Electronic Voting : : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings.
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Superior document: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; v.13553 |
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Place / Publishing House: | Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2022. ©2022. |
Year of Publication: | 2022 |
Edition: | 1st ed. |
Language: | English |
Series: | Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (197 pages) |
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Krimmer, Robert. Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. 1st ed. Cham : Springer International Publishing AG, 2022. ©2022. 1 online resource (197 pages) text txt rdacontent computer c rdamedia online resource cr rdacarrier Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; v.13553 Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- An Analysis of the Security and Privacy Issues of the Neovote Online Voting System -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints in France -- 3 Claims and Transparency -- 4 Code Re-use from Asmcrypto -- 4.1 General Copy -- 4.2 RSAES-PKCS -- 5 Publishing the Tally -- 6 Vote Verification -- 6.1 Availability of the Verification Process -- 6.2 Attacking the Ballot Box -- 6.3 Deanonymising the Votes -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notations -- 2.2 Open Vote Network (OV-Net) -- 2.3 Denial of Service -- 3 Parallel OV-Net -- 4 Parallel OV-Net DoS Resilience -- 5 Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 5.1 Comparing Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 6 Privacy of Parallel OV-Net -- 6.1 Definitions and Assumptions -- 6.2 Basic Cases: M=k=1 and M 1, k=1 -- 6.3 General Case -- 7 Conclusions and Further Research -- References -- Review Your Choices: When Confirmation Pages Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 3 Research Question and Scope -- 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests -- 4 Description of Simply Voting's System -- 4.1 Ballot Casting Process -- 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack -- 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application -- 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application -- 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield -- 6.1 Data Collection -- 6.2 Data Analysis -- 7 Additional Experiments -- 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore -- 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1 -- 8 Mitigations. 8.1 Client-Side Confirmation Page Generation -- 8.2 Fixed-Length Responses -- 8.3 Uniformly Random-Length Padding in Response Header -- 8.4 Padding from a Gaussian Distribution -- 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Running the Race: A Swiss Voting Story -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Swiss Post Protocol -- 1.2 Outline -- 2 The Requirements -- 2.1 Comments on the Requirements -- 3 The Specification and Proofs -- 3.1 The Protocol Specification is too Narrow -- 3.2 The Roles and Channels are Incompletely Aligned with the VEleS -- 4 The Bugs -- 4.1 Lack of Authentication: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.2 Lack of Details in Handling Inconsistencies: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.3 Lack of ZK Proofs of Correct Key Generation: Attack on Privacy -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on the Administration of Online Voting: Evidence from Ontario, Canada -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Context: Municipal Elections in Canada -- 2.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 2.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic -- 3 Literature Review -- 4 Data and Methods -- 5 Results -- 5.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 5.2 Do Effects Differ Across Municipal Types? -- 5.3 Open Ended Responses and Focus Group Insights -- 6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts -- References -- The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2017)5 on e-voting and Secret Suffrage: Time for yet Another Update? