Covid-19 and Capitalism : : Success and Failure of the Legal Methods for Dealing with a Pandemic.

• Superior document: Economic and Financial Law and Policy - Shifting Insights and Values Series ; v.7
• Author: Byttebier, Koen.
• Place / Publishing House: Cham : : Springer International Publishing AG,, 2022.; ©2022.
• Year of Publication: 2022
• Edition: 1st ed.
• Language: English
• Series: Economic and Financial Law and Policy - Shifting Insights and Values Series
• Physical Description: 1 online resource (1109 pages)

Table of Contents

Covid-19 and Capitalism -- Preface -- Legal Disclaimer -- Contents -- List of Figures -- List of Tables -- Chapter 1: Origin and Causes of Covid-19 -- 1.1 Origin of Covid-19 -- 1.1.1 The Covid-19 Epidemic: A Basic Chronology -- 1.1.2 Nature of Covid-19 -- 1.1.3 Plausible Causes of the Covid-19 Outbreak -- 1.2 How Capitalism (Ab)uses the Earth and Its Resources -- 1.3 Further Impact of Globalization -- 1.4 Capitalist Exploitation Methods as an Obvious Recipe for a Pandemic -- References -- Chapter 2: Initial (State) Response to Covid-19 -- 2.1 The Neoliberal State as the Socio-Economic Background Against Which Covid-19 Hit the World -- 2.1.1 Neoliberal Diminishment of the Welfare State Model vs the Ideal Neoliberal State Model -- 2.1.2 Underlying Neoliberal Doctrines -- 2.1.3 Possible National Accents -- 2.1.4 Some Further Specifics on the US Economic and Public Policy in the Period 2016-2018, with Its Impact on Healthcare -- 2.1.4.1 Overall Intent of the Public Policy of the Trump Administration in Matters of Socioeconomics -- 2.1.4.2 Healthcare Reform (Attempts) -- 2.1.4.3 How Donald Trumpś Health Policy Has Undermined the US-and the Worldś-Ability to Deal with Covid-19 -- 2.2 Other Examples of Neoliberal Ideas and Working Methods Which Have Been Ideal for Helping to Spread Covid-19 -- 2.2.1 General -- 2.2.2 Capitalist Agricultural Methods -- 2.2.3 Travelling and Tourism -- 2.2.3.1 General -- 2.2.3.2 Arrival of Covid-19 in Europe -- 2.2.3.3 Arrival of Covid-19 in the United States (via Inbound Travellers from China and Italy) -- 2.2.3.4 Provisional Conclusions -- 2.2.4 Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer -- 2.2.5 The (Abominable) Situation of the Health Care Sector at the Beginning of 2020 -- 2.2.6 The (Abominable) Situation of the Nursing Home Sector in Early 2020 -- 2.2.7 Supremacy of Economic Interests.

2.2.8 Neoliberal Education (as a System of Childcare for Working Parents) -- 2.2.9 In-Between Conclusion: Neoliberal Public Policy Choices Having Delivered Some of the Main Reasons for the Fast Spread of... -- 2.3 The EUś Utter Lack of Coordination in Responding Early to the Covid-19 Crisis During February and Early-March 2020 -- 2.4 Covid-19 Response in Some Specific European Countries -- 2.4.1 First Indications of Trouble (March 2020) -- 2.4.1.1 An Italian Wakeup Call -- 2.4.1.2 The Role of Ischgl in the Contamination of the European Continent Revisited -- 2.4.1.3 Attempts at Classification -- 2.4.2 Response of European Countries During the First Year of the Covid-19 Pandemic (±March 2020 to ±March 2021) -- 2.4.2.1 Countries That Have Reacted-More or Less-Decently -- 2.4.2.1.1 Nordic and Baltic States -- 2.4.2.1.2 Greece -- 2.4.2.1.3 Germany -- 2.4.2.1.4 Austria -- 2.4.2.2 European Countries That (Initially) Responded (Rather) Poorly -- 2.4.2.2.1 Sweden -- 2.4.2.2.2 Czechia -- 2.4.2.3 European Countries That (Already from the Start) Responded (Rather) Miserably -- 2.4.2.3.1 Italy -- 2.4.2.3.2 France -- 2.4.2.3.3 Spain -- 2.4.2.3.4 The Netherlands -- 2.4.2.3.5 The United Kingdom -- 2.4.2.3.5.1 Failed Attempts of Coping with the Covid-19 Pandemic -- 2.4.2.3.5.2 Economic Impact During 2020 -- 2.4.2.3.5.2.1 Overall Economic Consequences -- 2.4.2.3.5.2.2 Estimates About the UK Government Spending -- 2.4.2.3.5.3 The UK Roadmap Out of Lockdown -- 2.4.2.3.6 Belgium -- 2.4.2.3.6.1 Introduction -- 2.4.2.3.6.2 February 2020: ``Laissez-Faire, Laissez-Passer ́́(or ``No Need To Be Drama Queens)́́ -- 2.4.2.3.6.3 March 2020: Containment Measures -- 2.4.2.3.6.4 April 2020: Reopening of the Economy -- 2.4.2.3.6.5 In-Between Assessment of Belgiumś Handling of the First Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic.

