also in print. | ||
538 | |a Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. | ||
546 | |a In English. | ||
588 | 0 | |a Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Jul 2021) | |
650 | 0 | |a Comparative government. | |
650 | 0 | |a Legislation |z European Union countries. | |
650 | 0 | |a Political planning. | |
650 | 0 | |a Political science |x Decision making. | |
650 | 7 | |a POLITICAL SCIENCE / Political Process / General. |2 bisacsh | |
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Title is part of eBook package: |d De Gruyter |t Princeton University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013 |z 9783110442502 |
776 | 0 | |c print |z 9780691099897 | |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400831456 |
856 | 4 | 0 | |u https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400831456 |
856 | 4 | 2 | |3 Cover |u https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400831456.jpg |
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