Classics in Game Theory /

Classics in Game Theory / / ed. by Harold William Kuhn.

Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999
MitwirkendeR:
Aumann, R.,
Aumann, Robert,
Blackwell, David,
Debreu, Gerard,
Everett, H.,
Ferguson, T.,
Harsanyi, John,
Kreps, David,
Kuhn, H.,
Maschler, Michael,
Nash, John,
Peleg, B.,
Robinson, Julia,
Rubinstein, Ariel,
Scarf, Herbert,
Selten, R.,
Shapley, L.,
Shapley, Lloyd,
Shubik, Martin,
Thompson, F.,
HerausgeberIn:
Kuhn, Harold William,
Place / Publishing House:Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2020]
©1997
Year of Publication:2020
Language:English
Series:Frontiers of Economic Research
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (328 p.) :; 25 line illus. 30 tables
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Frontmatter
  • CONTENTS
  • Permissions
  • Foreword
  • Contributor
  • An Appreciation
  • Contributor
  • 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49.
  • 2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162.
  • 3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295.
  • 4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301.
  • 5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952).
  • 6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216.
  • 7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317.
  • 8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100.
  • 9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78.
  • 10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179.
  • 11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246.
  • 12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477.
  • 13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17.
  • 14. The Core of an ^-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69.
  • 15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players.
  • 16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163.
  • 17. On Market Games. IE. T. 1 (1969) 9-25.
  • 18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55.
  • List of Contributors
  • Index

Similar Items