Electronic Voting : : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings.

Electronic Voting : : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings.

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; v.13553
:
Krimmer, Robert.
TeilnehmendeR:
Volkamer, Melanie.
Duenas-Cid, David.
Rønne, Peter.
Germann, Micha.
Place / Publishing House:Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2022.
©2022.
Year of Publication:2022
Edition:1st ed.
Language:English
Series:Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series
Online Access:
Physical Description:1 online resource (197 pages)
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Table of Contents:
  • Intro
  • Preface
  • Organization
  • Contents
  • An Analysis of the Security and Privacy Issues of the Neovote Online Voting System
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints in France
  • 3 Claims and Transparency
  • 4 Code Re-use from Asmcrypto
  • 4.1 General Copy
  • 4.2 RSAES-PKCS
  • 5 Publishing the Tally
  • 6 Vote Verification
  • 6.1 Availability of the Verification Process
  • 6.2 Attacking the Ballot Box
  • 6.3 Deanonymising the Votes
  • 7 Discussion
  • 8 Conclusion
  • References
  • Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Preliminaries
  • 2.1 Notations
  • 2.2 Open Vote Network (OV-Net)
  • 2.3 Denial of Service
  • 3 Parallel OV-Net
  • 4 Parallel OV-Net DoS Resilience
  • 5 Tally-Combining Algorithms
  • 5.1 Comparing Tally-Combining Algorithms
  • 6 Privacy of Parallel OV-Net
  • 6.1 Definitions and Assumptions
  • 6.2 Basic Cases: M=k=1 and M 1, k=1
  • 6.3 General Case
  • 7 Conclusions and Further Research
  • References
  • Review Your Choices: When Confirmation Pages Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Background and Related Work
  • 3 Research Question and Scope
  • 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests
  • 4 Description of Simply Voting's System
  • 4.1 Ballot Casting Process
  • 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process
  • 5 Methodology
  • 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack
  • 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application
  • 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application
  • 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield
  • 6.1 Data Collection
  • 6.2 Data Analysis
  • 7 Additional Experiments
  • 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore
  • 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1
  • 8 Mitigations.
  • 8.1 Client-Side Confirmation Page Generation
  • 8.2 Fixed-Length Responses
  • 8.3 Uniformly Random-Length Padding in Response Header
  • 8.4 Padding from a Gaussian Distribution
  • 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion
  • References
  • Running the Race: A Swiss Voting Story
  • 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 The Swiss Post Protocol
  • 1.2 Outline
  • 2 The Requirements
  • 2.1 Comments on the Requirements
  • 3 The Specification and Proofs
  • 3.1 The Protocol Specification is too Narrow
  • 3.2 The Roles and Channels are Incompletely Aligned with the VEleS
  • 4 The Bugs
  • 4.1 Lack of Authentication: Attack on Individual Verifiability
  • 4.2 Lack of Details in Handling Inconsistencies: Attack on Individual Verifiability
  • 4.3 Lack of ZK Proofs of Correct Key Generation: Attack on Privacy
  • 5 Conclusion
  • References
  • The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on the Administration of Online Voting: Evidence from Ontario, Canada
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Context: Municipal Elections in Canada
  • 2.1 The 2018 Technical Incident
  • 2.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic
  • 3 Literature Review
  • 4 Data and Methods
  • 5 Results
  • 5.1 The 2018 Technical Incident
  • 5.2 Do Effects Differ Across Municipal Types?
  • 5.3 Open Ended Responses and Focus Group Insights
  • 6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts
  • References
  • The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2017)5 on e-voting and Secret Suffrage: Time for yet Another Update?
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 The Council of Europe's Rec(2017)5
  • 2.1 The First Council of Europe's Standards on e-voting
  • 2.2 The Road Towards Updated Rec(2017)5
  • 3 Secret Suffrage in Rec(2017)5
  • 3.1 Secret Suffrage: Section IV
  • 3.2 Beyond Section IV
  • 4 Time for yet Another Update?
  • 4.1 The Need for a Clearer Scope
  • 4.2 The Need for a New Approach
  • 4.3 The Need for an Update?
  • 5 Conclusions
  • References.
  • Sweeter than SUITE: Supermartingale Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Past Work
  • 3 Stratified Audits
  • 3.1 Assorters and Assertions
  • 3.2 Stratified Comparison Audits
  • 3.3 Union-intersection Tests
  • 3.4 Combining Functions
  • 3.5 Intersection Supermartingales
  • 3.6 Within-Stratum P-values
  • 3.7 Sequential Stratum Selection
  • 4 Evaluations
  • 4.1 Combination and Allocation Rules
  • 4.2 Comparison to SUITE
  • 4.3 A Highly Stratified Audit
  • 5 Discussion
  • A Computational details
  • B Data and Code
  • References
  • They May Look and Look, Yet Not See: BMDs Cannot be Tested Adequately
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Prior Work
  • 3 How Much Testing is Enough?
  • 3.1 Threats and Defenses
  • 3.2 Jurisdiction Sizes, Contest Sizes, and Margins
  • 3.3 Voting Transactions
  • 4 Passive Testing
  • 4.1 Targeting Vulnerable Voters
  • 4.2 FUD Attacks on Passive testing
  • 5 LAT and Parallel Testing
  • 5.1 Lower Bounds on the Difficulty of Parallel Testing
  • 5.2 Building a Model of Voter behavior
  • 6 Complications
  • 7 Conclusion
  • References
  • Individual Verifiability with Return Codes: Manipulation Detection Efficacy
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Related Work
  • 3 Background
  • 3.1 Swiss Electronic Voting System
  • 3.2 E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal
  • 4 Improvements to E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal and Descriptive Video
  • 4.1 Improvements to the Voting Material and User Interfaces
  • 4.2 Descriptive Video
  • 5 Methodology
  • 5.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses
  • 5.2 Considered Manipulation-Types
  • 5.3 Study Procedure
  • 5.4 Ethics, Data Protection, Recruitment
  • 6 Results
  • 6.1 Overall Manipulation Detection
  • 6.2 Manipulation Detection for Various Subgroups
  • 6.3 Video Related Statements
  • 7 Discussion
  • 8 Conclusion
  • References
  • Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review
  • 1 Introduction
  • 2 Background
  • 2.1 L&amp.
  • A Testing Goals
  • 2.2 U.S. Elections
  • 2.3 Related Work
  • 3 Methodology
  • 3.1 Data Collection
  • 3.2 Evaluation Criteria
  • 4 Analysis
  • 4.1 Performance by Criterion
  • 4.2 Performance by State
  • 5 Discussion
  • 6 Conclusion
  • A State-by-State Practices
  • References
  • Author Index.

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