Classics in Game Theory / / ed. by Harold William Kuhn.
Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a...
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [2020] ©1997 |
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Classics in Game Theory / ed. by Harold William Kuhn. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [2020] ©1997 1 online resource (328 p.) : 25 line illus. 30 tables text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontiers of Economic Research Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Permissions -- Foreword -- Contributor -- An Appreciation -- Contributor -- 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. -- 2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. -- 3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. -- 4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. -- 5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). -- 6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. -- 7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. -- 8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. -- 9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. -- 10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. -- 11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. -- 12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. -- 13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. -- 14. The Core of an ^-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. -- 15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. -- 16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. -- 17. On Market Games. IE. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. -- 18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. -- List of Contributors -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Classics in Game Theory assembles in one sourcebook the basic contributions to the field that followed on the publication of Theory of Games and Economic Behavior by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern (Princeton, 1944). The theory of games, first given a rigorous formulation by von Neumann in a in 1928, is a subfield of mathematics and economics that models situations in which individuals compete and cooperate with each other. In the "heroic era" of research that began in the late 1940s, the foundations of the current theory were laid; it is these fundamental contributions that are collected in this volume. In the last fifteen years, game theory has become the dominant model in economic theory and has made significant contributions to political science, biology, and international security studies. The central role of game theory in economic theory was recognized by the award of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science in 1994 to the pioneering game theorists John C. Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten. The fundamental works for which they were honored are all included in this volume.Harold Kuhn, himself a major contributor to game theory for his reformulation of extensive games, has chosen eighteen essays that constitute the core of game theory as it exists today. Drawn from a variety of sources, they will be an invaluable tool for researchers in game theory and for a broad group of students of economics, political science, and biology. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 29. Nov 2021) BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Econometrics. bisacsh Bayes-equivalence. Borel-measurable function. Harsanyi, John C. Morgenstern. Nash equilibrium point. Walras law. absence of coalitions. attribute vector. behavioral strategies. combinatorial problem. commodity-wise saturation. complete information. core. critical vector. decomposable game. direct market. equilibrium point. exchange economy. game tree. homeomorphic mapping. individually rational. joint probability, objective. local strategies. minimax condition. numerical probability. optimal strategies. payoff vector. permissible coalition. prior-lottery model. pure strategies. random-vector model. stable outcome. supinf condition. transferable utility. two-person games. utility function. vector system. Aumann, R., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Aumann, Robert, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Blackwell, David, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Debreu, Gerard, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Everett, H., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Ferguson, T., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Harsanyi, John, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Kreps, David, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Kuhn, H., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Kuhn, Harold William, editor. edt http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/edt Maschler, Michael, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Nash, John, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Peleg, B., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Robinson, Julia, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Rubinstein, Ariel, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Scarf, Herbert, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Selten, R., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Shapley, L., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Shapley, Lloyd, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Shubik, Martin, contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Thompson, F., contributor. ctb https://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/ctb Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 9783110442496 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829156?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400829156 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781400829156/original |
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Classics in Game Theory / |
spellingShingle |
Classics in Game Theory / Frontiers of Economic Research Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Permissions -- Foreword -- Contributor -- An Appreciation -- 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. -- 2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. -- 3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. -- 4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. -- 5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). -- 6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. -- 7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. -- 8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. -- 9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. -- 10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. -- 11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. -- 12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. -- 13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. -- 14. The Core of an ^-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. -- 15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. -- 16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. -- 17. On Market Games. IE. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. -- 18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. -- List of Contributors -- Index |
title_full |
Classics in Game Theory / ed. by Harold William Kuhn. |
title_fullStr |
Classics in Game Theory / ed. by Harold William Kuhn. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Classics in Game Theory / ed. by Harold William Kuhn. |
title_auth |
Classics in Game Theory / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Permissions -- Foreword -- Contributor -- An Appreciation -- 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. -- 2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. -- 3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. -- 4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. -- 5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). -- 6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. -- 7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. -- 8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. -- 9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. -- 10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. -- 11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. -- 12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. -- 13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. -- 14. The Core of an ^-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. -- 15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. -- 16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. -- 17. On Market Games. IE. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. -- 18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. -- List of Contributors -- Index |
title_new |
Classics in Game Theory / |
title_sort |
classics in game theory / |
series |
Frontiers of Economic Research |
series2 |
Frontiers of Economic Research |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
2020 |
physical |
1 online resource (328 p.) : 25 line illus. 30 tables |
contents |
Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Permissions -- Foreword -- Contributor -- An Appreciation -- 1. Equilibrium Points in n-Person Games. PNAS 36 (1950) 48-49. -- 2. The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18 (1950) 155-162. -- 3. Non-Cooperative Games. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 286-295. -- 4. An Iterative Method of Solving a Game. Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951) 296-301. -- 5. Equivalence of Games in Extensive Form. RAND Memo RM-759 (1952). -- 6. Extensive Games and the Problem of Information. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 193-216. -- 7. A Value for n-Person Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games II (1953) 307-317. -- 8. Stochastic Games. PNAS 39 (1953) 1095-1100. -- 9. Recursive Games. Contributions to the Theory of Games III (1957) 47-78. -- 10. Von Neumann-Morgenstern Solutions to Cooperative Games without Side Payments. Bulletin AMS 66 (1960) 173-179. -- 11. A Limit Theorem on the Core of an Economy. International Economic Review 4 (1963) 235-246. -- 12. The Bargaining Set for Cooperative Games. Advances in Game Theory (1964) 443-477. -- 13. Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders. Econometrica 34 (1966) 1-17. -- 14. The Core of an ^-Person Game. Econometrica 35 (1967) 50-69. -- 15. Games with Incomplete Information Played by "Bayesian" Players. -- 16. The Big Match. Ann. Math. Stat. 39 (1968) 159-163. -- 17. On Market Games. IE. T. 1 (1969) 9-25. -- 18. Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games. Int. J. Game Th. 4 (1975) 25-55. -- List of Contributors -- Index |
isbn |
9781400829156 9783110442496 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400829156?locatt=mode:legacy https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400829156 https://www.degruyter.com/document/cover/isbn/9781400829156/original |
illustrated |
Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
500 - Science |
dewey-tens |
510 - Mathematics |
dewey-ones |
519 - Probabilities & applied mathematics |
dewey-full |
519.3 |
dewey-sort |
3519.3 |
dewey-raw |
519.3 |
dewey-search |
519.3 |
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ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">behavioral strategies.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">combinatorial problem.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">commodity-wise saturation.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">complete information.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">core.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">critical vector.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">decomposable game.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">direct market.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">equilibrium point.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">exchange economy.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="653" ind1=" " 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