Table of Contents: Covid-19 and Capitalism :

Covid-19 and Capitalism : : Success and Failure of the Legal Methods for Dealing with a Pandemic.

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Bibliographic Details
Superior document:	Economic and Financial Law and Policy - Shifting Insights and Values Series ; v.7
:	Byttebier, Koen.
Place / Publishing House:	Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2022. ©2022.
Year of Publication:	2022
Edition:	1st ed.
Language:	English
Series:	Economic and Financial Law and Policy - Shifting Insights and Values Series
Online Access:	https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/oeawat/detail.action?docID=6961413
Physical Description:	1 online resource (1109 pages)
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Table of Contents:

Covid-19 and Capitalism
Preface
Legal Disclaimer
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Origin and Causes of Covid-19
1.1 Origin of Covid-19
1.1.1 The Covid-19 Epidemic: A Basic Chronology
1.1.2 Nature of Covid-19
1.1.3 Plausible Causes of the Covid-19 Outbreak
1.2 How Capitalism (Ab)uses the Earth and Its Resources
1.3 Further Impact of Globalization
1.4 Capitalist Exploitation Methods as an Obvious Recipe for a Pandemic
References
Chapter 2: Initial (State) Response to Covid-19
2.1 The Neoliberal State as the Socio-Economic Background Against Which Covid-19 Hit the World
2.1.1 Neoliberal Diminishment of the Welfare State Model vs the Ideal Neoliberal State Model
2.1.2 Underlying Neoliberal Doctrines
2.1.3 Possible National Accents
2.1.4 Some Further Specifics on the US Economic and Public Policy in the Period 2016-2018, with Its Impact on Healthcare
2.1.4.1 Overall Intent of the Public Policy of the Trump Administration in Matters of Socioeconomics
2.1.4.2 Healthcare Reform (Attempts)
2.1.4.3 How Donald Trumpś Health Policy Has Undermined the US-and the Worldś-Ability to Deal with Covid-19
2.2 Other Examples of Neoliberal Ideas and Working Methods Which Have Been Ideal for Helping to Spread Covid-19
2.2.1 General
2.2.2 Capitalist Agricultural Methods
2.2.3 Travelling and Tourism
2.2.3.1 General
2.2.3.2 Arrival of Covid-19 in Europe
2.2.3.3 Arrival of Covid-19 in the United States (via Inbound Travellers from China and Italy)
2.2.3.4 Provisional Conclusions
2.2.4 Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer
2.2.5 The (Abominable) Situation of the Health Care Sector at the Beginning of 2020
2.2.6 The (Abominable) Situation of the Nursing Home Sector in Early 2020
2.2.7 Supremacy of Economic Interests.
2.2.8 Neoliberal Education (as a System of Childcare for Working Parents)
2.2.9 In-Between Conclusion: Neoliberal Public Policy Choices Having Delivered Some of the Main Reasons for the Fast Spread of...
2.3 The EUś Utter Lack of Coordination in Responding Early to the Covid-19 Crisis During February and Early-March 2020
2.4 Covid-19 Response in Some Specific European Countries
2.4.1 First Indications of Trouble (March 2020)
2.4.1.1 An Italian Wakeup Call
2.4.1.2 The Role of Ischgl in the Contamination of the European Continent Revisited
2.4.1.3 Attempts at Classification
2.4.2 Response of European Countries During the First Year of the Covid-19 Pandemic (±March 2020 to ±March 2021)
2.4.2.1 Countries That Have Reacted-More or Less-Decently
2.4.2.1.1 Nordic and Baltic States
2.4.2.1.2 Greece
2.4.2.1.3 Germany
2.4.2.1.4 Austria
2.4.2.2 European Countries That (Initially) Responded (Rather) Poorly
2.4.2.2.1 Sweden
2.4.2.2.2 Czechia
2.4.2.3 European Countries That (Already from the Start) Responded (Rather) Miserably
2.4.2.3.1 Italy
2.4.2.3.2 France
2.4.2.3.3 Spain
2.4.2.3.4 The Netherlands
2.4.2.3.5 The United Kingdom
2.4.2.3.5.1 Failed Attempts of Coping with the Covid-19 Pandemic
2.4.2.3.5.2 Economic Impact During 2020
2.4.2.3.5.2.1 Overall Economic Consequences
2.4.2.3.5.2.2 Estimates About the UK Government Spending
2.4.2.3.5.3 The UK Roadmap Out of Lockdown
2.4.2.3.6 Belgium
2.4.2.3.6.1 Introduction
2.4.2.3.6.2 February 2020: ``Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer ́́(or ``No Need To Be Drama Queens)́́
2.4.2.3.6.3 March 2020: Containment Measures
2.4.2.3.6.4 April 2020: Reopening of the Economy
2.4.2.3.6.5 In-Between Assessment of Belgiumś Handling of the First Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic.
2.4.2.3.6.6 May 2020: Towards the Second Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic
2.4.2.3.6.7 October to November 2020: Belgiumś Second Wave
2.4.2.3.6.8 Early 2021
2.4.2.4 By Comparison (1): The Successful Examples of Taiwan, New Zealand and South Korea
2.4.2.4.1 Taiwan
2.4.2.4.2 New Zealand
2.4.2.4.3 Some Ups and Downs of the Covid-19 Containment Attempts in South Korea
2.4.2.4.4 Lessons from the Approach of Taiwan, New Zealand, and South Korea for Other Countries
2.4.2.5 By Comparison (2): The Failed Example of Brazil
2.4.3 Second Year-and Third Wave-of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the EU and Its Member States