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Council of Europe's Rec(2017)5 -- 2.1 The First Council of Europe's Standards on e-voting -- 2.2 The Road Towards Updated Rec(2017)5 -- 3 Secret Suffrage in Rec(2017)5 -- 3.1 Secret Suffrage: Section IV -- 3.2 Beyond Section IV -- 4 Time for yet Another Update? -- 4.1 The Need for a Clearer Scope -- 4.2 The Need for a New Approach -- 4.3 The Need for an Update? -- 5 Conclusions -- References. Sweeter than SUITE: Supermartingale Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Past Work -- 3 Stratified Audits -- 3.1 Assorters and Assertions -- 3.2 Stratified Comparison Audits -- 3.3 Union-intersection Tests -- 3.4 Combining Functions -- 3.5 Intersection Supermartingales -- 3.6 Within-Stratum P-values -- 3.7 Sequential Stratum Selection -- 4 Evaluations -- 4.1 Combination and Allocation Rules -- 4.2 Comparison to SUITE -- 4.3 A Highly Stratified Audit -- 5 Discussion -- A Computational details -- B Data and Code -- References -- They May Look and Look, Yet Not See: BMDs Cannot be Tested Adequately -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Prior Work -- 3 How Much Testing is Enough? -- 3.1 Threats and Defenses -- 3.2 Jurisdiction Sizes, Contest Sizes, and Margins -- 3.3 Voting Transactions -- 4 Passive Testing -- 4.1 Targeting Vulnerable Voters -- 4.2 FUD Attacks on Passive testing -- 5 LAT and Parallel Testing -- 5.1 Lower Bounds on the Difficulty of Parallel Testing -- 5.2 Building a Model of Voter behavior -- 6 Complications -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Individual Verifiability with Return Codes: Manipulation Detection Efficacy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Background -- 3.1 Swiss Electronic Voting System -- 3.2 E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal -- 4 Improvements to E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal and Descriptive Video -- 4.1 Improvements to the Voting Material and User Interfaces -- 4.2 Descriptive Video -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses -- 5.2 Considered Manipulation-Types -- 5.3 Study Procedure -- 5.4 Ethics, Data Protection, Recruitment -- 6 Results -- 6.1 Overall Manipulation Detection -- 6.2 Manipulation Detection for Various Subgroups -- 6.3 Video Related Statements -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 L&. A Testing Goals -- 2.2 U.S. Elections -- 2.3 Related Work -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 Data Collection -- 3.2 Evaluation Criteria -- 4 Analysis -- 4.1 Performance by Criterion -- 4.2 Performance by State -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- A State-by-State Practices -- References -- Author Index. Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources. Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. Electronic books. Volkamer, Melanie. Duenas-Cid, David. Rønne, Peter. Germann, Micha. Print version: Krimmer, Robert Electronic Voting Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2022 9783031159107 ProQuest (Firm) Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=7080214 Click to View |
language |
English |
format |
eBook |
author |
Krimmer, Robert. |
spellingShingle |
Krimmer, Robert. Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- An Analysis of the Security and Privacy Issues of the Neovote Online Voting System -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints in France -- 3 Claims and Transparency -- 4 Code Re-use from Asmcrypto -- 4.1 General Copy -- 4.2 RSAES-PKCS -- 5 Publishing the Tally -- 6 Vote Verification -- 6.1 Availability of the Verification Process -- 6.2 Attacking the Ballot Box -- 6.3 Deanonymising the Votes -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notations -- 2.2 Open Vote Network (OV-Net) -- 2.3 Denial of Service -- 3 Parallel OV-Net -- 4 Parallel OV-Net DoS Resilience -- 5 Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 5.1 Comparing Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 6 Privacy of Parallel OV-Net -- 6.1 Definitions and Assumptions -- 6.2 Basic Cases: M=k=1 and M 1, k=1 -- 6.3 General Case -- 7 Conclusions and Further Research -- References -- Review Your Choices: When Confirmation Pages Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 3 Research Question and Scope -- 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests -- 4 Description of Simply Voting's System -- 4.1 Ballot Casting Process -- 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack -- 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application -- 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application -- 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield -- 6.1 Data Collection -- 6.2 Data Analysis -- 7 Additional Experiments -- 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore -- 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1 -- 8 Mitigations. 