2.4.2.3.6.6 May 2020: Towards the Second Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic -- 2.4.2.3.6.7 October to November 2020: Belgiumś Second Wave -- 2.4.2.3.6.8 Early 2021 -- 2.4.2.4 By Comparison (1): The Successful Examples of Taiwan, New Zealand and South Korea -- 2.4.2.4.1 Taiwan -- 2.4.2.4.2 New Zealand -- 2.4.2.4.3 Some Ups and Downs of the Covid-19 Containment Attempts in South Korea -- 2.4.2.4.4 Lessons from the Approach of Taiwan, New Zealand, and South Korea for Other Countries -- 2.4.2.5 By Comparison (2): The Failed Example of Brazil -- 2.4.3 Second Year-and Third Wave-of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the EU and Its Member States -- 2.4.3.1 When, Despite Several WHO Warnings, the Third Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic Still Hit Europe -- 2.4.3.2 End-March 2021 Containment Measures -- 2.4.3.3 Looking for Explanations -- 2.4.3.3.1 Introduction -- 2.4.3.3.2 New SARS-CoV-2 Variants -- 2.4.3.3.3 The EU Vaccination Disaster -- 2.4.3.3.4 Covid-19 Pandemic Fatigue -- 2.4.3.4 End-April 2021: Relaxing the Covid-19 Lockdown Measures -- 2.5 Covid-19 Response in the United States -- 2.5.1 The Early Days -- 2.5.2 President Donald Trumpś Many Political Shenanigans in (Not) Dealing with the Covid-19 Pandemic -- 2.5.3 Americaś Withdrawal from the WHO -- 2.5.4 Practical Handling of the Covid-19 Crisis in the United States by the Trump Administration -- 2.5.4.1 The Missing First Six Weeks -- 2.5.4.2 March 2020 to April 2020: On Proclaiming Covid-19 a Hoax, Advising the Use of Hydroxychloroquine, Disinfectant, and UV... -- 2.5.4.2.1 Overview of the Trump Administrationś Health Policy of March 2020 -- 2.5.4.2.2 The Political Debate on Hydroxychloroquine -- 2.5.4.3 May 2020 to June 2020: Reopening the Economy, While Facing Rising Figures -- 2.5.4.4 Summer 2020: New Signs of Trouble -- 2.5.4.5 August 2020: The Sturgis Motorcycle Rally.