2.4.3.1 When, Despite Several WHO Warnings, the Third Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic Still Hit Europe
2.4.3.2 End-March 2021 Containment Measures
2.4.3.3 Looking for Explanations
2.4.3.3.1 Introduction
2.4.3.3.2 New SARS-CoV-2 Variants
2.4.3.3.3 The EU Vaccination Disaster
2.4.3.3.4 Covid-19 Pandemic Fatigue
2.4.3.4 End-April 2021: Relaxing the Covid-19 Lockdown Measures
2.5 Covid-19 Response in the United States
2.5.1 The Early Days
2.5.2 President Donald Trumpś Many Political Shenanigans in (Not) Dealing with the Covid-19 Pandemic
2.5.3 Americaś Withdrawal from the WHO
2.5.4 Practical Handling of the Covid-19 Crisis in the United States by the Trump Administration
2.5.4.1 The Missing First Six Weeks
2.5.4.2 March 2020 to April 2020: On Proclaiming Covid-19 a Hoax, Advising the Use of Hydroxychloroquine, Disinfectant, and UV...
2.5.4.2.1 Overview of the Trump Administrationś Health Policy of March 2020
2.5.4.2.2 The Political Debate on Hydroxychloroquine
2.5.4.3 May 2020 to June 2020: Reopening the Economy, While Facing Rising Figures
2.5.4.4 Summer 2020: New Signs of Trouble
2.5.4.5 August 2020: The Sturgis Motorcycle Rally.
2.5.4.6 September 2020: Some New Insights and Measures
2.5.4.7 October 2020: The US President and First Lady Catch Covid-19
2.5.4.8 New England Journal of Medicine Editorial Interim Evaluation
2.5.4.9 October 2020 to December 2020: Rising Number of Cases and Deaths
2.5.5 Assessment of the Trump Administrationś Policy on Covid-19
2.5.6 Situation in the United States Early-March 2021
2.5.7 The Third Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the United States
2.5.8 Tragedy in the US Prisons
2.6 Conclusions
References
Chapter 3: Monetary Response to and Financial Implications of Covid-19
3.1 Monetary Response to Covid-19 in General
3.2 Monetary Response by the European Monetary Union
3.2.1 General
3.2.1.1 Background of the ECB Monetary Policy from 2008 Until 2020
3.2.1.2 A Legal Discussion
3.2.2 Interest Rate Policy
3.2.3 Deploying Monetary Tools in Response to the Covid-19 Outbreak
3.2.3.1 Refinancing Operations
3.2.3.1.1 General
3.2.3.1.2 Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs)
3.2.3.1.3 Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs)
3.2.3.1.4 Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (PELTROs)
3.2.3.2 Quantitative Easing
3.2.3.2.1 General
3.2.3.2.2 Asset Purchase Programme (APP)
3.2.3.2.3 Use of the APP During the Covid-19 Pandemic
3.2.3.2.4 Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme (PEPP)
3.2.3.3 Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP)
3.2.4 EMU Collateral Framework
3.2.4.1 Origin and Original Scope
3.2.4.2 Adaptation to the EMU Collateral Framework due to Covid-19
3.2.5 Currency Repo and Swap Lines
3.2.6 Evaluation
3.3 United States
3.3.1 General
3.3.2 Interest Rate Policy and Forward Guidance
3.3.3 Measures to Support Financial Markets
3.3.3.1 General
3.3.3.2 Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).
3.3.3.3 Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF)
3.3.3.4 Repo Market Policy
3.3.4 Loans to Banks
3.3.5 Quantitative Easing
3.3.6 Support Measures for Corporations and Businesses
3.3.6.1 Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities
3.3.6.2 Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)
3.3.7 Main Street Lending Program (and Similar Programs)
3.3.8 Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility
3.3.9 Further Support to Households and Consumers
3.3.10 Supporting State and Municipal Borrowing
3.3.11 US Money Markets Policy
3.3.12 Evaluation of the FEDś Covid-19 Policy
3.4 IMF
3.4.1 IMF Policy in General
3.4.2 IMF Monitoring and Coordination
3.4.3 IMFś General Debt Policy
3.4.4 IMF Support Through Loans
3.4.4.1 General
3.4.4.2 (Eased Conditions of Borrowing Under the IMF) Stand-By Arrangement (SBA)
3.4.4.3 (Eased Conditions of Borrowing Under the IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF)
3.4.4.4 Rapid Credit Facility (RCF)
3.4.4.5 Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI)
3.4.4.6 Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL)
3.4.4.7 Extended Credit Facility (ECF)
3.4.4.8 Flexible Credit Line (FCL)
3.4.4.9 Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL)
3.4.4.10 Standby Credit Facility (SCF)
3.4.4.11 Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT)
3.4.4.12 Overview in Some Tables
3.4.5 IMF Surveillance
3.4.5.1 General
3.4.5.2 Country Surveillance
3.4.5.2.1 General Characteristics
3.4.5.2.2 The 2020 Article IV Report with Regard to the United States
3.4.5.3 Regional Surveillance
3.4.5.3.1 General
3.4.5.3.2 The 2020 Article IV Report Concerning the Euro Area
3.4.5.4 Global Surveillance
3.5 Increase of Debt
3.5.1 Introduction
3.5.2 Global Debt in General and Government Debt in Particular
3.5.2.1 Findings of the Institute of International Finance.
3.5.2.2 Findings of Eurostat.

Covid-19 and Capitalism : : Success and Failure of the Legal Methods for Dealing with a Pandemic.

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