A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
:
Place / Publishing House:Milton : : Taylor & Francis Group,, 2021.
Ã2021.
Year of Publication:2021
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (208 pages)
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Table of Contents:
  • Cover
  • Half Title
  • Series Page
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Table of Contents
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgements
  • Chapter 1: Introduction
  • 1.1 The Aims of This Book
  • 1.2 The Outline of the Book
  • 1.3 Causation, Metaphysics, and Our Understanding of the Natural World
  • 1.4 Causation Is Only One of Many Forms of Natural Determination
  • 1.5 Standard Approaches to Causation
  • 1.6 Powers-Based Approaches
  • 1.7 The Challenge from Modern Science
  • 1.8 The Empiricist Bias
  • 1.9 About the Method of My Project
  • Chapter 2: Powers-Based vs. neo-Humean Approaches
  • 2.1 Explaining vs. Characterising Causation
  • 2.2 Powers-Based and Neo-Humean Accounts Compatible on the Level of Characterisation
  • 2.3 Hume's Discussion of Causation
  • 2.4 The Tools of the Dominant Strategies
  • 2.5 Does It Really Matter?
  • Chapter 3: Causal Realism
  • 3.1 Powers-Based Accounts
  • 3.2 Salmon: Causal Production as Interaction Between Causal Processes
  • 3.3 The Transmission Account of Causation
  • 3.4 Ned Hall on the Generative Conception of Causation
  • 3.5 Stuart Glennan: The Mechanistic Account of Causal Production
  • 3.6 Causation as a Continuous Process of Production
  • 3.7 The Standard View
  • 3.8 Action or Influence in the Standard View
  • 3.9 Two Types of Empiricism
  • 3.10 A Return to the Empiricist Reduction of Causes
  • Chapter 4: Causal Production
  • 4.1 The Standard View: A Reminder
  • 4.2 A Fundamental Flaw in the Standard View
  • 4.3 Colloquial Language vs. Science: 'Action', 'Reaction', and 'Interaction'
  • 4.4 Reciprocity of Interactions
  • 4.5 Bunge's Rejection of Interaction as the Basis of Causation
  • 4.6 Interaction Involves Production
  • 4.7 Unidirectionality Due to Agency Bias
  • 4.8 Interactions Are Causally Fundamental
  • 4.9 Necessary Connections
  • 4.10 Production Requires Endurance and an A View of Time.
  • 4.11 Simultaneous Causation
  • 4.12 Causation a Form of One-Sided Existential Dependence
  • 4.13 The Asymmetry of Causation
  • 4.14 Conclusion
  • Chapter 5: Causal Necessity
  • 5.1 Causal Necessity as Logical Necessity
  • 5.2 The Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance
  • 5.3 The Problem of Interference and Prevention
  • 5.4 The Standard View Response
  • 5.5 Interference and Prevention in Powers-Based Causation
  • 5.6 Causal Necessity Without Ceteris Paribus Clause
  • 5.7 Conclusion
  • Chapter 6: Constitution and Persistence
  • 6.1 The Incompatibility of Causation, Constitution, and Persistence
  • 6.2 Characterisations
  • 6.3 A Causal Account of Constitution and Persistence
  • 6.4 Problems?
  • 6.5 Concluding Remarks
  • Chapter 7: Substance and Process
  • 7.1 Substance Ontology
  • 7.2 The Paradigm of Substance Ontology
  • 7.3 Aristotelian Substance Ontology
  • 7.4 Process Ontology
  • 7.5 The Problem of Process Ontology
  • 7.6 A World of Processes/Substances
  • Chapter 8: Powers
  • 8.1 Preliminary Remarks About My Treatment of Powers
  • 8.2 Different Views of Powers
  • 8.3 Are Qualities Observable?
  • 8.4 A Priori Reason for Qualities Being Fundamental
  • 8.5 Hume's Separation of Quality and Causal Role
  • 8.6 The Powerful Qualities View Implicit in the Scientific Image
  • 8.7 Locke's Powerful Qualities View
  • 8.8 Properties and Conditionals
  • 8.9 The Determinate Nature of Unmanifesting Powers
  • 8.10 Active and Passive Powers
  • 8.11 The Problem of Fit
  • 8.12 What Is Doing the Work: Powers or Particulars?
  • 8.13 Concluding Remark
  • Chapter 9: A Critique of Counterfactual Theories of Causation
  • 9.1 The Appeal of CTCs
  • 9.2 Counterfactuals Explain Causation vs. Causation Explains Counterfactuals?
  • 9.3 The Ordinary Concepts of Cause and Counterfactual Dependence
  • 9.4 Possible Worlds: Truth-Conditions or Truthmakers?.
  • 9.5 Possible Worlds as Truthmakers: Concrete or Abstract?
  • 9.6 Neo-Humean Metaphysics and CTCs
  • 9.7 Comparative Similarity and Supervenience
  • 9.8 Conclusion
  • Chapter 10: The Contrast to Alternative Views
  • 10.1 The Neo-Humean Contrast
  • 10.2 The Causal Objectivist Contrast
  • 10.3 The Contrast to the Standard View
  • 10.4 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts I: Relational Realism
  • 10.5 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts II: Process Realism
  • 10.6 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts III: Structural Accounts
  • 10.7 Contrast to 20th-Century Friends of Powers
  • 10.8 Concluding Remark
  • Bibliography
  • Index.