Global Corporate Governance / / ed. by Stuart Gillan, Donald Chew.

• Superior document: Title is part of eBook package: De Gruyter Columbia University Press eBook-Package Backlist 2000-2013
• MitwirkendeR: Butt, Shams,; Chakrabarti, Rajesh,; Durnev, Art,; Dyck, Alexander,; Easterbrook, Frank H.,; Franks, Julian,; Harbula, Péter,; Kim, E. Han,; Kim, Woochan,; Mayer, Colin,; Megginson, William I.,; Rajan, Raghuram G.,; Renneboog, Luc,; Roe, Mark J.,; Scannapieco, Dario,; Scholes, Louise,; Shivdasani, Anil,; Simons, Tomas,; Stendevad, Carsten,; Stulz, René M.,; Wright, Mike,; Wyman, Ann,; Zingales, Luigi,
• HerausgeberIn: Chew, Donald,; Gillan, Stuart,
• Place / Publishing House: New York, NY : : Columbia University Press, , [2009]; ©2009
• Year of Publication: 2009
• Language: English
• Series: Columbia Business School Publishing
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (392 p.) :; 34 illus; 23 tables

Effective corporate governance, or the set of controls and incentives that drive top management, originates both outside and inside the firm and assures investors who hope to commit their capital. Essential when buying stocks in one's own country, effective corporate governance is even more important abroad, where information can be less reliable and investor influence (or protection) more limited. In this collection of articles from the Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, more than thirty leading scholars and practitioners discuss the possibilities and limitations of global corporate finance and governance systems, whether in Europe and North America or in the emerging markets of Israel, India, Korea, and South Africa. Essays discuss the political roots of American corporate finance; the structural and financial variations between international corporations; control premiums and the effectiveness of corporate governance systems; debt, folklore, and cross-country differences in financial structures; the driving forces behind the East Asian Financial Crisis of 1997; corporate ownership and control in India, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom; financial and economic lessons of Italy's privatization program; changes in Korean corporate governance; sovereign wealth funds; and the new organization of Canadian business trusts. A special roundtable discussion addresses shareholder activism in the U.K.

Table of Contents

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Introduction -- PART I. Governance, Markets, and Law -- 1. The Limits of Financial Globalization -- 2. The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance -- 3. International Corporate Diff erences: Markets or Law? -- 4. Explaining Differences in the Quality of Governance among Companies -- Part II: Cross- Country Evidence on Governance Effectiveness and the Cost of Capital -- 5. Control Premiums and the Effectiveness of Corporate Governance Systems -- 6. Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital -- 7. Which Capitalism? -- Part III: Country- Specific Evidence on Ownership and Governance Structure -- 8. Corporate Governance in India -- 9. The Financial and Economic Lessons of Italy's Privatization Program -- 10. Changes in Korean Corporate Governance: A Response to Crisis -- 11. The Ownership Structure, Governance, and Performance of French Companies -- 12. Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K., Germany, and France -- Part IV: The Role of Active Investors -- 13. London Business School Roundtable on Shareholder Activism in the U.K. -- 14. Leveraged Buyouts in the U.K. and Continental Europe -- 15. Sovereign Wealth Funds -- About the Contributors -- Index