A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.

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Superior document:Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
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Place / Publishing House:Milton : : Taylor & Francis Group,, 2021.
Ã2021.
Year of Publication:2021
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
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Physical Description:1 online resource (208 pages)
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id 5007245001
ctrlnum (MiAaPQ)5007245001
(Au-PeEL)EBL7245001
(OCoLC)1378935608
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spelling Ingthorsson, R. D.
A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
1st ed.
Milton : Taylor & Francis Group, 2021.
Ã2021.
1 online resource (208 pages)
text txt rdacontent
computer c rdamedia
online resource cr rdacarrier
Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Aims of This Book -- 1.2 The Outline of the Book -- 1.3 Causation, Metaphysics, and Our Understanding of the Natural World -- 1.4 Causation Is Only One of Many Forms of Natural Determination -- 1.5 Standard Approaches to Causation -- 1.6 Powers-Based Approaches -- 1.7 The Challenge from Modern Science -- 1.8 The Empiricist Bias -- 1.9 About the Method of My Project -- Chapter 2: Powers-Based vs. neo-Humean Approaches -- 2.1 Explaining vs. Characterising Causation -- 2.2 Powers-Based and Neo-Humean Accounts Compatible on the Level of Characterisation -- 2.3 Hume's Discussion of Causation -- 2.4 The Tools of the Dominant Strategies -- 2.5 Does It Really Matter? -- Chapter 3: Causal Realism -- 3.1 Powers-Based Accounts -- 3.2 Salmon: Causal Production as Interaction Between Causal Processes -- 3.3 The Transmission Account of Causation -- 3.4 Ned Hall on the Generative Conception of Causation -- 3.5 Stuart Glennan: The Mechanistic Account of Causal Production -- 3.6 Causation as a Continuous Process of Production -- 3.7 The Standard View -- 3.8 Action or Influence in the Standard View -- 3.9 Two Types of Empiricism -- 3.10 A Return to the Empiricist Reduction of Causes -- Chapter 4: Causal Production -- 4.1 The Standard View: A Reminder -- 4.2 A Fundamental Flaw in the Standard View -- 4.3 Colloquial Language vs. Science: 'Action', 'Reaction', and 'Interaction' -- 4.4 Reciprocity of Interactions -- 4.5 Bunge's Rejection of Interaction as the Basis of Causation -- 4.6 Interaction Involves Production -- 4.7 Unidirectionality Due to Agency Bias -- 4.8 Interactions Are Causally Fundamental -- 4.9 Necessary Connections -- 4.10 Production Requires Endurance and an A View of Time.
4.11 Simultaneous Causation -- 4.12 Causation a Form of One-Sided Existential Dependence -- 4.13 The Asymmetry of Causation -- 4.14 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Causal Necessity -- 5.1 Causal Necessity as Logical Necessity -- 5.2 The Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance -- 5.3 The Problem of Interference and Prevention -- 5.4 The Standard View Response -- 5.5 Interference and Prevention in Powers-Based Causation -- 5.6 Causal Necessity Without Ceteris Paribus Clause -- 5.7 Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Constitution and Persistence -- 6.1 The Incompatibility of Causation, Constitution, and Persistence -- 6.2 Characterisations -- 6.3 A Causal Account of Constitution and Persistence -- 6.4 Problems? -- 6.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 7: Substance and Process -- 7.1 Substance Ontology -- 7.2 The Paradigm of Substance Ontology -- 7.3 Aristotelian Substance Ontology -- 7.4 Process Ontology -- 7.5 The Problem of Process Ontology -- 7.6 A World of Processes/Substances -- Chapter 8: Powers -- 8.1 Preliminary Remarks About My Treatment of Powers -- 8.2 Different Views of Powers -- 8.3 Are Qualities Observable? -- 8.4 A Priori Reason for Qualities Being Fundamental -- 8.5 Hume's Separation of Quality and Causal Role -- 8.6 The Powerful Qualities View Implicit in the Scientific Image -- 8.7 Locke's Powerful Qualities View -- 8.8 Properties and Conditionals -- 8.9 The Determinate Nature of Unmanifesting Powers -- 8.10 Active and Passive Powers -- 8.11 The Problem of Fit -- 8.12 What Is Doing the Work: Powers or Particulars? -- 8.13 Concluding Remark -- Chapter 9: A Critique of Counterfactual Theories of Causation -- 9.1 The Appeal of CTCs -- 9.2 Counterfactuals Explain Causation vs. Causation Explains Counterfactuals? -- 9.3 The Ordinary Concepts of Cause and Counterfactual Dependence -- 9.4 Possible Worlds: Truth-Conditions or Truthmakers?.
