Gatekeepers of Growth : : The International Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries / / Sylvia Maxfield.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Princeton University Press eBook-Package Archive 1927-1999
• VerfasserIn: Maxfield, Sylvia,
• Place / Publishing House: Princeton, NJ : : Princeton University Press, , [1998]; ©1998
• Year of Publication: 1998
• Edition: Course Book
• Language: English
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (192 p.) :; 21 tables
• Other title: Frontmatter --; Contents --; Acknowledgments --; One. Central Bank Independence: Why the Interest? --; Two. The Political Sources of Central Bank Independence --; Three. International Capital Flows and the Politics of Central Bank Independence --; Four. Central Bank Independence in the 1990s --; Five. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Thailand --; Six. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Mexico --; Seven. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: South Korea --; Eight. The Politics of Changing Central Bank Authority: Brazil --; Nine. Conclusion --; Notes --; Index
• Format: Mode of access: Internet via World Wide Web.
• ISBN: 9781400822287; 9783110442496
• DOI: 10.1515/9781400822287
• Access: restricted access
• Hierarchical level: Monograph
• Statement of Responsibility: Sylvia Maxfield.

Central banks can shape economic growth, affect income distribution, influence a country's foreign relations, and determine the extent of its democracy. While there is considerable literature on the political economy of central banking in OECD countries, this is the first book-length study focused on central banking in emerging market countries. Surveying the dramatic worldwide trend toward increased central bank independence in the 1990s, the book argues that global forces must be at work. These forces, the book contends, center on the character of international financial intermediation. Going beyond an explanation of central bank independence, Sylvia Maxfield posits a general framework for analyzing the impact of different types of international capital flows on the politics of economic policymaking in developing countries. The book suggests that central bank independence in emerging market countries does not spring from law but rather from politics. As long as politicians value them, central banks will enjoy independence. Central banks are most likely to be independent in developing countries when politicians desire international creditworthiness. Historical analyses of central banks in Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand, and quantitative analyses of a larger sample of developing countries corroborate this investor signaling explanation of broad trends in central bank status.