Gatekeepers of Growth : : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / / Sylvia Maxfield.
Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focu...
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Place / Publishing House: | Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [1998] ©1998 |
Year of Publication: | 1998 |
Edition: | Course Book |
Language: | English |
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (192 p.) :; 21 tables |
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Maxfield, Sylvia, author. aut http://id.loc.gov/vocabulary/relators/aut Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / Sylvia Maxfield. Course Book Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, [1998] ©1998 1 online resource (192 p.) : 21 tables text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier text file PDF rda Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- One. Central Bank Independence: Why the Interest? -- Two. The Political Sources of Central Bank Independence -- Three. International Capital Flows and the Politics of Central Bank Independence -- Four. Central Bank Independence in the 1990s -- Five. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Thailand -- Six. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Mexico -- Seven. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: South Korea -- Eight. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Brazil -- Nine. Conclusion -- Notes -- Index restricted access http://purl.org/coar/access_right/c_16ec online access with authorization star Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status. Issued also in print. Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web. In English. Description based on online resource; title from PDF title page (publisher's Web site, viewed 30. Aug 2021) BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Development / Economic Development. bisacsh Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 9783110442496 print 9780691002439 https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822287 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400822287 Cover https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400822287.jpg |
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English |
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eBook |
author |
Maxfield, Sylvia, Maxfield, Sylvia, |
spellingShingle |
Maxfield, Sylvia, Maxfield, Sylvia, Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- One. Central Bank Independence: Why the Interest? -- Two. The Political Sources of Central Bank Independence -- Three. International Capital Flows and the Politics of Central Bank Independence -- Four. Central Bank Independence in the 1990s -- Five. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Thailand -- Six. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Mexico -- Seven. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: South Korea -- Eight. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Brazil -- Nine. Conclusion -- Notes -- Index |
author_facet |
Maxfield, Sylvia, Maxfield, Sylvia, |
author_variant |
s m sm s m sm |
author_role |
VerfasserIn VerfasserIn |
author_sort |
Maxfield, Sylvia, |
title |
Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / |
title_sub |
The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / |
title_full |
Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / Sylvia Maxfield. |
title_fullStr |
Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / Sylvia Maxfield. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / Sylvia Maxfield. |
title_auth |
Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / |
title_alt |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- One. Central Bank Independence: Why the Interest? -- Two. The Political Sources of Central Bank Independence -- Three. International Capital Flows and the Politics of Central Bank Independence -- Four. Central Bank Independence in the 1990s -- Five. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Thailand -- Six. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Mexico -- Seven. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: South Korea -- Eight. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Brazil -- Nine. Conclusion -- Notes -- Index |
title_new |
Gatekeepers of Growth : |
title_sort |
gatekeepers of growth : the international political economy of central banking in developing countries / |
publisher |
Princeton University Press, |
publishDate |
1998 |
physical |
1 online resource (192 p.) : 21 tables Issued also in print. |
edition |
Course Book |
contents |
Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- One. Central Bank Independence: Why the Interest? -- Two. The Political Sources of Central Bank Independence -- Three. International Capital Flows and the Politics of Central Bank Independence -- Four. Central Bank Independence in the 1990s -- Five. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Thailand -- Six. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Mexico -- Seven. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: South Korea -- Eight. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Brazil -- Nine. Conclusion -- Notes -- Index |
isbn |
9781400822287 9783110442496 9780691002439 |
callnumber-first |
H - Social Science |
callnumber-subject |
HG - Finance |
callnumber-label |
HG3550 |
callnumber-sort |
HG 43550 M39 41997 |
url |
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822287 https://www.degruyter.com/isbn/9781400822287 https://www.degruyter.com/cover/covers/9781400822287.jpg |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
330 - Economics |
dewey-ones |
332 - Financial economics |
dewey-full |
332.1/1/091724 |
dewey-sort |
3332.1 11 591724 |
dewey-raw |
332.1/1/091724 |
dewey-search |
332.1/1/091724 |
doi_str_mv |
10.1515/9781400822287 |
oclc_num |
979581488 |
work_keys_str_mv |
AT maxfieldsylvia gatekeepersofgrowththeinternationalpoliticaleconomyofcentralbankingindevelopingcountries |
status_str |
n |
ids_txt_mv |
(DE-B1597)446109 (OCoLC)979581488 |
carrierType_str_mv |
cr |
hierarchy_parent_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 |
is_hierarchy_title |
Gatekeepers of Growth : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / |
container_title |
Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999 |
_version_ |
1806143520707182592 |
fullrecord |
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