9.5 Possible Worlds as Truthmakers: Concrete or Abstract? -- 9.6 Neo-Humean Metaphysics and CTCs -- 9.7 Comparative Similarity and Supervenience -- 9.8 Conclusion -- Chapter 10: The Contrast to Alternative Views -- 10.1 The Neo-Humean Contrast -- 10.2 The Causal Objectivist Contrast -- 10.3 The Contrast to the Standard View -- 10.4 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts I: Relational Realism -- 10.5 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts II: Process Realism -- 10.6 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts III: Structural Accounts -- 10.7 Contrast to 20th-Century Friends of Powers -- 10.8 Concluding Remark -- Bibliography -- Index.
Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.
Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries.
Electronic books.
Print version: Ingthorsson, R. D. A Powerful Particulars View of Causation Milton : Taylor & Francis Group,c2021 9780367486297
ProQuest (Firm)
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=7245001 Click to View
language English
format eBook
author Ingthorsson, R. D.
spellingShingle Ingthorsson, R. D.
A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Aims of This Book -- 1.2 The Outline of the Book -- 1.3 Causation, Metaphysics, and Our Understanding of the Natural World -- 1.4 Causation Is Only One of Many Forms of Natural Determination -- 1.5 Standard Approaches to Causation -- 1.6 Powers-Based Approaches -- 1.7 The Challenge from Modern Science -- 1.8 The Empiricist Bias -- 1.9 About the Method of My Project -- Chapter 2: Powers-Based vs. neo-Humean Approaches -- 2.1 Explaining vs. Characterising Causation -- 2.2 Powers-Based and Neo-Humean Accounts Compatible on the Level of Characterisation -- 2.3 Hume's Discussion of Causation -- 2.4 The Tools of the Dominant Strategies -- 2.5 Does It Really Matter? -- Chapter 3: Causal Realism -- 3.1 Powers-Based Accounts -- 3.2 Salmon: Causal Production as Interaction Between Causal Processes -- 3.3 The Transmission Account of Causation -- 3.4 Ned Hall on the Generative Conception of Causation -- 3.5 Stuart Glennan: The Mechanistic Account of Causal Production -- 3.6 Causation as a Continuous Process of Production -- 3.7 The Standard View -- 3.8 Action or Influence in the Standard View -- 3.9 Two Types of Empiricism -- 3.10 A Return to the Empiricist Reduction of Causes -- Chapter 4: Causal Production -- 4.1 The Standard View: A Reminder -- 4.2 A Fundamental Flaw in the Standard View -- 4.3 Colloquial Language vs. Science: 'Action', 'Reaction', and 'Interaction' -- 4.4 Reciprocity of Interactions -- 4.5 Bunge's Rejection of Interaction as the Basis of Causation -- 4.6 Interaction Involves Production -- 4.7 Unidirectionality Due to Agency Bias -- 4.8 Interactions Are Causally Fundamental -- 4.9 Necessary Connections -- 4.10 Production Requires Endurance and an A View of Time.