2.5.4.6 September 2020: Some New Insights and Measures -- 2.5.4.7 October 2020: The US President and First Lady Catch Covid-19 -- 2.5.4.8 New England Journal of Medicine Editorial Interim Evaluation -- 2.5.4.9 October 2020 to December 2020: Rising Number of Cases and Deaths -- 2.5.5 Assessment of the Trump Administrationś Policy on Covid-19 -- 2.5.6 Situation in the United States Early-March 2021 -- 2.5.7 The Third Wave of the Covid-19 Pandemic in the United States -- 2.5.8 Tragedy in the US Prisons -- 2.6 Conclusions -- References -- Chapter 3: Monetary Response to and Financial Implications of Covid-19 -- 3.1 Monetary Response to Covid-19 in General -- 3.2 Monetary Response by the European Monetary Union -- 3.2.1 General -- 3.2.1.1 Background of the ECB Monetary Policy from 2008 Until 2020 -- 3.2.1.2 A Legal Discussion -- 3.2.2 Interest Rate Policy -- 3.2.3 Deploying Monetary Tools in Response to the Covid-19 Outbreak -- 3.2.3.1 Refinancing Operations -- 3.2.3.1.1 General -- 3.2.3.1.2 Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) -- 3.2.3.1.3 Targeted Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (TLTROs) -- 3.2.3.1.4 Pandemic Emergency Longer-Term Refinancing Operations (PELTROs) -- 3.2.3.2 Quantitative Easing -- 3.2.3.2.1 General -- 3.2.3.2.2 Asset Purchase Programme (APP) -- 3.2.3.2.3 Use of the APP During the Covid-19 Pandemic -- 3.2.3.2.4 Pandemic Emergency Purchasing Programme (PEPP) -- 3.2.3.3 Corporate Sector Purchase Programme (CSPP) -- 3.2.4 EMU Collateral Framework -- 3.2.4.1 Origin and Original Scope -- 3.2.4.2 Adaptation to the EMU Collateral Framework due to Covid-19 -- 3.2.5 Currency Repo and Swap Lines -- 3.2.6 Evaluation -- 3.3 United States -- 3.3.1 General -- 3.3.2 Interest Rate Policy and Forward Guidance -- 3.3.3 Measures to Support Financial Markets -- 3.3.3.1 General -- 3.3.3.2 Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF).

3.3.3.3 Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (MMLF) -- 3.3.3.4 Repo Market Policy -- 3.3.4 Loans to Banks -- 3.3.5 Quantitative Easing -- 3.3.6 Support Measures for Corporations and Businesses -- 3.3.6.1 Primary and Secondary Market Corporate Credit Facilities -- 3.3.6.2 Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF) -- 3.3.7 Main Street Lending Program (and Similar Programs) -- 3.3.8 Paycheck Protection Program Liquidity Facility -- 3.3.9 Further Support to Households and Consumers -- 3.3.10 Supporting State and Municipal Borrowing -- 3.3.11 US Money Markets Policy -- 3.3.12 Evaluation of the FEDś Covid-19 Policy -- 3.4 IMF -- 3.4.1 IMF Policy in General -- 3.4.2 IMF Monitoring and Coordination -- 3.4.3 IMFś General Debt Policy -- 3.4.4 IMF Support Through Loans -- 3.4.4.1 General -- 3.4.4.2 (Eased Conditions of Borrowing Under the IMF) Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) -- 3.4.4.3 (Eased Conditions of Borrowing Under the IMF) Extended Fund Facility (EFF) -- 3.4.4.4 Rapid Credit Facility (RCF) -- 3.4.4.5 Rapid Financing Instrument (RFI) -- 3.4.4.6 Short-Term Liquidity Line (SLL) -- 3.4.4.7 Extended Credit Facility (ECF) -- 3.4.4.8 Flexible Credit Line (FCL) -- 3.4.4.9 Precautionary and Liquidity Line (PLL) -- 3.4.4.10 Standby Credit Facility (SCF) -- 3.4.4.11 Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT) -- 3.4.4.12 Overview in Some Tables -- 3.4.5 IMF Surveillance -- 3.4.5.1 General -- 3.4.5.2 Country Surveillance -- 3.4.5.2.1 General Characteristics -- 3.4.5.2.2 The 2020 Article IV Report with Regard to the United States -- 3.4.5.3 Regional Surveillance -- 3.4.5.3.1 General -- 3.4.5.3.2 The 2020 Article IV Report Concerning the Euro Area -- 3.4.5.4 Global Surveillance -- 3.5 Increase of Debt -- 3.5.1 Introduction -- 3.5.2 Global Debt in General and Government Debt in Particular -- 3.5.2.1 Findings of the Institute of International Finance.

3.5.2.2 Findings of Eurostat.