8.1 Client-Side Confirmation Page Generation -- 8.2 Fixed-Length Responses -- 8.3 Uniformly Random-Length Padding in Response Header -- 8.4 Padding from a Gaussian Distribution -- 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Running the Race: A Swiss Voting Story -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Swiss Post Protocol -- 1.2 Outline -- 2 The Requirements -- 2.1 Comments on the Requirements -- 3 The Specification and Proofs -- 3.1 The Protocol Specification is too Narrow -- 3.2 The Roles and Channels are Incompletely Aligned with the VEleS -- 4 The Bugs -- 4.1 Lack of Authentication: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.2 Lack of Details in Handling Inconsistencies: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.3 Lack of ZK Proofs of Correct Key Generation: Attack on Privacy -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on the Administration of Online Voting: Evidence from Ontario, Canada -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Context: Municipal Elections in Canada -- 2.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 2.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic -- 3 Literature Review -- 4 Data and Methods -- 5 Results -- 5.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 5.2 Do Effects Differ Across Municipal Types? -- 5.3 Open Ended Responses and Focus Group Insights -- 6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts -- References -- The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2017)5 on e-voting and Secret Suffrage: Time for yet Another Update? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Council of Europe's Rec(2017)5 -- 2.1 The First Council of Europe's Standards on e-voting -- 2.2 The Road Towards Updated Rec(2017)5 -- 3 Secret Suffrage in Rec(2017)5 -- 3.1 Secret Suffrage: Section IV -- 3.2 Beyond Section IV -- 4 Time for yet Another Update? -- 4.1 The Need for a Clearer Scope -- 4.2 The Need for a New Approach -- 4.3 The Need for an Update? -- 5 Conclusions -- References. Sweeter than SUITE: Supermartingale Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Past Work -- 3 Stratified Audits -- 3.1 Assorters and Assertions -- 3.2 Stratified Comparison Audits -- 3.3 Union-intersection Tests -- 3.4 Combining Functions -- 3.5 Intersection Supermartingales -- 3.6 Within-Stratum P-values -- 3.7 Sequential Stratum Selection -- 4 Evaluations -- 4.1 Combination and Allocation Rules -- 4.2 Comparison to SUITE -- 4.3 A Highly Stratified Audit -- 5 Discussion -- A Computational details -- B Data and Code -- References -- They May Look and Look, Yet Not See: BMDs Cannot be Tested Adequately -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Prior Work -- 3 How Much Testing is Enough? -- 3.1 Threats and Defenses -- 3.2 Jurisdiction Sizes, Contest Sizes, and Margins -- 3.3 Voting Transactions -- 4 Passive Testing -- 4.1 Targeting Vulnerable Voters -- 4.2 FUD Attacks on Passive testing -- 5 LAT and Parallel Testing -- 5.1 Lower Bounds on the Difficulty of Parallel Testing -- 5.2 Building a Model of Voter behavior -- 6 Complications -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Individual Verifiability with Return Codes: Manipulation Detection Efficacy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Background -- 3.1 Swiss Electronic Voting System -- 3.2 E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal -- 4 Improvements to E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal and Descriptive Video -- 4.1 Improvements to the Voting Material and User Interfaces -- 4.2 Descriptive Video -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses -- 5.2 Considered Manipulation-Types -- 5.3 Study Procedure -- 5.4 Ethics, Data Protection, Recruitment -- 6 Results -- 6.1 Overall Manipulation Detection -- 6.2 Manipulation Detection for Various Subgroups -- 6.3 Video Related Statements -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 L&. A Testing Goals -- 2.2 U.S. Elections -- 2.3 Related Work -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 Data Collection -- 3.2 Evaluation Criteria -- 4 Analysis -- 4.1 Performance by Criterion -- 4.2 Performance by State -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- A State-by-State Practices -- References -- Author Index. |
author_facet |
Krimmer, Robert. Volkamer, Melanie. Duenas-Cid, David. Rønne, Peter. Germann, Micha. |
author_variant |
r k rk |
author2 |
Volkamer, Melanie. Duenas-Cid, David. Rønne, Peter. Germann, Micha. |
author2_variant |
m v mv d d c ddc p r pr m g mg |
author2_role |
TeilnehmendeR TeilnehmendeR TeilnehmendeR TeilnehmendeR |
author_sort |
Krimmer, Robert. |
title |
Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. |
title_sub |
7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. |
title_full |
Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. |
title_fullStr |
Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. |
title_full_unstemmed |
Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. |
title_auth |