4.11 Simultaneous Causation -- 4.12 Causation a Form of One-Sided Existential Dependence -- 4.13 The Asymmetry of Causation -- 4.14 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Causal Necessity -- 5.1 Causal Necessity as Logical Necessity -- 5.2 The Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance -- 5.3 The Problem of Interference and Prevention -- 5.4 The Standard View Response -- 5.5 Interference and Prevention in Powers-Based Causation -- 5.6 Causal Necessity Without Ceteris Paribus Clause -- 5.7 Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Constitution and Persistence -- 6.1 The Incompatibility of Causation, Constitution, and Persistence -- 6.2 Characterisations -- 6.3 A Causal Account of Constitution and Persistence -- 6.4 Problems? -- 6.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 7: Substance and Process -- 7.1 Substance Ontology -- 7.2 The Paradigm of Substance Ontology -- 7.3 Aristotelian Substance Ontology -- 7.4 Process Ontology -- 7.5 The Problem of Process Ontology -- 7.6 A World of Processes/Substances -- Chapter 8: Powers -- 8.1 Preliminary Remarks About My Treatment of Powers -- 8.2 Different Views of Powers -- 8.3 Are Qualities Observable? -- 8.4 A Priori Reason for Qualities Being Fundamental -- 8.5 Hume's Separation of Quality and Causal Role -- 8.6 The Powerful Qualities View Implicit in the Scientific Image -- 8.7 Locke's Powerful Qualities View -- 8.8 Properties and Conditionals -- 8.9 The Determinate Nature of Unmanifesting Powers -- 8.10 Active and Passive Powers -- 8.11 The Problem of Fit -- 8.12 What Is Doing the Work: Powers or Particulars? -- 8.13 Concluding Remark -- Chapter 9: A Critique of Counterfactual Theories of Causation -- 9.1 The Appeal of CTCs -- 9.2 Counterfactuals Explain Causation vs. Causation Explains Counterfactuals? -- 9.3 The Ordinary Concepts of Cause and Counterfactual Dependence -- 9.4 Possible Worlds: Truth-Conditions or Truthmakers?.
9.5 Possible Worlds as Truthmakers: Concrete or Abstract? -- 9.6 Neo-Humean Metaphysics and CTCs -- 9.7 Comparative Similarity and Supervenience -- 9.8 Conclusion -- Chapter 10: The Contrast to Alternative Views -- 10.1 The Neo-Humean Contrast -- 10.2 The Causal Objectivist Contrast -- 10.3 The Contrast to the Standard View -- 10.4 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts I: Relational Realism -- 10.5 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts II: Process Realism -- 10.6 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts III: Structural Accounts -- 10.7 Contrast to 20th-Century Friends of Powers -- 10.8 Concluding Remark -- Bibliography -- Index.
author_facet Ingthorsson, R. D.
author_variant r d i rd rdi
author_sort Ingthorsson, R. D.
title A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
title_full A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
title_fullStr A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
title_full_unstemmed A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
title_auth A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
title_new A Powerful Particulars View of Causation.
title_sort a powerful particulars view of causation.
series Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
series2 Routledge Studies in Metaphysics Series
publisher Taylor & Francis Group,
publishDate 2021
physical 1 online resource (208 pages)
edition 1st ed.
contents Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1: Introduction -- 1.1 The Aims of This Book -- 1.2 The Outline of the Book -- 1.3 Causation, Metaphysics, and Our Understanding of the Natural World -- 1.4 Causation Is Only One of Many Forms of Natural Determination -- 1.5 Standard Approaches to Causation -- 1.6 Powers-Based Approaches -- 1.7 The Challenge from Modern Science -- 1.8 The Empiricist Bias -- 1.9 About the Method of My Project -- Chapter 2: Powers-Based vs. neo-Humean Approaches -- 2.1 Explaining vs. Characterising Causation -- 2.2 Powers-Based and Neo-Humean Accounts Compatible on the Level of Characterisation -- 2.3 Hume's Discussion of Causation -- 2.4 The Tools of the Dominant Strategies -- 2.5 Does It Really Matter? -- Chapter 3: Causal Realism -- 3.1 Powers-Based Accounts -- 3.2 Salmon: Causal Production as Interaction Between Causal Processes -- 3.3 The Transmission Account of Causation -- 3.4 Ned Hall on the Generative Conception of Causation -- 3.5 Stuart Glennan: The Mechanistic Account of Causal Production -- 3.6 Causation as a Continuous Process of Production -- 3.7 The Standard View -- 3.8 Action or Influence in the Standard View -- 3.9 Two Types of Empiricism -- 3.10 A Return to the Empiricist Reduction of Causes -- Chapter 4: Causal Production -- 4.1 The Standard View: A Reminder -- 4.2 A Fundamental Flaw in the Standard View -- 4.3 Colloquial Language vs. Science: 'Action', 'Reaction', and 'Interaction' -- 4.4 Reciprocity of Interactions -- 4.5 Bunge's Rejection of Interaction as the Basis of Causation -- 4.6 Interaction Involves Production -- 4.7 Unidirectionality Due to Agency Bias -- 4.8 Interactions Are Causally Fundamental -- 4.9 Necessary Connections -- 4.10 Production Requires Endurance and an A View of Time.