Electronic Voting : 7th International Joint Conference, e-Vote-ID 2022, Bregenz, Austria, October 4-7, 2022, Proceedings. |
title_new |
Electronic Voting : |
title_sort |
electronic voting : 7th international joint conference, e-vote-id 2022, bregenz, austria, october 4-7, 2022, proceedings. |
series |
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; |
series2 |
Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series ; |
publisher |
Springer International Publishing AG, |
publishDate |
2022 |
physical |
1 online resource (197 pages) |
edition |
1st ed. |
contents |
Intro -- Preface -- Organization -- Contents -- An Analysis of the Security and Privacy Issues of the Neovote Online Voting System -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Legal and Regulatory Constraints in France -- 3 Claims and Transparency -- 4 Code Re-use from Asmcrypto -- 4.1 General Copy -- 4.2 RSAES-PKCS -- 5 Publishing the Tally -- 6 Vote Verification -- 6.1 Availability of the Verification Process -- 6.2 Attacking the Ballot Box -- 6.3 Deanonymising the Votes -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Time, Privacy, Robustness, Accuracy: Trade-Offs for the Open Vote Network Protocol -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Preliminaries -- 2.1 Notations -- 2.2 Open Vote Network (OV-Net) -- 2.3 Denial of Service -- 3 Parallel OV-Net -- 4 Parallel OV-Net DoS Resilience -- 5 Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 5.1 Comparing Tally-Combining Algorithms -- 6 Privacy of Parallel OV-Net -- 6.1 Definitions and Assumptions -- 6.2 Basic Cases: M=k=1 and M 1, k=1 -- 6.3 General Case -- 7 Conclusions and Further Research -- References -- Review Your Choices: When Confirmation Pages Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 3 Research Question and Scope -- 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests -- 4 Description of Simply Voting's System -- 4.1 Ballot Casting Process -- 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack -- 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application -- 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application -- 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield -- 6.1 Data Collection -- 6.2 Data Analysis -- 7 Additional Experiments -- 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore -- 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1 -- 8 Mitigations. 8.1 Client-Side Confirmation Page Generation -- 8.2 Fixed-Length Responses -- 8.3 Uniformly Random-Length Padding in Response Header -- 8.4 Padding from a Gaussian Distribution -- 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Running the Race: A Swiss Voting Story -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Swiss Post Protocol -- 1.2 Outline -- 2 The Requirements -- 2.1 Comments on the Requirements -- 3 The Specification and Proofs -- 3.1 The Protocol Specification is too Narrow -- 3.2 The Roles and Channels are Incompletely Aligned with the VEleS -- 4 The Bugs -- 4.1 Lack of Authentication: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.2 Lack of Details in Handling Inconsistencies: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.3 Lack of ZK Proofs of Correct Key Generation: Attack on Privacy -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on the Administration of Online Voting: Evidence from Ontario, Canada -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Context: Municipal Elections in Canada -- 2.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 2.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic -- 3 Literature Review -- 4 Data and Methods -- 5 Results -- 5.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 5.2 Do Effects Differ Across Municipal Types? -- 5.3 Open Ended Responses and Focus Group Insights -- 6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts -- References -- The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2017)5 on e-voting and Secret Suffrage: Time for yet Another Update? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Council of Europe's Rec(2017)5 -- 2.1 The First Council of Europe's Standards on e-voting -- 2.2 The Road Towards Updated Rec(2017)5 -- 3 Secret Suffrage in Rec(2017)5 -- 3.1 Secret Suffrage: Section IV -- 3.2 Beyond Section IV -- 4 Time for yet Another Update? -- 4.1 The Need for a Clearer Scope -- 4.2 The Need for a New Approach -- 4.3 The Need for an Update? -- 5 Conclusions -- References. Sweeter than SUITE: Supermartingale Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Past Work -- 3 Stratified Audits -- 3.1 Assorters and Assertions -- 3.2 Stratified Comparison Audits -- 3.3 Union-intersection Tests -- 3.4 Combining Functions -- 3.5 Intersection Supermartingales -- 3.6 Within-Stratum P-values -- 3.7 Sequential Stratum Selection -- 4 Evaluations -- 4.1 Combination and Allocation Rules -- 4.2 Comparison to SUITE -- 4.3 A Highly Stratified Audit -- 5 Discussion -- A Computational details -- B Data and Code -- References -- They May Look and Look, Yet Not See: BMDs Cannot be Tested Adequately -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Prior Work -- 3 How Much Testing is Enough? -- 3.1 Threats and Defenses -- 3.2 Jurisdiction Sizes, Contest Sizes, and Margins -- 3.3 Voting Transactions -- 4 Passive Testing -- 4.1 Targeting Vulnerable Voters -- 4.2 FUD Attacks on Passive testing -- 5 LAT and Parallel Testing -- 5.1 Lower Bounds on the Difficulty of Parallel Testing -- 5.2 Building a Model of Voter behavior -- 6 Complications -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Individual Verifiability with Return Codes: Manipulation Detection Efficacy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Background -- 3.1 Swiss Electronic Voting System -- 3.2 E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal -- 4 Improvements to E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal and Descriptive Video -- 4.1 Improvements to the Voting Material and User Interfaces -- 4.2 Descriptive Video -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses -- 5.2 Considered Manipulation-Types -- 5.3 Study Procedure -- 5.4 Ethics, Data Protection, Recruitment -- 6 Results -- 6.1 Overall Manipulation Detection -- 6.2 Manipulation Detection for Various Subgroups -- 6.3 Video Related Statements -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 L&. A Testing Goals -- 2.2 U.S. Elections -- 2.3 Related Work -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 Data Collection -- 3.2 Evaluation Criteria -- 4 Analysis -- 4.1 Performance by Criterion -- 4.2 Performance by State -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- A State-by-State Practices -- References -- Author Index. |
isbn |
9783031159114 9783031159107 |
callnumber-first |
Q - Science |
callnumber-subject |
QA - Mathematics |
callnumber-label |
QA268 |
callnumber-sort |
QA 3268 |
genre |
Electronic books. |
genre_facet |
Electronic books. |
url |
https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=7080214 |
illustrated |
Not Illustrated |
dewey-hundreds |
300 - Social sciences |
dewey-tens |
320 - Political science |
dewey-ones |
324 - The political process |
dewey-full |
324.65 |
dewey-sort |
3324.65 |
dewey-raw |
324.65 |
dewey-search |
324.65 |
oclc_num |
1344426097 |
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Break Ballot Secrecy in Online Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background and Related Work -- 3 Research Question and Scope -- 3.1 Vendor Demo Access Requests -- 4 Description of Simply Voting's System -- 4.1 Ballot Casting Process -- 4.2 Potential Side-channel Attacks in the Ballot Casting Process -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Testing a Length-Based Side-channel Attack -- 5.2 Technical Implementation of the Client Application -- 5.3 Technical Implementation of the Server Application -- 6 Experiment 1 (Single Contest): Township of Selwyn, Ward Lakefield -- 6.1 Data Collection -- 6.2 Data Analysis -- 7 Additional Experiments -- 7.1 Experiment 2 (Two Contests): Township of Selwyn, Ward Ennismore -- 7.2 Experiment 3 (Three Contests): Town of Ajax, Ward 1 -- 8 Mitigations.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">8.1 Client-Side Confirmation Page Generation -- 8.2 Fixed-Length Responses -- 8.3 Uniformly Random-Length Padding in Response Header -- 8.4 Padding from a Gaussian Distribution -- 8.5 Discussion and Conclusion -- References -- Running the Race: A Swiss Voting Story -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 The Swiss Post Protocol -- 1.2 Outline -- 2 The Requirements -- 2.1 Comments on the Requirements -- 3 The Specification and Proofs -- 3.1 The Protocol Specification is too Narrow -- 3.2 The Roles and Channels are Incompletely Aligned with the VEleS -- 4 The Bugs -- 4.1 Lack of Authentication: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.2 Lack of Details in Handling Inconsistencies: Attack on Individual Verifiability -- 4.3 Lack of ZK Proofs of Correct Key Generation: Attack on Privacy -- 5 Conclusion -- References -- The Effect of Exogenous Shocks on the Administration of Online Voting: Evidence from Ontario, Canada -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Context: Municipal Elections in Canada -- 2.