4.11 Simultaneous Causation -- 4.12 Causation a Form of One-Sided Existential Dependence -- 4.13 The Asymmetry of Causation -- 4.14 Conclusion -- Chapter 5: Causal Necessity -- 5.1 Causal Necessity as Logical Necessity -- 5.2 The Problem of Action at a Temporal Distance -- 5.3 The Problem of Interference and Prevention -- 5.4 The Standard View Response -- 5.5 Interference and Prevention in Powers-Based Causation -- 5.6 Causal Necessity Without Ceteris Paribus Clause -- 5.7 Conclusion -- Chapter 6: Constitution and Persistence -- 6.1 The Incompatibility of Causation, Constitution, and Persistence -- 6.2 Characterisations -- 6.3 A Causal Account of Constitution and Persistence -- 6.4 Problems? -- 6.5 Concluding Remarks -- Chapter 7: Substance and Process -- 7.1 Substance Ontology -- 7.2 The Paradigm of Substance Ontology -- 7.3 Aristotelian Substance Ontology -- 7.4 Process Ontology -- 7.5 The Problem of Process Ontology -- 7.6 A World of Processes/Substances -- Chapter 8: Powers -- 8.1 Preliminary Remarks About My Treatment of Powers -- 8.2 Different Views of Powers -- 8.3 Are Qualities Observable? -- 8.4 A Priori Reason for Qualities Being Fundamental -- 8.5 Hume's Separation of Quality and Causal Role -- 8.6 The Powerful Qualities View Implicit in the Scientific Image -- 8.7 Locke's Powerful Qualities View -- 8.8 Properties and Conditionals -- 8.9 The Determinate Nature of Unmanifesting Powers -- 8.10 Active and Passive Powers -- 8.11 The Problem of Fit -- 8.12 What Is Doing the Work: Powers or Particulars? -- 8.13 Concluding Remark -- Chapter 9: A Critique of Counterfactual Theories of Causation -- 9.1 The Appeal of CTCs -- 9.2 Counterfactuals Explain Causation vs. Causation Explains Counterfactuals? -- 9.3 The Ordinary Concepts of Cause and Counterfactual Dependence -- 9.4 Possible Worlds: Truth-Conditions or Truthmakers?.
9.5 Possible Worlds as Truthmakers: Concrete or Abstract? -- 9.6 Neo-Humean Metaphysics and CTCs -- 9.7 Comparative Similarity and Supervenience -- 9.8 Conclusion -- Chapter 10: The Contrast to Alternative Views -- 10.1 The Neo-Humean Contrast -- 10.2 The Causal Objectivist Contrast -- 10.3 The Contrast to the Standard View -- 10.4 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts I: Relational Realism -- 10.5 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts II: Process Realism -- 10.6 Contrast to Powers-Based Accounts III: Structural Accounts -- 10.7 Contrast to 20th-Century Friends of Powers -- 10.8 Concluding Remark -- Bibliography -- Index.
isbn 9781000361032
9780367486297
genre Electronic books.
genre_facet Electronic books.
url https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=7245001
illustrated Not Illustrated
dewey-hundreds 100 - Philosophy & psychology
dewey-tens 120 - Epistemology
dewey-ones 122 - Causation
dewey-full 122
dewey-sort 3122
dewey-raw 122
dewey-search 122
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