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 2.2 The COVID-19 Pandemic -- 3 Literature Review -- 4 Data and Methods -- 5 Results -- 5.1 The 2018 Technical Incident -- 5.2 Do Effects Differ Across Municipal Types? -- 5.3 Open Ended Responses and Focus Group Insights -- 6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts -- References -- The Council of Europe's CM/Rec(2017)5 on e-voting and Secret Suffrage: Time for yet Another Update? -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Council of Europe's Rec(2017)5 -- 2.1 The First Council of Europe's Standards on e-voting -- 2.2 The Road Towards Updated Rec(2017)5 -- 3 Secret Suffrage in Rec(2017)5 -- 3.1 Secret Suffrage: Section IV -- 3.2 Beyond Section IV -- 4 Time for yet Another Update? -- 4.1 The Need for a Clearer Scope -- 4.2 The Need for a New Approach -- 4.3 The Need for an Update? -- 5 Conclusions -- References.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Sweeter than SUITE: Supermartingale Stratified Union-Intersection Tests of Elections -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Past Work -- 3 Stratified Audits -- 3.1 Assorters and Assertions -- 3.2 Stratified Comparison Audits -- 3.3 Union-intersection Tests -- 3.4 Combining Functions -- 3.5 Intersection Supermartingales -- 3.6 Within-Stratum P-values -- 3.7 Sequential Stratum Selection -- 4 Evaluations -- 4.1 Combination and Allocation Rules -- 4.2 Comparison to SUITE -- 4.3 A Highly Stratified Audit -- 5 Discussion -- A Computational details -- B Data and Code -- References -- They May Look and Look, Yet Not See: BMDs Cannot be Tested Adequately -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Prior Work -- 3 How Much Testing is Enough? -- 3.1 Threats and Defenses -- 3.2 Jurisdiction Sizes, Contest Sizes, and Margins -- 3.3 Voting Transactions -- 4 Passive Testing -- 4.1 Targeting Vulnerable Voters -- 4.2 FUD Attacks on Passive testing -- 5 LAT and Parallel Testing -- 5.1 Lower Bounds on the Difficulty of Parallel Testing -- 5.2 Building a Model of Voter behavior -- 6 Complications -- 7 Conclusion -- References -- Individual Verifiability with Return Codes: Manipulation Detection Efficacy -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Related Work -- 3 Background -- 3.1 Swiss Electronic Voting System -- 3.2 E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal -- 4 Improvements to E-Vote-ID-2021-Proposal and Descriptive Video -- 4.1 Improvements to the Voting Material and User Interfaces -- 4.2 Descriptive Video -- 5 Methodology -- 5.1 Research Questions, Hypotheses -- 5.2 Considered Manipulation-Types -- 5.3 Study Procedure -- 5.4 Ethics, Data Protection, Recruitment -- 6 Results -- 6.1 Overall Manipulation Detection -- 6.2 Manipulation Detection for Various Subgroups -- 6.3 Video Related Statements -- 7 Discussion -- 8 Conclusion -- References -- Logic and Accuracy Testing: A Fifty-State Review -- 1 Introduction -- 2 Background -- 2.1 L&amp.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="505" ind1="8" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">A Testing Goals -- 2.2 U.S. Elections -- 2.3 Related Work -- 3 Methodology -- 3.1 Data Collection -- 3.2 Evaluation Criteria -- 4 Analysis -- 4.1 Performance by Criterion -- 4.2 Performance by State -- 5 Discussion -- 6 Conclusion -- A State-by-State Practices -- References -- Author Index.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="588" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="590" ind1=" " ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, 2024. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries. </subfield></datafield><datafield tag="655" ind1=" " ind2="4"><subfield code="a">Electronic books.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Volkamer, Melanie.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Duenas-Cid, David.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Rønne, Peter.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="700" ind1="1" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">Germann, Micha.</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="776" ind1="0" ind2="8"><subfield code="i">Print version:</subfield><subfield code="a">Krimmer, Robert</subfield><subfield code="t">Electronic Voting</subfield><subfield code="d">Cham : Springer International Publishing AG,c2022</subfield><subfield code="z">9783031159107</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="797" ind1="2" ind2=" "><subfield code="a">ProQuest (Firm)</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="830" ind1=" " ind2="0"><subfield code="a">Lecture Notes in Computer Science Series</subfield></datafield><datafield tag="856" ind1="4" ind2="0"><subfield code="u">https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=7080214</subfield><subfield code="z">Click to View</subfield></datafield></record></collection> |